Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1827, SITUATION REPORT FROM NORTH DARFUR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KHARTOUM1827.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1827 2006-07-31 15:37 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5954
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1827/01 2121537
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311537Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3960
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001827 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  SITUATION REPORT FROM NORTH DARFUR 
 
KHARTOUM 00001827  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  From July 12 to July 22, the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Humanitarian Protection and Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP) Advisor provided field officer coverage in 
El Fasher, North Darfur. Intra-Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) fighting, 
an increase in numbers of new IDPs, and additional attacks against 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) were the major 
issues observed during this period.  Amidst the volatile and 
unpredictable security situation in North Darfur, USAID/OFDA 
implementing partners continue to respond to beneficiaries' 
humanitarian needs in a timely and efficient manner.  End summary. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Intra-SLA Fighting Causes New Displacements 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  From July 12 to July 22, the USAID/OFDA Protection Advisor 
traveled to El Fasher, North Darfur to provide field coverage and 
support.  The USAID/OFDA Protection Advisor remained in El Fasher 
and visited area camps Al Salaam and Zam Zam.  In El Fasher, the 
USAID/OFDA Protection Advisor also met with USAID/OFDA implementing 
partners, representatives from the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 
and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA). 
 
3. Increased violence and inter-fighting between SLA/Minni Minawi 
(SLA/MM) and SLA/Abdel Wahid al Nur (SLA/AW) forces in the areas 
surrounding Tawila and Korma caused the displacement of civilians to 
the camps surrounding El Fasher.  As of July 26, OCHA estimated that 
between 18,000 and 20,000 people had been displaced in these areas. 
OCHA did not have an estimate on the number of potential IDPs that 
are not in camps and have scattered around the Tawila and Korma 
areas.  On a positive note, OCHA indicated that the humanitarian 
response to this large displacement has been efficient. 
 
4.  OCHA and UNMIS-Human Rights (UNMIS-HR) reported that SLA/MM 
forces have engaged in indiscriminate attacks, killings, and looting 
of civilians who are attempting to flee the violence.  In mid July, 
OCHA, UNMIS-HR, UNMIS-Protection, and the U.N. Department of Safety 
and Security (UNDSS) conducted an inter-agency assessment mission to 
the Korma area to further investigate these allegations.  On July 
18, the USAID/OFDA Protection Advisor met with UNMIS-HR and obtained 
additional details and confirmation of the attacks committed by 
SLA/MM forces around the Korma area between July 5 and 7. 
 
5. The attacks led by SLA/MM forces in villages surrounding Korma 
led to the deaths 56 men.  This death toll was confirmed by 
UNMIS-HR, based on the consistent accounts from surviving villagers 
and from the newly displaced people interviewed in the camps around 
the El Fasher area.  In addition, UNMIS-HR visited the grave sites 
and has a list of the victims' names. 
 
6.  The focal point of the killings occurred in the Daljil village 
area, where UNMIS-HR confirmed that 48 males were killed (11 were 
students and under the age of 18), and another 12 adult men were 
wounded. UNMIS-HR described the villagers as unarmed civilians, and 
characterized the attack on Daljil as a massacre carried out by 
SLA/MM forces.  UNMIS-HR stated that SLA/MM forces described the 
incident as a battle against SLA/AW militants, and there was an 
exchange of fire.  According to the IDPs and villagers, there were 
no reports of an exchange of fire.  Villagers and IDPs stated that 
they were "under the control of SLA/AW forces," but they were not 
combatants.  The villagers who remain in the area currently have 
restricted freedom of movement, as SLA/MM forces are preventing them 
from traveling outside their villages.  UNMIS-HR highlighted that 
Shoba village is currently uninhabited, while Daljil village has 
some people remaining in it. 
 
7.  Thus far, it appears that sexual violence against women did not 
play a central role in these attacks.  Although UNMIS-HR has 
received some allegations regarding this issue, to date, they have 
been unable to confirm any cases.  According to the Sheik of Daljil 
village, the women remained in their homes while the men fled.  In 
some of the attacks, women and men have been whipped.  UNMIS-HR will 
continue to follow this issue. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001827  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
INGOs Face Increased Security Challenges 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8.  USAID/OFDA partners International Rescue Committee, Relief 
International (RI), GOAL, and CHF International, as well as other 
INGOs operating in North Darfur, are increasingly faced with real 
threats of banditry and carjackings.  RI reported that on July 12 
one of their national staff members was fatally shot on the 
Kabkabiya/Al Shireaf road by three bandits, in what was reported as 
a carjacking gone awry.  There are unconfirmed rumors that the 
incident was ethnically motivated. RI has temporarily suspended 
activities in the area, and a police investigation is on-going. On 
July 14, UNDSS reported that it evacuated seven NGO workers 
(MSF-Belgium and RI staff) from Saraf Omra after MSF-Belgium's 
compound was raided by three armed men who attempted to steal three 
vehicles. The armed men successfully stole one vehicle, but no one 
was injured during the robbery.  RI and MSF-Belgium temporarily 
suspended activities in the area.  According to OCHA, the evacuation 
was conducted in an efficient and timely manner. 
 
9.  According to the USAID/OFDA Protection Advisor, the general 
feeling among INGOs facing these security incidents is that they 
were not specifically targeted; rather, these incidents were acts of 
opportunity aimed at acquiring vehicles.  UNDSS continues to monitor 
the situation and remains in close coordination with all INGOs in 
the area. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Humanitarian Response to Influx of IDPs 
--------------------------------------- 
 
10.  The USAID/OFDA Protection Advisor observed that OCHA 
coordinated the humanitarian response to the new influx of IDPs in 
the camps surrounding El Fasher in an organized and efficient 
manner.  OCHA is concerned that there are a large number of IDPs 
that have scattered into rural areas or villages in the Korma and 
Kassam Tunjur area.  The displacement picture is much larger than 
that illustrated by the camp arrivals.  Many IDPs are either unable 
to reach camps or have sought refuge with family members in remote 
villages.  The challenge for the humanitarian community is to access 
these areas.  UNDSS is evaluating travel conditions to affected 
areas. 
 
11.  OCHA reported that the humanitarian assistance response in 
camps has been well organized, and supplies are available.  Notably, 
IDPs arriving at Zam Zam camp and Tawila have been arriving with 
some food stocks and household materials.  Few emergency food 
rations have been required, non-food item (NFI) stocks are not 
strained, and the food aid pipeline problems have been resolved, 
with IDPs receiving full rations.  However, IDPs arriving at Al 
Salaam camp have fewer possessions or assets. 
 
STEINFELD