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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1808, Unaligned SSDF Lay Out Conditions for Peace

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1808 2006-07-27 13:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2808
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1808/01 2081301
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271301Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3927
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001808 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS SU
SUBJECT: Unaligned SSDF Lay Out Conditions for Peace 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: On July 19, Embassy PolOff was invited to meet 
the leaders of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) militia groups 
that did not align with the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) and will not be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces 
(SAF).  The meeting including all four major hold-outs from the Juba 
Declaration:  Gordon Kong Chol, leader of the SSDF coalition, Ismail 
Kongi, Tom Al-Nur Galgum, and Gabriel Tangyang Tang.  The men said 
they where men of peace who support the CPA, despite what Government 
of Southern Sudan (GoSS) President Salva Kiir might tell the U.S. 
President.  Their views ranged from the more conciliatory Kongi to 
the hard-line Kong, but all expressed support for the CPA and wanted 
the South-South dialogue to continue, despite their deep distrust of 
the Dinka-dominated SPLM.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Still Proud to be SAF 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (U) All the assembled leaders fought with the north during the 
war and were open about their SAF affiliations.  They are considered 
unaligned groups because the SAF has no capacity to absorb them and 
they refuse to redeploy North with the other SAF troops.  In 
addition to Kangi, Kong, Tang and Al-Nur, three other SSDF leaders 
sat in on the meeting:  Elia Lado from Central Equatoria, John Jeat, 
from north Upper Nile, and Vincent Kany from Bentiu.  None of these 
three control significant fighting forces, although Kany is a 
respected elder who co-founded Anyanya II.  All seven carry the SAF 
rank of Major General, with Kangi, Kong, Tang, and Lado in SAF 
uniform. 
 
-------------------------- 
Kongi: Clear Path to Peace 
-------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Murle leader Ismail Kongi, from Jonglei, spoke first and 
longest, saying he would disarm his militia immediately if there 
were a proper Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
process.  He said the SSDF accepts the CPA, but does not trust the 
SPLA.  Kongi explained he has no problem working with the SPLA to 
disarm, indeed he is a Member of the Southern Sudan Legislative 
Assembly, but the clumsy disarmament in Jonglei last spring looked 
like a Dinka power grab that led him to question the SPLA's 
motives. 
 
------------------- 
Tang: Ready to Deal 
------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Gabriel Tang, also known as Tangyang, said he too was 
willing to deal, although he was less clear about his demands.  The 
problem with the Juba Declaration negotiations, he said, was that 
then-SSDF leader Paulino Matiep, now Deputy Commander-in-Chief of 
the SPLA, did not consult with his staff and abandoned the SSDF's 
demands in exchange for a high personal position in the SPLA.  Tang 
believed a resumption of the South-South dialogue could resolve the 
outstanding issues. 
 
----------------------------- 
Al-Nur: Peace on SSDF's Terms 
----------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Tom Al-Nur's plan for Southern unity was equal 
representation between the SPLA and the SSDF.  He said that the SSDF 
was stronger than the SPLA, so the SSDF should at least have equal 
representation in the army, the police, and the government.  The 
alternative, Al-Nur explained, was to forcibly dislodge him from 
outside of Wau, something the SPLA could not do during the war. 
Al-Nur feared that an SPLA-controlled security apparatus would 
continue to menace non-Dinka southerners and fix the upcoming 
elections, which the SSDF planned to contest. 
 
--------------------------- 
Kong: SPLA Will Kill Us All 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Gordon Kong, leader of the SSDF's loose coalition and 
former deputy of Matiep, took the hardest line.  Although he also 
said he was a man of peace, he talked of war.  Harboring a deep 
distrust of the SPLA, and all Dinka, Kong said that the only reason 
the GoSS wants to disarm them is to make it easier to kill all the 
non-Dinka.  While ethnic rivalries are a problem, Kong also believes 
the SPLM will never forgive the SSDF for siding with the north 
during the war.  Kong, known to personally hate the late SPLM leader 
John Garang, said that he actually preferred Garang to Kiir.  At 
least you knew where you stood with Garang, he explained, whereas 
Kiir will say nice things and then go behind your back to kill you. 
Kong emphasized that the SSDF was not a proxy militia to destabilize 
the south.  He said they have refused to move north because they are 
southerners.  Kong declared there would be no peace in Southern 
Sudan until the government and the security forces represented all 
the people and not just tribal interests. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001808  002 OF 002 
 
 
----------------------------- 
Questions About the U.S. Role 
----------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) According to the SSDF leaders, the SPLM had said that the 
U.S., the UN, and the entire international community was in the 
SPLM's pocket.  The SPLA had warned the SSDF that they would be 
wiped out by UN forces if they continued to resist.  PolOff 
explained that the USG was only interested in helping bring peace, 
stability, and prosperity to the Southern Sudanese.  He explained 
that while the U.S. had developed a strong relationship with the 
SPLM by working together to achieve these goals in the past, the USG 
wanted to work with a broad spectrum of tribal leaders and political 
parties to build civil society and democracy in Southern Sudan. 
PolOff also assured the leaders that UNMIS remained a neutral force. 
 The SSDF leaders expressed gratitude for this meeting, their first 
with a U.S. official since the CPA was signed, and said they were 
now more reassured about the United States and its impartiality. 
They encouraged the Embassy to maintain contact to help facilitate 
South-South dialogue and to confront what they described as SPLM 
lies about their intentions. 
 
STEINFELD