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DE RUEHMU #1571/01 1992206
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 182206Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7001
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001571 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM ECON EFIN NU
SUBJECT: BOAQUENOS TALK ELECTIONS WITH AMBASSADOR, FEAR 
ORTEGA VICTORY 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0399 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Peter Brennan. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  During Ambassador's recent trip to Boaco, 
interlocutors fretted that Sandinista (FSLN) leader Daniel 
Ortega may win the November election by excluding large 
numbers of potential voters and committing fraud on Election 
Day.  While Boaco is a predominately Liberal department, the 
FSLN made inroads here when "Boaquenos" elected an apolitical 
mayor running on the FSLN ticket.  After visiting a USAID 
model school, Ambassador met with local leaders of Eduardo 
Montealegre's Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN); Edmundo 
Jarquin's Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS); Movimiento por 
Nicaragua (MpN) and Etica y Transparencia (ET); the six 
mayors of Boaco department; the PLC-dominated Ranchers' 
Association; and, Vicar Juan Moreira.  The Ambassador was 
also interviewed by center-right Radio Oxigeno and met with 
local Peace Corps volunteers.  Ambassador reiterated our 
commitment to helping Nicaraguans hold clean, fair, 
inclusive, and credible elections and our view that 
Nicaraguans stand at a crossroads where they can choose the 
path of progress, including the benefits of CAFTA and the 
Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC).  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) During Ambassador's July 13 trip to Boaco department 
(population 150,500), most interlocutors fretted that FSLN 
leader Daniel Ortega may win the November election by 
excluding large numbers of potential voters and through 
electoral fraud the day of the polls.  While Boaco is a 
predominately Liberal department, the FSLN made inroads when 
in 2004 "Boaquenos" elected an apolitical mayor running on 
the FSLN ticket.  After visiting and delivering curricular 
materials to USAID's model "Excellence" Juanita Sovalbarro 
Suarez Elementary School, Ambassador met with local leaders 
of Eduardo Montealegre's ALN; Edmundo Jarquin's MRS; NGOs MpN 
and ET; Boaco department mayors; the PLC-dominated Ranchers' 
Association; and, father Juan Moreira, Vicar of Boaco's 
Diocese.  The Ambassador was also interviewed by center-right 
Radio Oxigeno and met with local Peace Corps volunteers. 
 
A UNITED ALN CRAVES MANAGUA ATTENTION AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C) Leaders of Eduardo Montealegre's diverse alliance in 
Boaco -- including members of "Vamos con Eduardo" and the 
ALN, as well as representatives from the Conservative (PC), 
Resistance (PRN), Alliance for the Republic (APRE), and 
Independent Liberal (PLI) parties, presented a united front. 
Group leader Hugo Barquero (ALN) underscored the importance 
of uniting under a common cause: winning the November 
elections and ending the corruption of FSLN-PLC pact. 
According to Barquero, about 70% of Boaco voters are 
Liberals, and while ALN support is strong in the city of 
Boaco, the PLC continues to dominate in most of the 
department's rural areas.  The fact that Montealegre's 
running mate is from San Jose de los Remates is an advantage 
the ALN must exploit, he said.  He noted that ALN party poll 
monitors (fiscales) were present in all voting centers during 
the recent voter registry verification process.  IRI training 
in late July-early August will further prepare the fiscales, 
said Barquero. 
 
¶4.  (C) Despite these advantages, the ALN campaign is off to 
"a soft start" because the lack of logistical support - 
including vehicles, fuel, party banners, and funds for radio 
spots -- is hampering efforts to woo voters, warned Barquero. 
For example, the ALN needs banners and other campaign 
materials to use during the Boaco festivities starting July 
¶21.  While acknowledging that the PLC presents formidable 
competition in Boaco's rural areas, Emigdio Alvarado (PLI) 
explained that the FSLN is the real enemy to beat.  However, 
as an adversary, the PLC is also a challenge.  U.S. pressure 
on Aleman and his inner circle could help loosen the PLC's 
popularity, suggested Barquero.  The Ambassador clarified 
that our problem with the PLC is Aleman and his cohorts, not 
Rizo and that our efforts in isolating Aleman have been 
robust -- including visa revocations. 
 
THE MAYOR OF ALL PEOPLE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador met privately with Boaco Mayor Vivian 
Orozco, an apolitical, wealthy rancher who won on the 
Sandinista ticket.  Orozco was receptive to the Ambassador's 
concerns that non-FSLN supporters have difficulty obtaining 
national/voter IDs (cedulas).  However, he justified his 
 
non-involvement in the issue because the Supreme Electoral 
Council's (CSE) independence must be respected.  Ambassador 
urged him to reconsider -- noting that it is incumbent upon 
all public officials to ensure their constituents can 
exercise their right to vote.  (NOTE:  Other interlocutors 
offered nothing but praise for Orozco's fine work, lauding 
his non-partisan treatment of Boaquenos and his efforts to 
improve infrastructure, including building roads.) 
 
ONE PLC MAYOR SET TO JUMP SHIP 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador met briefly with Santa Lucia Mayor 
Elba Maria Salinas before his general meeting with PLC and 
APRE mayors.  A disgruntled and disillusioned Salinas 
informed the Ambassador of her plans to leave the PLC and 
join Eduardo Montealegre's ALN.  She explained that the PLC 
has virtually ostracized her because she refused to hire 
municipal employees in accordance to their loyalty to the 
PLC.  Instead, she has hired people who were most qualified 
for the positions.  According to Salinas the Liberal vote in 
her district is evenly split between Montealegre and Rizo. 
She feared that a split Liberal vote will advantage Ortega, 
although she also claimed that Sandinista mayor Vivian Orozco 
privately supports Montealegre, not Ortega. 
 
PRO-ALEMAN AND PRO-MONTEALEGRE MAYORS SHARE COMMON CONCERNS . 
. . 
- -  - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - 
 
¶7.  (C) In the Ambassador's joint meeting with four PLC 
mayors (Elba Maria Salinas, Rolando Ruiz, Leonel Leonidas, 
and William Hernandez), a PLC councilman (Juan Obando), and 
one APRE mayor (Carlos Cajina), problems with cedula issuance 
and fears that the CSE will forbid Nicaraguans from voting in 
their area of residence dominated the conversation.  While 
Ruiz acknowledged that Montealegre enjoys considerable 
popularity in Boaco, he predicted that most Liberals will 
mark PLC box number 1 on the ballot, as they always have. 
Cajina opined that the fact that his brother Fabricio is 
Montealegre's running mate will give Montealegre an advantage 
in Boaco.  He added, however, that the most crucial goal is 
to ensure Ortega does not win the election; issues regarding 
Montealegre versus Rizo are secondary.  Obando focused on the 
high unemployment among the department's youth, explaining 
that only five out of 100 high school graduates continue on 
to university, and very few university graduates can find 
gainful employment in Boaco.  Thus, many young professionals 
migrate to the United States to find work. 
 
. . . WHILE RANCHERS' ASSOCIATION LEADERS ARE CLEARLY 
ARNOLDISTA 
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- - 
 
¶8.  (C) The three representatives of Boaco's Ranchers 
Association -- Luis Ortega Urbina, Miguel Somoza, and Gil 
Salvador Granja -- are unabashed Arnoldistas, claiming that 
Rizo will draw the lion's share of the department's rural 
votes.  They acknowledged, however, that Montealegre could 
attract enough votes, but mainly from elites and 
Conservatives, to allow Ortega to win the election. 
According to these die-hard PLC ranchers, the U.S. efforts to 
end caudillo rule in Nicaragua are misplaced and have 
encouraged the Liberal division.  Caudillo leadership remains 
the norm in Nicaraguan communities, argued Somoza, who added 
that change in Nicaragua's political culture must be gradual. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador remarked that the two caudillos have 
divided power at the expense of, and detriment to, the 
country.  Aleman has gradually handed over control to Ortega, 
and Nicaragua is suffering the consequences, including 
allowing a presidential candidate to win with 35% of the 
votes.  Ortega Urbina countered that President Bolanos must 
share the blame for the continuation of the FSLN-PLC pact. 
By isolating Aleman, Bolanos divided the National Assembly's 
Liberal votes, preventing the Liberals from reforming the 
Constitution and "oxygenizing" the FSLN.  The ranchers also 
complained of foreign assistance to Sandinista NGOS, but they 
were at a loss for words when the Ambassador suggested the 
PLC form more civil society groups.  (COMMENT:  Aleman 
empowered Ortega long before Bolanos' election.  The PLC 
often complains of Sandinista dominance over civil society 
groups, but appears unwilling to establish its own NGOs.) 
 
MRS ENTHUSED, BUT PENNILESS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) Local MRS leaders -- including National Assembly 
candidates Francisco Gutierrez Espinoza, and Noelia Guerrero; 
legal representative Frank Gutierrez; and, local party 
coordinators William Cuadra Lopez and Freddy Coronado -- were 
understandably still affected by Herty Lewites' recent death. 
 However, they were determined to carry on with his legacy 
and confident that their party will attract a sizable number 
of both traditionally FSLN and undecided voters.  After all, 
argued Cuadra, the MRS is not only Herty.  Its project offers 
to combat corruption and poverty within a democratic, 
tolerant, and pragmatic framework.  Gutierrez added that 
Carlos Mejia Godoy's candidacy will likely attract more 
Sandinista voters.  The MRS leaders were confident that they 
have enough party poll watchers (fiscales) to defend the vote 
on November 5 and appreciated IRI's training of their 
fiscales.  Further many MRS fiscales were previously FSLN 
poll watchers, who know the "tricks."  The lack of campaign 
funds was the MRS's 
greatest concern, ventured Gutierrez Espinoza.  And, like 
their ALN and PLC counterparts, MRS leaders complained that 
the CSE facilitates cedula applications of citizens 
affiliated with the FSLN, while it stalls on the applications 
of others. 
 
¶11.  (C) To the Ambassador's observation that many 
center-right Nicaraguans claim the MRS is the FSLN's "Trojan 
Horse" to ensure an Ortega victory and their concerns that 
many of Lewites' inner circle are Sandinista "comandantes," 
Gutierrez Espinoza replied that the MRS holds different views 
from the FSLN vis a vis relations with the United States and 
economic policy.  While the MRS seeks positive relations with 
the United States and is committed to an open economy, Ortega 
prefers a confrontational relationship with the U.S. and a 
closed economy, explained Espinoza, who added that most 
Nicaraguans seek "social pragmatism," not outmoded ideology. 
Gutierrez asserted that the FSLN is not democratic because it 
rejects change.  Guerrero noted that many MRS supporters, 
herself included, had broken with the FSLN some time ago. 
Rather, Herty articulated the desires of many anti-Ortega 
Sandinistas.  The MRS is attracting former PLC militants, and 
other non-Sandinistas, as it is a change-oriented movement 
that appeals to the poor, small producers, youth, and women, 
asserted Gutierrez Espinoza. 
 
¶12.  (C) The Ambassador reiterated Assistant Secretary 
Shannon's recent statement encouraging Nicaraguans to move 
beyond the traditional caudillo-style political party 
leadership and replace it with truly democratic parties.  He 
assured the MRS leaders that the United States can work with 
right or left-leaning governments so long as they govern 
under democratic practices, establish reasonable economic 
policies, and cooperate with the United States to combat 
trafficking and terrorism.  Eager to distance himself from 
the FSLN, Espinoza asserted that MRS break with Ortega is 
permanent and that "democracy is not the patrimony of 
anyone."  "To rescue Sandinismo and end the pact, we must 
finish with Daniel Ortega," asserted Cuadra. 
 
CLAMOR FOR CEDULAS 
 - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (C)  Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN) local representative 
Javier de Jesus Alonso and Etica y Transparencia (ET) 
coordinator Alejandro Perez Cerda concurred that the 
FSLN-dominated CSE is manipulating cedula issuance to its 
benefit and voiced concern that Nicaraguans who did not 
verify their presence on the voter roster (padron) may not be 
able to vote.  ALN, MRS, PLC, and NGO contacts also 
complained over the FSLN's "hold" over cedula issuance. 
Montealegre supporter Emigdio Alvarado (PLI) claimed that of 
the ALN's 17,000 affiliates in Boaco, 30% do not possess a 
cedula and attributed this fact to instructions from the 
FSLN-controlled CSE in Managua to block cedula issuance to 
all but FSLN supporters.  When ALN supporters apply at the 
local CSE office, they are confronted with all sorts of 
obstacles that impinge on their ability to obtain the prized 
document, e.g., applicants are told that their photo is of 
poor quality, that their birth certificates are fraudulent. 
Nicaraguan youth are especially disadvantaged, and the youth 
vote could determine the outcome of the November election, 
argued Barquero.  The Ambassador urged all interlocutors to 
document these irregularities and present them to the OAS, 
the EU, and the Carter Center and to draw on civil society 
and the media to pressure the CSE. 
 
 
MEDDLING 
- - - - 
 
¶14.  (C) To Ambassador's query regarding his engagement in 
Nicaragua, Montealegre supporters opined that the Ambassador 
should be even stronger in his support for Nicaragua's 
democracy.  Barquero (ALN) argued that Venezuelan President 
Chavez, who openly endorses Ortega, is the true meddler in 
Nicaragua's domestic affairs.  Alvarado (PLI) opined that the 
USG's association with Montealegre helps more than hurts the 
campaign, as most Liberal Nicaraguans, especially rural 
voters, are interested in the U.S. perspective.  PLC mayor 
Rolando Ruiz remarked that the U.S. Embassy role is important 
and can foster democracy in Nicaragua and differentiated 
between helpful suggestions and unhelpful impositions.  PLC 
ranchers opined that U.S. support for democracy is welcome, 
while favoring a particular party is not.  MRS leader 
Espinoza believed that the current level of U.S. engagement 
is appropriate, adding that too much U.S. aggression could 
work in Ortega's favor.  In meetings the Ambassador clarified 
that the USG does not finance particular parties or 
candidates; rather, we are contributing over USD 12 million 
towards civic education, cedula issuance, and fiscal and 
observer support and training. 
 
CAFTA CAN HELP, BUT GIVE US ROADS, JOBS, AND KEEP UP THE 
REMITTANCES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - 
 
¶15.  (C) Invariably, interlocutors cited the department's 
substantial reliance on remittances to keep the local economy 
minimally afloat.  And, while most were enthused about the 
opportunities CAFTA offers, they cited the lack of 
infrastructure, particularly roads and electricity, as 
limitations to competing in CAFTA.  For Boaquenos, the area's 
lack of roads is the "Achilles heel" of Cafta because it 
limits the ability of producers to transport their products 
to market before they spoil (Boaco produces meat, dairy 
products, and fruit and vegetables, including some coffee.) 
Some opined that if the roads are fixed, CAFTA-related 
investment will pour in, and with it unemployment will drop. 
Other concerns included the lack of access to health care, 
housing, and job training. 
 
¶16.  (C) To the Ambassador's suggestion that local taxes be 
used to build roads, PLC Mayor Ruiz replied that property 
taxes could be used but since there are no taxes on dairy, 
beef, and chicken production, the revenues are limited. 
However, he acknowledged that some local producers could be 
persuaded to contribute to road construction to supplement 
Ministry of Transport and Development Fund (FISE) monies.  He 
mentioned that the Mayor of Boaco is currently engaged in 
this type of cooperative effort, combining local 
contributions with national funds to build roads.  Ruiz added 
that tolls could be charged to cover maintenance costs.  PLC 
Mayor Cajina remarked that if Nicaraguans were not always 
campaigning for one election or another, they would have more 
time to resolve development issues. 
 
¶17.  (C) The Ambassador noted that since CAFTA 
implementation, Nicaraguan exports to the United States have 
increased 30%.  He highlighted the basic recipe for CAFTA 
success: rule of law, human capital, and infrastructure, and 
encouraged Boaquenos to take advantage of U.S. assistance 
programs in the department -- including dairy and coffee 
production assistance, education, health care, road 
rehabilitation, and judicial sector strengthening -- to help 
Boaco compete.  Ruiz noted that his district, Camoapa, has 
benefited greatly from USAID assistance in the dairy 
industry.  According to many of the interlocutors, including 
the Mayor of Boaco and PLC Councilman Obando, the area is 
ripe for a free trade zone, as it is close to Managua and is 
situated between Managua and the southern area of the 
Atlantic Coast.  A free trade zone might provide these 
professionals with a reason to stay, suggested Obando.  The 
Ambassador suggested that Boaquenos approach Pro Nicaragua 
for help with the tax free zone initiative. 
 
VICAR FAVORS PARTIES OF CHANGE 
- - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶18.  (C) Vicar Juan Moreira shared the concerns of other 
interlocutors over the difficulties non-FSLN supporters face 
in obtaining cedulas and the fears that the FSLN is prepared 
to win the election at all costs.  He noted that Archbishop 
 
Brenes will release a Church communique calling for free, 
fair, and credible elections.  However, he was optimistic 
because this election presents new choices and opportunities 
that he hopes Boaquenos will support in November. 
BRENNAN