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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1811, CPA: JDB Working Well, OAGs Still a Problem

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1811 2006-07-30 10:07 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4948
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1811/01 2111007
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301007Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3934
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS SU
SUBJECT: CPA: JDB Working Well, OAGs Still a Problem 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  On July 18, the Technical Committee of the Joint 
Defense Board (JDB) addressed the Assessment and Evaluation 
Commission (AEC) and reported that establishment and deployment of 
the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) was almost complete, although 
training remained an issue.  The Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army 
(SPLA) is no longer in the north, and the redeployment of Sudanese 
Armed Forces (SAF) out of the south is well ahead of schedule, but 
still "tricky" around the oil fields. 
 
2.  (SBU) The committee emphasized that other armed groups (OAGs) 
would remain a threat until the OAG Commission had counted them and 
a proper Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
program begins.  After being pressed, the SAF admitted to continuing 
to support the unaligned OAGs with food and medicine, although not 
weapons, until the DDR process is complete.  For the Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA), the committee said that the JIUs, SPLA, and 
SAF are developing a plan to quickly deal with the LRA if talks 
fail.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
JDB Working Well, JIUs in Place 
------------------------------- 
 
3.  (U) Comprised of eight members split evenly between SAF and 
SPLA, the Technical Committee is responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the JDB.  Its offices are now fully operational and it 
is supported by a staff of 42.  During the presentation, the 
committee members from both sides worked well together and clearly 
had established a good rapport. 
 
4.  (U) The committee explained that it had now established many of 
the ground rules for the JIUs, including uniform design, insignia, 
pay (75 percent premium pay), code of conduct, and method of 
operations.  The two issues that remained were equipment -- 
currently all JIU troops bring the equipment issued them by their 
respective armies, leading to inequities -- and training.  Training 
was more difficult because they had no budget and therefore no way 
to plan.  Without joint training, they opined, the units could not 
really function as an integrated whole.  The only joint training 
that had taken place so far was demining training in Kenya, and 
those groups were already starting to map minefields and begin 
work. 
 
5.  (U) Virtually all 39,500 JIU troops, evenly split between SAF 
and SPLA, were now deployed and salaries were being paid.  The 
breakdown of deployed JIU troops is as follows:  24,000 in Southern 
Sudan, 6,000 in Nuba Mountains, 6,000 in Southern Blue Nile, 3,000 
in Khartoum (in Soba and Jebel Aulia), and 600 in Abyei. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Redeployment Ahead, But Not Around Oil Fields 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (U) The Technical Committee said that redeployment was now well 
ahead of schedule, with all SPLA troops withdrawn from the north and 
almost all SAF troops out of the south.  The SAF had completely 
pulled out of greater Equatoria and the last contingent of SAF in 
greater Bahr Al-Ghazal was awaiting redeployment.  The committee 
said the SAF headquarters in Juba and Wau had been turned over to 
the JIUs and the headquarters in Malakal would be transferred soon. 
Redeployment in the greater Upper Nile region was further behind, 
and the oil fields were the la!(pent to the oil 
field regions. 
 
7.  (SBU) The oil fields remain a potential trouble spot, with a 
relatively small area hosting troops from JIUs, SAF, SPLA, OAGs 
aligned to either the SAF or the SPLA but not integrated, unaligned 
OAGs, and other northern security forces.  A few days after the 
presentation, this was highlighted by a small misunderstanding 
between a SAF soldier and some OAGs that turned deadly.  COMMENT: 
The fact that the incident was dealt with quickly and did not lead 
to further escalation is a testament to the level of confidence 
between the SPLA and the SAF. END COMMENT. 
 
------------------------- 
OAG Major Threat to Peace 
------------------------- 
 
8.  (U) Both the SAF and SPLA representatives agreed that OAGs 
remained a major threat to peace, and would remain a problem until 
the CPA's mandated OAG committee was formed and a full DDR program 
could proceed.  The OAG committee was charged with counting all 
OAGs, recording their status -- SAF-aligned, SPLA-aligned, or to be 
disarmed -- and mapping them.  The committee estimated that there 
were 45,000 OAG troops at the end of the war, most under the banner 
of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) and supported by the SAF. 
Of these, 15,000 are being integrated into the SPLA and 6,000 have 
declared for the SAF.  The SAF will redeploy 3,000 of these troops 
north, with the remaining 3,000 assigned to JIUs: 1,000 in each of 
 
KHARTOUM 00001811  002 OF 002 
 
 
the south's three regions.  That left 19,000 which remained 
unaligned.  The SAF explained that while they supported these groups 
in the war, they had no capacity to integrate them and the groups 
had refused to move north. 
 
9.  (SBU) The SAF representatives then admitted that they were 
continuing to provide support for these 19,000 troops in the form of 
food and medicine.  In a shift from the overwhelming congenial tone 
of the meeting, the SPLA representatives responded with alarm and 
said that they had not heard this before.  One SPLA representative 
explained he was from Pibor, where the SSDF is causing problems, and 
that any support to this OAG allows it to operate more easily.  The 
SAF responded that it would continue to do this until DDR takes 
place, because the alternative, a hungry and sick armed group, was 
worse.  They emphasized that no arms were being provided, only 
humanitarian assistance. 
 
STEINFELD