VZCZCXRO1548
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1796/01 2071119
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261119Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3897
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001796 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: VIEWS ON THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT FROM THE 
GROUND: MUKJAR AND GARSILA, WEST DARFUR 
 
KHARTOUM 00001796  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  From July 8 to 13, a USAID/Office of Transition 
Initiatives (OTI) Field Advisor and a USAID Program 
Assistant traveled to Mukjar and Garsila towns in West 
Darfur to speak to displaced communities about the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and the Darfur-Darfur 
Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC).  A subsequent cable 
will address quick-impact programming possibilities in 
these areas. 
 
¶2.  Fur internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Mukjar 
and Garsila area are still very negative toward the DPA. 
Their primary grievances are that uniformed Arab 
militias have not been disarmed, the compensation is not 
enough for the Fur who lost more in the conflict than 
the Zaghawa, and Abdel Wahid al Nur did not sign the 
document.  Fur IDPs claim that the distribution of the 
DPA is a waste of time, and they will not read it until 
Al Nur signs it. 
 
¶3.  There are concrete actions that can be done 
immediately to support the DPA in this area.  The 
African Union (AU) needs to improve public relations 
with IDPs and inhabitants in the Mukjar/Garsila area. 
Also, the U.N. can use its reputation as being an 
unbiased actor to facilitate discussions and workshops 
with the AU.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Situation in Mukjar and Garsila 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  Both Mukjar and Garsila are primarily Fur.  Mukjar 
town is the government seat of Mukjar locality, which is 
home to 16,000 to 18,000 people, according to 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Prior to the conflict, the population of Mukjar was 
between 4,000 and 8,000 people.  The Mukjar area was the 
scene of some of the most brutal fighting Q in August 
2003, the villages around Mukjar were burned, residents 
fled into Mukjar (and a minority to Nyala and Khartoum), 
and mass executions reportedly took place.  The majority 
of the current population are those who fled the burning 
of villages in the rural countryside. 
 
¶5.  Garsila town is home to approximately 40,000 IDPs in 
three different camps along the villagesQ outskirts. 
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) estimated that prior to the conflict there were 
6,000 households of primarily African tribes, with some 
Arab households.  Most IDPs in Garsila came from a 
cluster of approximately 30 villages near Garsila that 
were completed destroyed and are now visibly occupied by 
nomad civilians and Arab militia. 
 
------------------------- 
View from Women and Youth 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  During this trip, the USAID team discussed the 
humanitarian situation and early recovery needs.  In 
Mukjar, six Fur women leaders referred to as Qsheikas 
described how the lack of security and food influenced 
their views of the DPA.  They angrily stated that the 
U.N. Food Program (WFP) reduced their rations in April. 
(Note:  WFP rations were reduced to half due to pipeline 
problems, but full rations will resume soon.  End note.) 
They also stated that Arab militias had not been 
disarmed, and they are unable to farm due to the 
occupation of lands by nomads.  They QlostQ on the 
compensation issue in the agreement, and that they do 
not trust Minni Minawi to give them even the limited 
provisions that are in the DPA.  For these reasons they 
were against the DPA.  The women repeated, QWe need food 
or a force, not the DPA. 
 
¶7.   Also in Mukjar, after the signing of the DPA, the 
IDP residents, particularly young men made a written 
 
KHARTOUM 00001796  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
record of their grievances.  This was formally presented 
to the AU in Mukjar on May 26, and shared with the USAID 
team.  The main points were the following:  1) 
protection of IDPs by U.N. forces; 2) disarmament of the 
uniformed Arab militia; 3) immediate delivery of war 
criminals to the International Criminal Court; 4) 
individual compensation to IDPs and refugees; 5) 
rebuilding destroyed villages; and 6) separation of 
humanitarian issues from political demands.  In Garsila, 
the USAID team also met with a school master who 
explained that immediately after the DPA was signed, he 
observed that many of his students and other youth in 
the IDP camps left to join the SLA/Abdel Wahid (AW) to 
demonstrate their rejection of the agreement. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Views on DPA and DDDC from SheiksQ and Local Elites 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶8.  The USAID team met with four of the five most senior 
sheiks from the displaced community residing in Mukjar. 
They were against the DPA because they lost everything, 
compensation is not enough, and Abdel Wahid al Nur did 
not sign the agreement.  The sheiks did not want copies 
of the DPA for themselves and claimed they would not 
read the DPA until Abdel Wahid signs it.  Additionally, 
they were distrustful of the Sudanese government. 
According to the sheikhs, the area is Qfull of arms, 
and they doubted the Sudanese governmentQs ability to 
change the situation.  As they explained, Qthe 
government hasnQt finished the war and they are 
supporting the Chadian opposition right in Mukjar.  Thus 
they cannot be serious about disarming anyone. 
According to the group, several weeks earlier Arab 
militia had come into Mukjar to meet with the Sudanese 
government.  The Sudanese government issued them new 
uniforms and openly stated that the Arab militia were to 
prepare themselves for U.N. troops. 
 
¶9.  When asked if they heard of any plans for the DDDC, 
the sheiks stated that it was Qbig joke.Q  The 
government in Mukjar recently requested that the sheiks 
travel to El Geneina for the first meeting of the DDDC; 
however, they refused to go because the Sudanese 
government offered them money and told them what to say 
at the meeting.  In Garsila, the team met with local 
educated elites who were frustrated with the general 
security situation and did not have high hopes for the 
DDDC, saying that it will probably be manipulated by the 
Sudanese government. (Note:  The USAID team attempted to 
meet with the sheik leadership of the three Garsila 
camps, but the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) stated 
that they must facilitate such a meeting, so the USAID 
team refused.  End note.) 
 
----------------- 
The AU in Mukjar 
----------------- 
 
¶10.  The IDP community views the AU as being co-opted by 
and under the direction of the Sudanese government, and 
the AU does little to dissuade this perception.  When 
the AU first arrived in Mukjar in June 2005, the 
community presented a list of persons reportedly 
executed and buried in a mass grave near to the location 
where the AU was building its base.  The community 
claimed that the AU did nothing, even at a minimum to 
secure the location or even investigate the existence of 
the graves.  During this visit, the AU told the USAID 
team that they were aware of the mass graves and that 
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had conducted 
an internal investigation. 
 
¶11.  The Acting AU Commander in Charge stated that AU 
staff do not hold meetings with the IDPs.  The AU 
confirmed that they did not proceed with the firewood 
patrols that were requested by the IDPs and UNHCR, 
because the Commissioner for Mukjar locality, Hashim 
Abbas Ziad, refused to allow them to occur. 
Regarding DPA actions and planning for the DDDC, the AU 
Commander in Charge stated that the AU has not conducted 
 
KHARTOUM 00001796  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
any DPA related activities because they have not been 
trained on the document and do not feel prepared to 
speak on its contents.  Instead of independently asking 
civil society members to participate, the AU asked the 
local government to identify DDDC participants.  The IDP 
leaders are well aware that this is how the AU is 
proceeding on the DPA and it exacerbates their negatives 
views of both the AU and the DPA. 
 
------------------------------------ 
The Perspective of Local Governments 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶12.  The USAID team made a courtesy call to Abdul Nasir, 
the Deputy Commissioner of Mukjar locality.  He thanked 
the U.S. for all its assistance to the people of Darfur. 
Nasir stated that he needs assistance in discussing and 
explaining the DPA because it is a complex and lengthy 
legal document, and he has no financial resources to 
implement it.  Regarding the DDDC, Nasir stated that he 
is waiting for more information from the Qpeace 
committeesQ that are established in the various states 
to deal with the DDDC.  When the team visited the HAC in 
Garsila, they complained that they were not informed of 
USAIDQs programs and needed to arrange USAIDQs visit 
with IDPs.  The HAC in Garsila were supportive of DPA 
activities but recognized that the NGOs cannot work on 
these issues due to a conflict of mandate. 
 
----------------------- 
The Compensation Issue 
----------------------- 
 
¶13.  Members of Darfur civil society, heads of local 
NGOs, lawyers, and U.N. officials explain that the Fur 
are the majority of the displaced population.  The Fur 
constitute the highest number of people who lost land, 
homes, fruit trees, livestock, relatives, livelihoods, 
and personal possessions.  UNHCR-Intersos findings 
confirm that in Wadi Saleh/Mukjar area, the majority of 
villages destroyed were 80 to 100 percent Fur.  Most 
Zaghawa have remained on their desert land, which is 
unlike the fertile, greener lands of Jebel Marra and 
Wadi Saleh.  The Fur, rightly or wrongly, see that the 
Qleader of the ZaghawaQ did not fight for the needed 
compensation because the Zaghawa did not lose as much as 
the Fur did.  The perception of such an imbalance 
between losses suffered may explain why the compensation 
issue is so important to the Fur. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Actions Needed to Implement the DPA 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  Merely distributing the DPA and hoping the IDPs 
will read it, be convinced by it, and change the minds 
of their leaders is not enough.  The IDPs do not feel 
involved or connected to the DPA and its origins.  What 
little steps the Sudanese government has taken on the 
DDDC have spoiled the DPAQs credibility within the 
Mukjar community already.  Quick action by the U.N. and 
AU must be taken in the areas where Fur are the 
majority.  Those opposing the DPA see the AU as Qunder 
the thumbQ of the Sudanese government.  The AU must 
improve its public relations strategy with IDPs in order 
to proceed on DPA implementation.  For the most part, 
IDPs in Mukjar and Garsila still see the U.N. as an 
unbiased international organization.  The U.N., in 
coordination with the AU, should facilitate discussions 
and workshops for those who want to learn more about the 
DPA and DDDC. 
 
STEINFELD