VZCZCXRO7124
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #5133/01 2020641
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210641Z JUL 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6813
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3074
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 6411
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 6417
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9459
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 3160
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 7102
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0815
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3621
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 5470
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 5477
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 4860
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 2872
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 4698
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 3515
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1727
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4029
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 005133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR S/CT AND SCA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL SCUL IN PK
SUBJECT: WHY AL-QA'IDA WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY GAINING 
TRACTION IN J&K 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 4928 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: We -- and many of our contacts -- are 
skeptical about the July 13 telephone claim by a man calling 
himself "al-Qa'ida's Kashmir spokesman Abu Hadeed" to Current 
News Service in Srinagar -- our J&K journalist contacts say 
terrorist groups regularly use CNS to distribute their 
messages to the media, earning it the nickname "Kashmir's 
Al-Jazeera."  Many Kashmiris have publicly denounced the 
announcement of al-Qa'ida operating in Kashmir as a hoax, but 
these same spokespersons have distanced themselves 
nonetheless from any connection to the group.  In our 
assessment, 
although J&K clearly is fertile ground for terrorism, 
al-Qa'ida would have to overcome cultural hurdles to 
establish a presence beyond such affiliated terrorist groups 
as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), unless 
we are witnessing the morphing of a preexisting group into a 
Kashmir-based al-Qa'ida group to gain access to global jihadi 
funding.  This does not rule out a possible expansion of the 
group into the region, but we judge that if such a move met 
with success, it would be because of the tangible benefits 
al-Qa'ida could provide, and not from any social or cultural 
affinities.  End Summary. 
 
Kashmiris Say 7/13 Announcement Probably a Hoax 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Reportedly speaking in Urdu, the so-called Abu 
Hadeed named as "Kashmir,s al-Qa'ida Chief" one Abu Abdur 
Rahman Ansari, and "expressed happiness" at the Mumbai 
terrorist attacks, which he claimed were "a reaction to the 
oppression in India of minorities in general and Muslims in 
particular." Additional Director General of Police Kuldeep 
Khoda (Reftel) told us police tracked the call to a public 
calling booth in downtown Srinagar and questioned the owner, 
who said he did not know the caller but described him as 
"looking Kashmiri."  CNS journalist Rashid Rahi, who took the 
call, told the Christian Science Monitor that Hadeed "spoke 
pure Urdu" and "was a Pakistani." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) This is the first time anyone has publicly claimed 
to represent a direct al-Qa'ida presence in Kashmir.; Both 
Abu Hadeed and Abu Abdur Rahman Ansari are Arabic names, 
which are not common in India and are possibly noms du 
guerre.; Hadeed claimed al-Qa'ida in Kashmir would issue 
regular statements, with all future communication only in 
Arabic.; The statement drew swift denials from various 
corners of J&K: 
 
-- If the accounts of the press and Khoda are accurate, the 
inconsistencies in the reporting about the caller -- a man 
claiming to have an Arab (not Urdu) name looking like a 
Kashmiri and speaking Urdu -- suggest the caller may have 
been trying to mask a Kashmiri identity. 
 
-- Hurriyat chairman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq told reporters that 
although the Kashmir movement had a "military dimension," 
there was "no role" (in his stated opinion) for al-Qa'ida. 
He called the event a hoax designed to malign the 
separatists.  Other leading separatists, from outsiders 
Shabir Shah and Sajjad Gani Lone to pro-Pakistan hardliner 
SAS Geelani, issued similar statements. 
 
NEW DELHI 00005133  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
-- Junai-ul-Islam, spokesman for Hizbul Mujahedeen -- the 
largest ethnic Kashmiri terrorist organization -- publicly 
agreed that the announcement was a hoax, claimed there never 
was nor would be space for al-Qa'ida in the Kashmir movement, 
and condemned the Mumbai blasts as an "act of terrorism." 
 
-- Our journalist contacts, including "Indian Express" Bureau 
Chief Muzamil Jaleel and "The Hindu" correspondent Shujaat 
Bukhari, also believe a local conducted this call-in. 
 
J&K Fertile Ground for Local Terrorists 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) J&K is undeniably fertile ground for terrorist 
recruitment, but we question whether al-Qa'ida can take root 
there.  The grievances we hear from our contacts (and their 
contacts) tend to be local/regional in nature (i.e. 
Delhi-Srinagar or Indo-Pak).; There appears to be almost no 
solid affiliation with pan-Islamic causes like Palestine or 
Chechnya, which may limit, but not rule out, recruitment. 
The notable exception here was anger over the controversial 
Danish cartoons, but even that was muted compared to the 
outbursts of outrage seen in Delhi and Uttar Pradesh.  We 
doubt whether a global jihadist message can successfully 
appeal to Kashmiri extremists, when compared to the more 
local nature of al-Qa'ida affiliates Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and 
Jaish-e-Mohammad, and other local/regional organizations who 
play on the tangible grievances of a population besieged by 
both terrorists and security forces.  Even the cross-border 
jihadi groups receive less support than indigenous groups 
like Hizbul Mujahedeen. 
 
Kashmiri Clannishness Would Complicate al-Qa'ida Recruiting 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) When the Kashmiri militancy first began 
accommodating "foreign fighters" -- primarily Pakistanis but 
also some Afghans and Arabs -- they were welcomed with open 
arms as "guest militants" in the parlance of the Valley. 
However, cultural clashes led to prison fights and even 
mini-wars between Kashmiri and outside terrorist groups. 
Kashmiri clannishness and suspicion of "foreigners," 
including Indians from other parts of the country, would 
complicate local recruitment in J&K: 
 
-- Many Kashmiris already firmly differentiate themselves 
from Indians and Pakistanis, and maintain a social-cultural 
distance from both groups resulting in a nearly island 
mentality (Reftel).  This distance has evolved, and is 
reinforced, by J&K's physical isolation from the rest of 
India.  Groups whose ultimate allegiance is to either a 
non-South Asian leader or extra-regional goals will have 
trouble pitching their message to this clannish population. 
We know al-Qa'ida is able to recruit non-Arabs; we are less 
certain how well they can recruit Kashmiris. 
 
-- From our J&K police and journalist contacts, as well as 
NGO activists -- some of whom are former terrorists -- our 
sense is that there is no firm anti-US sentiment in J&K.  At 
worst, we encounter disappointment in USG policy, not hatred, 
including through indirect reporting. 
 
 
NEW DELHI 00005133  003 OF 004 
 
 
-- Kashmiri terror organizations like Hizbul Mujahedeen 
appeal to nationalist sentiments.  Cross-border groups like 
LeT and JeM, who are populated by non-Kashmiris, already 
maintain an outward-looking jihadi orientation.  Public GOI 
estimates of the J&K terrorist(population suggest around 75% 
of the 1400 "active terrorists" in J&K are Kashmiri. 
 
-- We cannot predict how established al-Qa'ida affiliates LeT 
and JeM would react to an al-Qa'ida branch in their area of 
operation. 
 
-- Recruitment into Kashmiri (and, we believe, jihadi) groups 
is often by personal connections; a terrorist might try to 
recruit his brother or cousin, but not recruit or be 
recruited by a stranger.  Indian press has even reported 
anecdotal incidents of Hindus joining terrorist groups, via 
their Muslim friends, seeking a paying job.  Furthermore, 
many terror groups active in J&K are themselves off-shoots of 
prior terror groups, vice "greenfield" organizations, 
although a Kashmir-based al-Qa'ida might seek to follow this 
paradigm. 
 
-- As a future "Abu Hadeed" would know if he conducted the 
terrorist equivalent of market research, the use of Arabic 
over Urdu or Kashmiri marks the organization as an outsider. 
 
-- The high level of mistrust of all outsiders, coupled with 
the pervasive belief in conspiracy in J&K, may well lead some 
potential recruits to be dismiss any alleged "al-Qa'ida" as a 
sting operation conducted by Indian security forces. 
 
What Kind of al-Qa'ida Is It? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The creation of an "al-Qa'ida in Kashmir" begs the 
question of what kind of al-Qa'ida may arise.  Likely 
possibilities include: 
 
-- A new group -- either indigenous or exogenous -- with bona 
fide al-Qa'ida links may emerge.  This scenario envisions 
al-Qa'ida fighters, with or without prior links to J&K, 
operating in the region.  Such a group might be a spin-off 
under its own control, or it may retain connections to other 
al-Qa'ida organizations. 
 
-- A preexisting terrorist group may change its name to 
"al-Qa'ida in Kashmir," either with or without permission 
from the main al-Qa'ida group.  Cross-border jihadi groups 
such as LeT and JeM already are known to operate under 
multiple names, including paper-thin "names of convenience." 
 
-- As with the previous scenario, a collection of terrorists 
from several groups may come together to form an "al-Qa'ida 
in Kashmir," again either with or without permission from the 
main al-Qa'ida group.  As noted above, many current jihadi 
groups were themselves spun out of other groups, some of 
which are now defunct. 
 
-- It is also possible that Kashmiris (or Pakistanis) with no 
connection to the international jihadi movement might create 
an "al-Qa'ida in Kashmir" with the hope of joining into the 
larger al-Qa'ida. 
 
 
NEW DELHI 00005133  004 OF 004 
 
 
Comment: How al-Qa'ida Might Attract Followers 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The above is not to rule out entirely al-Qa'ida 
achieving a foothold in J&K; although he doubted the veracity 
of the July 13 phone call, Kuldeep Khoda refused to rule out 
the possibility of a future al-Qa'ida in Kashmir. 
 
-- The group does have several assets, including name 
recognition, a history of successful spectacular attacks, and 
funding which the group could use to provide cutting-edge 
weapons and a payroll to willing cadres.  Its possible 
success would not lie in cultural or political affiliation, 
but on what tangibles the organization has to offer. 
 
-- Although the global jihad message may not resonate in J&K, 
appealing to the endemic feelings of alienation (and in many 
cases occupation, see Reftel) might.  An al-Qa'ida recruiter 
pitching to disaffected Kashmiris -- such as the 
ex-terrorists described in Reftel who say they are routinely 
humiliated by security forces -- an opportunity to retaliate 
against Indian troops may hit home. 
 
-- Bin Ladin's relatively recent inclusion of Kashmiris in 
his recorded speeches may also help shape the ground for 
recruitment. 
 
-- Al-Qa'ida is also well positioned geographically to expand 
or spill over from the arc of northern Afghanistan and 
Pakistan into J&K.  Al-Qa'ida elements could conceivably 
establish a position just across the porous LoC from Pakistan. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Al-Qa'ida as a new actor in the Valley may 
conversely be viewed as an asset to a desperate people, 
compared to the groups active in J&K for over a decade. 
University of Kashmir Law Professor Sheikh Showcat Hussein 
told journalists "the desperation is to such an extent here, 
whoever is ready to support people, whether it is al-Qa'ida 
or anyone else, people are receptive to them." 
 
¶9.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: 
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) 
PYATT