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Viewing cable 06RABAT1374, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S SECRET PLAN FOR MOROCCO'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06RABAT1374 2006-07-20 14:45 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #1374/01 2011445
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201445Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4282
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4086
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3022
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3239
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4293
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 8972
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 1910
UNCLAS RABAT 001374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR MO
SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S SECRET PLAN FOR MOROCCO'S 
2007 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 
 
 
 1. (U)  Summary: French language weekly, Le Journal 
Hebdomaire (July 15), reported on the Moroccan Ministry of 
Interior (MOI)'s projections on the 2007 legislative 
elections.  The projections confirmed the preeminence of the 
Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD), the strong 
position of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) and 
Istiqlal and also mentioned possible formations of leftist 
parties to balance Islamist power.  According to Le Journal, 
the Government of Morocco (GOM) seeks a balance between 
powers that will encourage the democratization of 
institutions but not challenge the Monarchy's authority.  It 
describes PJD difficulties in rural areas and the isolation 
of the USFP on the issue of the electoral code reform.  Le 
Journal criticized the GOM for releasing a plan to "drive the 
elections" rather than an objective description of the 
current political configuration.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
THE GOM IN THE 2007 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2. (U)  The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) conducted polling 
and simulations in order to gauge where parties stand in the 
current political configuration.  The MOI findings estimated 
that the PJD could win between 60 and 70 seats; USFP could 
win approximately 50 seats; Istiqlal approximately 40 seats; 
and the Popular Movement Party (UMP) and National Rally of 
Independents (RNI) could win between 30 and 40 seats each. 
The Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) could increase its 
position to a little over 20 seats. 
 
3. (U)  Le Journal said that the 2002 legislative elections 
failed to present a clear majority and forced the King to 
nominate a politically independent prime minister.  The 
weekly asserted that, with a changed political landscape, the 
King intends to nominate a partisan prime minister in 2007 
and that the MOI's polling and simulations are laying the 
groundwork for this decision.  An unnamed official of the MOI 
said it was not intervening in the elections but merely 
conducting a study in order to predict the results; however, 
Le Journal criticized the MOI for attempting to "orient" the 
results of the elections. 
 
4. (U)  According to the report, the GOM seeks to avoid the 
massive victory of one party or the formation of a 
homogeneous coalition that would not need the Palace's 
support and thereby weaken its authority.  The GOM also seeks 
a party committed to democratization without questioning the 
Monarchy. The GOM's main goal is to create a balance between 
the parties which will last beyond the 2007 elections. 
 
---------- 
ISLAMISTS 
---------- 
 
5. (U)  The GOM's strategy regarding the Islamists and the 
PJD is to maintain the 2002 electoral lists and distribution 
of constituencies.  The report notes that the votes of 
Moroccan residents abroad will continue to be discarded so as 
to limit Islamists' power.  Le Journal claims that the PJD 
would have trouble gaining votes in rural areas if the 
electoral code is passed but also acknowledges that the 14 
parties unfavorable to the code might then seek support from 
the PJD.  The MOI report maintained that the best defense 
against conservative Islam is an active opposition with 
innovative ideas presented by credible people.  The "Left," 
according to Le Journal, holds the best keys for 
institutional democratization but could also threaten the 
Palace's authority. 
 
 
--------- 
THE LEFT 
--------- 
 
6. (U)  Le Journal claims that the proposed electoral code 
reform will most likely be amended in order to allow for the 
participation of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), whose 
absence in the elections would discredit the code.  The MOI 
official was allegedly vague regarding questions about the 
PSU but did acknowledge that the progressive party would win 
seats by associating itself with other parties from the 
radical Left.  The MOI predicts the institutionalization of 
the PSU and other parties of the Moroccan Left into a united 
 
opposition integrated into Parliament after 2007, according 
to Le Journal. 
 
7. (U)  This united Left also depends on whether the USFP 
will cooperate or pursue "hegemonic ambitions."  It predicted 
that the USFP under its current Secretary General, Mohamed 
Elyazghi, is unlikely to form a coalition with the PSU or 
other parties from the Left.  Le Journal wrote that the MOI 
is not pleased with the isolation of the USFP regarding its 
support for the electoral code reform unanimously contested 
by other parties.  Le Journal suggested the GOM's interest in 
the changes in the Left was a way to appease critics and to 
find a counterbalance to Islamist parties. 
 
8. (U)  The MOI report also recognized the increasing 
importance of the PPS.  It acknowledged the importance of 
political bureau member Nabil Benabdallah, the Minister of 
Communication and government spokesperson, who could demand 
constitutional reforms from friends if the PPS has electoral 
difficulties similar to those of the PSU. 
 
9. (U)  According to Le Journal, a PPS with 20 to 25 seats in 
the future Chamber of Representatives would be ideal for the 
MOI as it would calm USFP demands for constitutional reforms. 
 The MOI also hopes the PSU would have around 14 deputies so 
that it would be coherent enough to form an active opposition 
in Parliament and balance the PJD discourse but small enough 
so that its reformist discourse would resonate minimally.  Le 
Journal reported that there has been recent communication 
between the MOI and certain PSU leaders.  The Minister 
Delegate to the Ministry of the Interior, Fouad Ali El Himma, 
made it known that he expected increased PSU participation in 
Parliament, which he claimed would benefit political 
institutions in Morocco. 
 
****************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
****************************************** 
 
RILEY