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UNCLAS LIMA 002926 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SNAR PINR PE
SUBJECT: CRACKS APPEAR IN HUMALA'S BASE IN AYACUCHO 
 
REF: A. LIMA 2743 
 
     ¶B. 2005 LIMA 976 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified, Please Handle Accordingly. 
 
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Summary: 
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¶1. (SBU) Ayacucho voters overwhelmingly supported radical 
opposition leader and former presidential candidate Ollanta 
Humala in the recent 6/4 presidential runoff.  However, 
Humala will have trouble transferring this support to 
candidates he favors in November's regional and municipal 
elections.  Radical groups that coalesced behind him during 
the presidential campaign have divided and are offering their 
own candidates.  While this hurts Humala, it also presents 
challenges for the Garcia government, which will need 
effective local partners to promote successful development 
programs.  Ayacucho's anti-establishment mood extends to the 
Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA), which many local 
farmers oppose without knowing its provisions.   Long-term, 
building democracy in Ayacucho will require strengthening 
political parties and other consensus-building mechanisms to 
enhance governability in this impoverished, highly 
marginalized, and politically volatile region.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Poloff met with local leaders in Ayacucho on 7/12-13 
to assess the region's political landscape.  Local 
interlocutors included: Omar Quesada, Ayacucho Regional 
President;  Gerardo Ludena, Mayor of Ayacucho; Rigoberto 
Garcia, leader of the Ayacucho Regional Front (FRA), Clelia 
Galvez de Verbist, Director of the Ayacucho Center for 
Competitiveness; Hernan Paz, Director of the Poverty 
Reduction and Alleviation Program in Ayacucho; Monsenor Luis 
Sebastiani, Archbishop of Ayacucho; Victor Belleza, Ayacucho 
Coordinator for World Vision, Jeffrey Gamarra, sociologist at 
the University of Huamanga; Mario Cueto, journalist and 
correspondent for Radio Programs of Peru; and Aguida Valverde 
and Marco Juscamayta from local newspaper "la Voz de 
Huamanga." 
 
------------------------------- 
Why Humala took 83% in Ayacucho 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ayacucho voted overwhelmingly for former anti-system 
presidential candidate Ollanta Humala in the recent 
presidential races.  Humala scored 62 percent in the first 
round (4/9) and 83 percent in second round (6/4), tallies 
that far outstripped his showings in other areas.  Humala's 
anti-system message resonated in Ayacucho, where the poverty 
level is 73 percent and extreme poverty level is 45 percent, 
both well above national averages.  Ayacucho also remains 
scarred by the internal war against Sendero Luminoso (SL). 
Interlocutors said Ayacuchanos believe the state owes them a 
social debt and communities are still waiting for 
compensation.  For Ayacuchanos the state, at best, is seen as 
neglectful.  For some, particularly cocaleros, it is also 
perceived as the enemy.  The Apurimac and Ene River Valley 
(VRAE) in Ayacucho is a major zone of illegal coca 
production. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Regional and Municipal Elections - Fragmented Politics 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Observers agreed that Humala's  support in the 
recent presidential contest is not/not transferable to 
pro-Humala candidates in November's regional and municipal 
elections.  The panoply of leftist movements that rallied 
behind Humala have again split and are now jockeying for 
position, forming alliances and seeking their own candidates 
for November.  In addition, Humala's own Peruvian Nationalist 
Party (PNP) has split from its coalition partner, the Union 
for Peru (UPP), and both are expected to run separate 
candidates.  Much is at stake for Humala in Ayacucho, given 
his dominance in recent national elections.  If his party 
does not win, he will be further weakened politically. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Political fragmentation extends to other parties and 
E 
movements, all of which will likely offer candidates in 
November.  APRA now controls both the Ayacucho Regional 
Presidency and the Mayorship of the city.  Both incumbents, 
however, have been discredited by corruption allegations. 
The pro-Fujimori party Alianza para el Futuro has a 
significant political presence.  Another group, the Ayacucho 
Regional Front (FRA), enjoys a local support base.  (Contacts 
tied the FRA to both SL and to violent protests.)  Finally, 
cocalero leader Nelson Palomino, released from jail on 6/6 
after completing a third of his 10-year sentence for 
kidnapping, burglary, and other crimes, has formed a regional 
pro-coca political movement called Kuska Peru (KP).  (Quechua 
for "Together for Peru.")  Palomino is expected to cut into 
Humala's cocalero support, but his presence adds another wild 
card to Ayacucho's already hyperactive political scene. 
(Palomino is as yet ineligible for office because of his 
crimes.  Further on cocalero politics septel.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) University of Huamanga Sociologist Jeffrey Gamarra 
attributed the "excessive fragmentation" of Ayacucho politics 
to weak political parties and to the personality- and 
patronage-driven nature of the region's organizations.  The 
need, Gamarra maintained, was to "democratize the democracy" 
that exists in Ayacucho by strengthening key local parties. 
There are too many competitors in local elections, 
guaranteeing a constantly divided field that denies winners 
governing majorities.  The 2002 election featured 12 
candidates for regional president and 18 candidates for 
mayor.  APRA won both contests, with 23 percent for the 
Regional Presidency and 15 percent for the Mayor, percentages 
far too low to offer winners a mandate to govern. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
The Shadow of Sendero/Anti-Americanism 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Eager to take advantage of the fragmentation of the 
above-ground political actors is SL.  Local contacts said 
that SL remained defeated militarily, but retained a 
political and ideological presence in Ayacucho and was 
working to rebuild its civil society networks in universities 
and in other institutions. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Anti-Americanism is also a problem in Ayacucho. 
U.S. counter-narcotics programs, misrepresented by local 
opponents, generate some of the hostility.  Many local 
agricultural leaders oppose an FTA with the US even as they 
support similar agreements with other potential trading 
partners (e.g., E.U., China) that have higher subsidies. 
Contacts acknowledged that if the PTPA along with President 
Garcia's plans to promote agricultural exports succeeded in 
improving local opportunities, then anti-government, anti-US 
feelings could moderate.  This will be difficult, however, 
since many of the angry Ayacuchanos are subsistence farmers 
with low technology, low levels of education and a strong 
reluctance to change their ways. 
 
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Comment: 
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¶10. (SBU) Ayacucho is a case study in the tendency of a 
marginalized Peruvian population to adopt an almost 
instinctive oppositional approach to any perceived authority, 
either from Lima or the U.S.  This expresses itself in voting 
for Peru's perennial "outsider" candidates.  Ayacucho voters 
heavily favored previous "outsiders" Alberto Fujimori (1990) 
and Alejandro Toledo (2001) in recent elections.  Given 
Humala's high numbers in the recent 6/4 runoff, the regional 
and municipal elections constitute an important test for him. 
 So far, his prospects are far from certain.  In Ayacucho's 
highly divided political atmosphere, we do not discount the 
possibility that a pro-Humala candidate could squeak in. 
Even this result, however, would not repeat Humala's recent 
landslide wins in the presidential race.  Local politics is 
simply too fragmented for that. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Ayacucho has everything to gain and little to lose 
with the PTPA. Despite GOP and Post efforts on outreach, 
there is a widespread misunderstanding of the agreement.  The 
PTPA has become a scapegoat for Ayacucho's continuing 
problems and a continued rallying point for leftist, radical 
groups. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Longer term, Ayacucho needs assistance in 
developing stronger, more participatory political parties 
that can generate consensus.  Ayacucho's citizens are 
politically active, but they work through an array of weak 
parties and personalized mini-movements that do not generate 
sufficient consensus to ensure post-election governability at 
either the regional or the municipal level.  Even without big 
victories by pro-Humala candidates in November, the Garcia 
government faces significant challenges in the south. 
STRUBLE