VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1624/01 2071427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261427Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6385
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
JULY 21, 2006 
 
 
This is CWC-65-06. 
 
¶1. (U) Although generally a quiet week, delegations made up 
for it on Thursday 20 July, holding a WEOG meeting, two 
informal consultations (Budget and Article VII), and one 
small group discussion of the Schedule 3 Transfer draft 
decision language. 
 
------ 
Budget 
------ 
 
¶2. (U) Co-facilitators Walter Lion (Belgium) and Hela Lahmar 
(Tunisia) chaired the opening session of the budget 
negotiations.  First Rick Martin (Head/B&F) made a 
presentation on his methodology and presented an overview 
(faxed back to ISN/CB).  Delegations were requested to make 
general observations.  The response was nearly unanimous: the 
zero nominal growth budget and its presentations are both 
welcome, and a great improvement over years' past.  India 
raised the first dissenting voice, supported by Mexico: it is 
inappropriate to put all the new industry inspections against 
OCPFs, resulting in a greater burden on States party with a 
smaller number of OCPFs.  Rather, the increase should be 
spread across all industry categories to reflect their 
relative risk to the Convention.  In addition to the 
unacceptable increase in OCPF inspections, these delegations 
noted the apparent decrease in ICA funding.  The US, UK, 
Japan, France, and Austria all noted that in terms of 
percentages, the OCPF category had by far the fewest 
inspections and it is appropriate to increase the number of 
OCPF inspections. 
 
¶3. (U) Iran made a long, difficult intervention, protesting 
the duplications in the draft, citing an agreement in 2006 in 
which the Secretariat promised that the next budget would be 
much shorter.  In Iran,s view, the text is too descriptive, 
and brings into the budget debate topics that are still 
contentious in informal consultations (OCPF site selection, 
Article VII, etc).  Japan and France countered that it was 
appropriate to include in a policy document discussion of 
such topics.   Iran also reiterated its position: the core 
objectives and indicators of achievement are only for use in 
a budget context and cannot replace the mandate of the OPCW. 
Iran also noted that in last year,s budget, delegations 
agreed to include disclaimer language indicating that nothing 
in the budget text would supercede Convention mandates.  DDG 
John Freeman noted that the OPCW's mandate comes from the 
Convention, and this also drives the core objectives. 
 
¶4. (U) Finally, the co-facilitators distributed a program of 
work (faxed to ISN/CB) that sets out meeting dates and topics 
beginning the first week of September.  Delegations protested 
the number of meetings - up to 20, but agreed to see how the 
discussions went before deciding to adjust the schedule. 
 
----------- 
Article VII 
----------- 
 
¶5. (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak held an informal consultation 
on 20 July 2006 to review the events of EC-46 and consider 
how to move forward towards EC-47 and CSP-11.  To del reps, 
dismay, Lak noted the apparent lack of linkage between 
Article VII and CW destruction issues and hoped that this 
would continue.  Sudan stressed the importance of our finding 
consensus language during EC-47 and exhorted delegations to 
maintain this spirit through the Conference. 
 
¶6. (U) Maarten then requested a discussion on our work 
schedule.  Mexico noted the full plate of topics that 
delegations must cover, and stressed the difficulty for the 
part-time or small delegations to cover everything, 
especially given the proposed 20 sessions scheduled for 
budget consultations.  Mexico recommended that the 
facilitator improve the efficiency or our work by chairing 
three or four informal consultations when the situation 
warranted, greatly increase the level and frequency of the 
facilitator's bilateral work, and create an open-ended 
 
drafting group to work on language.  The US supported the 
first two suggestions, but noted that it would have 
difficulty putting an artificial cap on the number of 
consultations, because the TS might want to provide regular 
status reports, and SPs might also want to provide 
information regarding their implementation support efforts. 
Finally the US raised concerns about the potential for 
limiting general participation if a drafting group was 
created, which were supported by Germany, Australia, New 
Zealand, France, the UK, and Korea.  Mexico explained that 
the intent was not to limit participation; everyone could 
participate in the drafting exercise. 
 
¶7. (U) Iran, supported by India, noted that our work must be 
based on the Tenth conference decision (Dec.16), that no new 
elements should be introduced as had been attempted in the 
past few Council sessions.  Delegations need to take a 
holistic approach, for instance, paragraph 12 (remedial 
measures) should not be taken out-of-context.  Assistance and 
encouragement are the most important elements.  Legislating 
is a long process, and artificial limits cannot be imposed. 
Finally, Iran noted that CW destruction is a far more 
critical issue and should not be overshadowed by other 
discussion topics such as Article VII. 
 
¶8. (U) France supported by a number of other delegations 
noted that our work should not turn into solely drafting 
exercises.  Delegations also want to hear about the 
implementation support work of the Secretariat and States 
parties, as well as the impressions of states that have been 
the recipients of TAVs. 
 
¶9. (U) The facilitator noted that he would take delegations' 
views into account, and that he would host the next 
consultation on 24 August.   The next progress report should 
be available in early September, so the facilitator may need 
to hold one or two meetings in early September as well.  In 
response to those delegations protesting that 24 August was 
too early and that many would still be on vacation, Lak 
responded that those in town were welcome to attend. 
 
-------------- 
CW Destruction 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (U) During the 20 July 2006 WEOG meeting, Maarten Lak 
(Netherlands) noted that delegations avoided linking Article 
VII and CW destruction extension requests during EC-46, and 
that he hoped this would continue through EC-47 (not all 
delegations agreed with his assessment).  Delegations 
expressed a general interest in the way ahead for CW 
destruction and the extension requests, and the topic of 
Russia's CW destruction program.  Russia,s reluctance to 
accept site visits was noted, and a number of delegations 
supported focusing first on getting Russian acceptance of the 
principle of site visits before working out the details of 
the visits.  The U.S. commented on Russia,s apparent 
inflexibility on site visits, and briefly introduced the U.S. 
proposal for site visit parameters (later provided to the 
document counter for wider distribution).  Del rep also noted 
that consultations to discuss the draft decision texts and 
site visits had been raised as a possibility, and that, while 
Washington had concerns about this sort of discussion forum, 
one benefit might be to draw out national positions on the 
issue.  As opposed to offering insight from his role as Vice 
Chair of the CW cluster, Ambassador Petri noted that the U.S. 
was unlikely to receive feedback if it appeared to be 
inflexible on its decision text.  Germany further noted that 
the US and Russia are 8approaching the same situation (i.e. 
not meeting 2012) from two different sides,8 and pointed out 
that the issue of visits may be deadlocked, as Russia is 
willing to entertain visits in capital only, while the U.S. 
would prefer visits only to CW destruction facilities. 
 
------------------------------- 
Industry ) Schedule 3 Transfers 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) Facilitator Arya Sandeep (India) held an informal 
 
discussion on 6 July 2006 version (EC-46/DEC/CRP.2) of his 
decision text on Schedule 3 transfers.  With respect to 
Preambular Paragraph 5 (PP5), its focus on Universality and 
the benefits from adherence of all States not Party suggests 
to German, India and Iran that the phrase &in particular8 
from the Plan of Action on Universality is not necessary. 
The US noted that it wanted the quote verbatim.  Germany 
noted its willingness to accept the language here as long as 
it was reworked in Operational Paragraph 1 (OP1).  US asked 
for a redraft of second half per guidance.  Iran, Germany, 
and India all advised that because this paragraph always was 
focused on Universality and its benefits for States not 
Party, the linkage to nonproliferation would be 
inappropriate; also because of the focus on the benefits of 
adherence, the US proposal was seen as too negative. 
 
¶11. (U) Debate moved on to OP1: The US noted that because it 
is unnecessary to exhort SPs that have already done so to do 
so, the text should call only upon those that have yet to 
implement.  Iran pushed back (supported by India), noting 
that it is important to exhort and/or remind all states to 
meet their obligations.  Germany agreed with US, but noted 
that it could live with the first sentence as long as the 
next phrase was redrafted so that the phrase &whose 
adherence is a cause for serious concern8 is replaced by 
"the non-adherence of whom is a cause for serious concern." 
Delegations agreed to go back to capitals and discuss the 
responses sometime the week of 24 July. 
 
SANDERS SENDS. 
BLAKEMAN