VZCZCXRO1824
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHYN #2058/01 1990957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180957Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4686
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP  PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002058 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KMPI KMCA YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN'S DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY REVISED 
 
REF: A. SANAA 926 
     ¶B. SANAA 1771 
 
SANAA 00002058  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  Since its articulation of a Democratic Reform 
Strategy nearly one year ago, Post has registered a number of 
successes.  The sustainability of such changes remains 
uncertain, however, and they are at best only small steps on 
the road to democracy.  In order to consolidate recent 
reforms and push for additional progress, Post is revising 
its Democratic Reform Strategy (DRS) for the coming year. 
The new strategy establishes clear milestones for democratic 
reform in elections, the media, civil society, and the power 
of the President, outlining specific programs Post will use 
and develop to achieve these ends. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------- 
Democratic Reform To Date 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. In the last year, the DRS for the Freedom Agenda has made 
great strides in Yemen.  Post coordinated a strategy with 
other missions and international organizations in Yemen to 
press the ROYG to adopt reforms, resulting in a Cabinet 
change and a new government reform plan. (REF A)  This led to 
some improvements in press freedom, rule of law, and 
anti-corruption efforts.  Post maintained momentum by 
engaging the ROYG in its efforts to regain threshold status 
for the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and tracking 
Yemen's progress on specific reforms. 
 
¶3. During a MEPI visit to Sanaa in May 2000, Emboffs 
discussed with the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 
team the need for a more targeted Democratic Reform Strategy 
in order to capitalize on the current momentum for reform. 
It was agreed that a clearer focus would allow Post to better 
utilize available resources from MEPI, USAID, and other 
sources.  In place of the usual Freedom Agenda quarterly 
report, this cable aims to reset Embassy Sanaa's goals for 
its DRS, and to outline specific strategies for the coming 
months. 
 
¶4. Post will pursue four milestones as the core of Yemen's 
DRS, with anti-corruption as a cross-cutting goal in each 
area: 
 
* Open and transparent presidential and local council 
elections in September; 
* Reform of press legislation that protects a free media and 
civil society; 
* Increased capacity in civil society to effectively advocate 
for reform; 
* Improved system of checks and balances within ROYG 
institutions. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Milestone 1: Open and Transparent Elections 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. Presidential and local council elections are scheduled for 
September 2006.  Judging by National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) reports on recent by-elections and the registration 
process, Post is expecting irregularities and will reevaluate 
its long-term strategy after September.  Nevertheless, a 
number of recent developments have increased the importance 
of this year's elections.  For the first time in Yemen's 
history, opposition parties nominated a common candidate to 
oppose President Saleh.  In addition, the ruling GPC party 
and the opposition recently signed an agreement to reform 
elections administration and assure equal access to the 
media.  Post maintains modest expectations, but the following 
strategies will help to achieve substantial gains for Yemen's 
elections process: 
 
*  A MEPI-funded elections monitoring program through NDI 
will set benchmarks for upcoming elections and train local 
monitors to report violations.  The final report will form 
the basis of Post conclusions about the ROYG's elections 
performance. 
 
*  An existing program with the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES) will train elections staff and help 
resolve disputes at the polls peacefully. 
 
*  Post will coordinate with the European Union, the United 
Nations Development Program and others on diplomatic 
approaches with the ROYG following:  1) the upcoming release 
of the USG-backed voter registration monitoring effort by 
NDI; 2) a planned pre-election assessment by NDI; and 3) the 
domestic election effort mentioned above. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Milestone 2: Reform of Press Legislation 
 
SANAA 00002058  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  Embassy's sustained pressure on the ROYG regarding press 
freedom has produced a significant change in policy over the 
past quarter.  The ROYG suspended a proposed press law, 
uniformly opposed by journalists and civil society, pending 
further discussions.  Attacks against journalists have nearly 
disappeared in recent months, largely as a result of the 
ROYG's desire to improve its standing with the MCA.  The 
following strategies are intended to build on this progress 
to expand and protect freedom of expression: 
 
*  Post will seek the assistance of the MEPI-funded IREX 
regional program to work with journalists and civil society 
in advocating for free speech and influencing new 
legislation. 
 
*  Post will coordinate with other donor efforts, including 
the BBC Trust and the Danish Media Program, and seek to fill 
specific gaps (such as Internet news training) through MEPI 
and PD small grants. 
 
*  Using such programs as MEPI's regional grant with NYU, 
Post will help professionalize Yemen's independent media, and 
provide training on how to succeed commercially. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Milestone 3: Civil Society Advocacy 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  Yemen's civil society is broad and active, but generally 
lacking in capacity and basic skills required for effective 
organizing and advocacy.  Over the past year, Post has 
explored a number of program options with MEPI and USAID to 
address this need, but has not as yet arrived at the right 
formula.  Rather than pursue a comprehensive civil society 
training facility, the revised strategy will improve NGO 
capacity through more targeted interventions: 
 
*  A MEPI grant to the Civil Democratic Forum, a local NGO, 
will work with welfare organizations to transform them into 
effective advocates for human rights and democracy. 
 
*  As part of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue, local NGOs 
HRITC and the Sisters Arab Forum will strengthen civil 
society networks advocating for human rights and democracy in 
the region. 
 
*  Post will use the MEPI small grants program to identify 
promising local NGOs, improving their capacity to become 
active players in Yemeni civil society. 
 
*  Post endorses the concept (and seeks MEPI support for) an 
NGO hub, designed to bring together the most active civil 
society members in a democratically run association.  Such an 
organization will provide programming opportunities to 
support local NGOs in effective networking and advocacy 
strategies, with a focus on pressing governance issues such 
as corruption. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Milestone 4: Checks and Balances 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  President Saleh's recent decision to seek another 
seven-year term ensures that he will remain a dominant force 
in the Yemeni polity for the foreseeable future.  In recent 
months, however, there have been promising signs that Saleh 
may be willing to relinquish some of his power to other 
branches of government.  In May, Saleh signed a law removing 
the Supreme Judicial Council from the office of the 
President. (REF B)  Earlier in the year, Parliament overrode 
a Presidential veto for the first time in its history.  In 
the revised DRS, Post seeks to support this trend and utilize 
all available expertise to this end: 
 
*  The MEPI-funded ABA/CEELI office in Sanaa will focus on 
assisting the Supreme Judicial Council to establish its 
independence from the executive branch. 
 
*  Post will support NDI in its work with reform-minded 
parliamentarians, especially as they tackle issues of 
corruption and public finance, and look to expand the program 
to work directly with relevant parliamentary committees (e.g. 
finance and budget). 
 
*  USAID will extend support for decentralization and assess 
the effectiveness of such efforts, in cooperation with UNDP, 
with the aim of strengthening fiscal autonomy and civil 
society participation in local government. Post will employ 
additional diplomatic approaches to the ROYG to encourage the 
transfer of funds for central to local authorities. 
 
SANAA 00002058  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
*  Post will explore possibilities for supporting 
anti-corruption initiatives both in government and civil 
society, following a USAID assessment in the summer of 2006. 
Khoury