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PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0810/01 2091636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281636Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5472
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6546
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2690
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2365
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RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2926
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7311
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3053
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2519
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000810 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR FOR MSULLIVAN 
STATE PASS EXIMBANK 
STATE PASS OPIC FOR MORONESE, RIVERA, MERVENNE 
NSC FOR FEARS 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D 
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA 
TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND DDOUGLASS 
DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
USAID/W FOR LAC/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON EAGR BR
SUBJECT: IMPROVING POLL NUMBERS BUOY OPTIMISM OF ALCKMIN'S CAMPAIGN 
COORDINATOR 
 
REF: (A) BRASILIA 1441; (B) SAO PAULO 734; 
 
     (C) SAO PAULO 647 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) Opposition presidential candidate Geraldo Alckmin's 
campaign coordinator told Consul General that the campaign is coming 
together well and that support for Alckmin is growing, as reflected 
in recent polls.  Joao Carlos Meirelles said that critical alliances 
at the state level are firming up.  The campaign will publish its 
comprehensive platform and government program on August 9 and then 
flood the airwaves when the period of free radio and television 
advertising begins August 15.  Meirelles acknowledged that social 
programs like "Bolsa Familia" give President Lula an advantage among 
lower-class voters but believes Lula also has significant 
vulnerabilities, notably among farmers hurt by the Lula 
administration's agricultural policies.  The election, he said, will 
go to a second round, in which "voters don't choose a person, they 
reject a person," and Lula's high negatives will doom him.  This 
optimistic scenario is only to be expected from Meirelles, who was 
talking positively even back at the beginning of June (ref C), when 
Lula's lead in the polls exceeded 25 points, but he is likely 
correct in predicting that Alckmin will narrow the gap between now 
and the October 1 first-round balloting, and that the second round 
opens up new possibilities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) Consul General (CG) and Poloff met July 27 with Joao Carlos 
de Souza Meirelles, overall campaign coordinator for opposition 
candidate Geraldo Alckmin (see ref C).  Meirelles said the campaign 
was going very well and repeated some of his observations from our 
previous meeting with him.  The polls, he reiterated, are merely 
exercises in name recognition, and Lula's name is universally known 
in Brazil, especially because of the constant media exposure he has 
received in recent months.  In that context, the improvement in 
Alckmin's numbers -- in early June, polls showed him trailing by 
25-30 points; now it's closer to 15 -- is surprising and 
encouraging.  Meirelles estimated that perhaps 40 percent of the 
population nationwide now knows who Alckmin is, with much work 
remaining to be done in the northeastern and the center-west 
regions. 
 
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ALLIANCES 
--------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Meirelles described the consolidation of alliances at the 
state level, which he said will be key to electoral success. 
Alckmin's Social Democracy Party of Brazil (PSDB) is allied with the 
Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the smaller Popular Socialist Party 
(PPS).  The alliance is particularly strong in the densely populated 
south and much of the southeast.  In some states - he mentioned 
Santa Catarina as an example - they have an ad hoc alliance with the 
centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB).  Meirelles 
acknowledged problems in certain states, notably Maranhao in the 
northeast and Rio de Janeiro.  Nevertheless, he contrasted the 
alliance's strength with Lula's coalition, which in addition to 
Lula's Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) includes only 
the Communists and the small Brazilian Republican Party (PRB) of 
Vice President Alencar.  The PT was not even able to bring its 
traditional Socialist allies on board.  While Lula himself is 
broadly popular, Meirelles said, his own party is not particularly 
strong even in the northeast ("only one governorship, in Piaui, and 
they might not hold that"), and his alliance is not likely to be 
 
SAO PAULO 00000810  002 OF 003 
 
 
able to deliver votes, especially with his own party's image so 
badly tarnished by scandal. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On or about August 9, the campaign will publish its 
comprehensive platform and governing program, covering some thirteen 
areas (e.g., health, education, macroeconomy, telecommunications, 
foreign policy).  Thirteen working groups have been developing the 
program for months; since late June, when the alliance was 
formalized, PFL and PPS representatives have been participating in 
the working groups as well.  Alckmin delivered an abbreviated 
version of the government program in his June 11 speech accepting 
the PSDB nomination (ref B), but the platform will describe in 
detail how his government will achieve its objectives.  Many 
elements of the program will be featured in the free radio and 
television advertising spots that begin August 15 and run through 
the rest of the campaign.  It is also safe to assume, Meirelles 
said, that these spots will target corruption in the Lula 
administration (the "mensalao" scandal) as well as what he 
characterized as incompetence and "immobilism." 
 
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SOCIAL PROGRAMS 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) CG asked how the Alckmin campaign planned to counteract 
Lula's advantage in the northeast generated in large part by social 
programs, especially "Bolsa Familia."  This government stipend 
program now reaches more than eleven million poor families, many of 
them in the impoverished northeast; numerous pollsters and political 
analysts have asserted that Lula can count on the votes of Bolsa 
Familia recipients, as well as those who have benefited from the 
sharp increase in the minimum wage.  Meirelles noted that Bolsa 
Familia was a PSDB program, begun during the administration of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), which the PSDB still supports.  He 
expressed the view that the population that benefits from the 
program is volatile in its voting habits and will not base its vote 
solely on its receiving a handout from the federal government.  He 
noted further that on August 4, the Alckmin campaign has planned an 
event in Recife unveiling a program for a new northeast, 
highlighting its plans for investment in the region.  Finally, he 
stressed the key role of municipalities, especially Mayors, in 
administering the Bolsa Familia program, and suggested that local 
alliances may prove more important than the federal government's 
role in determining voter preferences.  Ultimately, he acknowledged, 
Lula would likely defeat Alckmin in the northeast, but not by nearly 
as wide a margin as polls currently suggest, while Alckmin held a 
large advantage in the south and southeast.  Alckmin not only still 
enjoys strong popularity in the most populous state, Sao Paulo, but 
will benefit from a strong gubernatorial candidate in Jose Serra. 
Likewise, in the second most populous state, Minas Gerais, he will 
benefit from the coattails of PSDB leader Aecio Neves, who appears a 
shoo-in for re-election AS Governor.  Alckmin would likely run well 
in the rural Center-West as well, he said, where "policy errors 
committed by the Lula administration" had led to an agricultural 
crisis.  On the other hand, Meirelles acknowledged problems in the 
populous state of Rio de Janeiro which would need to be addressed in 
order to boost Alckmin's votes there. 
 
------------------------------- 
LULA'S POSSIBLE VULNERABILITIES 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Asked about the impact on the campaign of third-party 
candidate Heloisa Helena (who got about ten percent in recent 
polls), Meirelles said it was good for Alckmin.  A leftist who had 
been expelled from the PT, she would take some votes away from Lula 
and would gain other votes that otherwise would have been null or 
 
SAO PAULO 00000810  003 OF 003 
 
 
blank.  CG asked also about the role of Lula's former Chief of 
Staff, Jose Dirceu, who recently met with the Landless Movement 
(MST).  Meirelles said that having an individual like Dirceu, who 
had resigned from government in disgrace and then been expelled from 
Congress and deprived of his political rights, representing the 
ruling party in these core social movements, created a very bad 
image.  He also claimed that at the recent Mercosul Summit in 
Cordoba, Argentina, Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez had expressed 
support for Lula's re-election.  This, he said, was like Chavez's 
support for Humala in Peru and Lopez Obrador in Mexico, something 
that was likely to boomerang on Lula, and certainly something the 
opposition was going to take advantage of at the opportune moment. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The bottom line for Meirelles was that Lula will win the 
first round, though not by an exceedingly wide margin.  In the 
October 29 runoff, he said, Alckmin will have the advantage, because 
"in the second round, you don't choose a person, you reject a 
person," and Lula is known to have high negative numbers. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Asked if former President Cardoso (FHC) would be 
campaigning for Alckmin, Meirelles said that had not yet been 
decided.  The Lula campaign was trying to portray the Alckmin 
campaign as a throwback to the FHC years, and the candidate and 
strategists wanted to wait to see whether it looked like FHC would 
be more an asset than a liability. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) For Meirelles to talk optimistically is to be expected; 
nevertheless, much of what he says makes sense.  Lula, who does 
indeed have high rejection numbers, may well have hit his ceiling, 
and Alckmin is certainly moving up, though he still has a long way 
to go.  The Alckmin campaign does appear to be running much better 
than it was a month ago, and although Lula remains popular, he does 
have vulnerabilities.  Assuming the election does go to a second 
round, as appears likely, Lula may still be the favorite, but his 
victory would by no means be a sure thing.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia. 
 
MCMULLEN