VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSO #0800/01 2061213
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251213Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5460
INFO RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 6534
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 7304
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2516

UNCLAS SAO PAULO 000800 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE INR/R/MR; IIP/R/MR; WHA/PD 
 
DEPT PASS USTR 
 
USDOC 4322/MAC/OLAC/JAFEE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KMDR OPRC OIIP ETRD BR
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: MIDDLE EAST: UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE; GLOBAL 
ECONOMY: SUSPENSION OF THE DOHA ROUND TALKS; WESTERN HEMISPHERE: 
MERCOSUL SUMMIT, CHAVEZ; SAO PAULO 
 
 
¶1. "Peacekeeping Force" 
 
Liberal, largest circulation daily Folha de S. Paulo (7/25) opined: 
"The proposal of an international force made up mainly of European 
troops to be sent to the South of Lebanon is praiseworthy.... That 
seems to be the best way both for an immediate ceasefire and to 
ensure that the events that triggered the current conflict are not 
repeated in the near future. The extinction of Hezbollah as a 
militia is essential for peace in the region.  The South of Lebanon 
can no longer be used as a platform from which radicals launch 
rockets against Israel. The Lebanese state must exert a real control 
over its territory. This does not mean that the Lebanese Shiites are 
to be deprived of political representation.  But it is not 
reasonable that they maintain, through Hezbollah, a state within a 
state.... However, for the plan to be successful, more than NATO 
troops will be necessary. The key to neutralizing the militia's 
military power is Syria. Diplomatic moves should bring it back to 
the negotiation table. It is difficult, but not impossible. 
Damascus' alliance with Hezbollah is much more circumstantial than 
ideological. If Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad concludes that he 
has more to gain by breaking relations with the militia than by 
supporting it, it is very likely that he will do that. What remains 
to be seen is what the US and Israel can offer in exchange. 
Washington could normalize its diplomatic and commercial relations 
with Damascus. Israel would need to suggest the return of the Golan 
Heights." 
 
¶2. "Failure at the WTO" 
 
Liberal, largest national circulation daily Folha de S. Paulo (7/25) 
editorialized: "The failure in the Doha Round trade negotiations 
complicates the future scenario of multilateral agreements due to 
the expiration, in July 2007, of the fast track mechanism that 
authorizes the US President to negotiate commercial pacts.... The 
main obstacle to such negotiations comes from the fact that neither 
the US nor the EU will accept any reduction in their tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to imports of agricultural products.... 
Developing nations have been pressured to make further concessions 
in the industrial goods sector, but the potential gains in terms of 
their agricultural products' access to developed nations' markets 
would be very limited.... It is obvious that the developed nations 
must advance in their proposals to open their agricultural markets 
if they really want to resume multilateral negotiations. The result 
of the suspension of the Doha Round may be the proliferation of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements, which will fragmentize even 
more the norms and rules of international commerce." 
 
¶3. "Doha Round Collapse" 
 
Center-right O Estado de S. Paulo maintained (7/25): "Brazil and 
other developing nations will be the most affected by the collapse 
of the global trade negotiations.... Maybe it is premature to 
announce the Doha Round's death and prepare its funeral, but it is 
hard at this moment to avoid the impression of a final collapse.... 
The main responsibility for the impasse can be attributed to the 
developed powers.... A week ago, there were signs that the US was 
preparing to make the Europeans responsible for the probable 
failure.... What will remain in the scenario are regional, bilateral 
and inter-region agreements, which will make international trade 
more complicated. Among the major economies, the Brazilian is the 
least prepared to face this game. Tied to a Third World vision, the 
current Brazilian administration did not have the necessary 
pragmatism to pursue trade agreements with the partners that most 
interest the nation." 
 
¶4. "Mercosul Summit Emitted Politically Mistaken Signs" 
 
Business-oriented Valor Economico commented (7/25): "By attracting 
ideology to Mercosul's core, Brazil is running the risk of being 
overcome by neighbors that are cleverer in playing that trump card 
in addition to lacking common sense.... By inviting Bolivian 
President Evo Morales and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro to join 
Mercosul, what President Lula da Silva did in practice was to place 
political interests not on the same level of the commercial ones, 
but above them. The indication of Venezuela to occupy a rotating 
seat at the UN Security Council unquestionably revealed the bloc's 
political preferences as well as its increasing commitment with a 
leader that has distanced himself from democratic practices." 
 
¶5. "Ideology And Mercosul" 
 
An editorial in center-right O Estado de S. Paulo (7/25) remarked: 
 
 
"Nothing prevents Mercosul from doing business with other blocs or 
nations, but its statute forbids the association with non-democratic 
partners.... The premature reference to the entry of Cuba in the 
originally Southern group was not the only inconsistency of 
President Lula's conduct in Cordoba.... The first problem is 
Chvez's clear intention of using Mercosul as a platform for his 
anti-Americanism and to affirm his hegemonic aspirations. By 
watching what has happened in Venezuela, the second problem is 
knowing how long one will consider Venezuela a democracy in 
accordance with Mercosul's statutes." 
McMullen