VZCZCXRO8672
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1764/01 2041457
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231457Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3848
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001764 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: ABU SHOUK TRIBAL LEADERS PROVIDE VIEWS ON SECURITY, DPA 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  Tribal leaders from Abu Shouk IDP camp pointed out 
shortcomings in the DPA, but many also noted their support for the 
document and desire to learn more about it.  The group emphasized 
the need for rapid implementation of the agreement and unanimously 
favored a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  ARC Officer, accompanied by two USAID colleagues, met July 18 
for three hours with a group of 22 tribal leaders, omdas and sheiks 
from Abu Shouk internally displaced persons (IDP) camp to discuss 
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), security, and general conditions 
in the camp.  Several leaders opined on the inadequacies of the DPA, 
including its lack of buy-in from all the rebel movements, absence 
of individual compensation, and shortcomings in providing for the 
disarmament of Janjaweed.  ARC Officer countered that while not all 
parties signed the agreement, efforts continued to persuade the JEM 
and SLA-Abdel Wahid to lend their support to the DPA, and the 
international community clearly recognized the need to expand 
popular support for the accord.  ARC Officer also noted the specific 
DPA articles relating to compensation, which provide for individual 
compensation, and acknowledged the pressing need to operationalize 
and publicize the compensation committees called for in the DPA. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
SOME RECOGNITION THAT DPA MAY BE NEXT BEST ALTERNATIVE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶3.  Despite the reservations conveyed by several omdas regarding the 
DPA, many of the tribal leaders expressed the need for a pragmatic 
approach and even outright support for the agreement.  One sheik 
commented that there was a growing recognition that the DPA, while 
imperfect, was a reality that could lead to amelioration of the 
situation in Darfur.  He stated that much of the initial resistance 
to the document was the result of misinformation and, in part, AMIS' 
failure to sufficiently explain the accord and its provisions, which 
many Darfurians find confusing.  The sheik emphasized that IDPs at 
Abu Shouk want and need to learn about the DPA.  He urged the 
international community to take steps to provide such information 
quickly in a way that would be easily understandable to the 
predominantly illiterate camp population.  Like other leaders, he 
highlighted the importance of expeditiously establishing the various 
DPA committees, particularly on compensation, to tangibly 
demonstrate implementation of the agreement. 
 
¶4.  ARC officer explained the importance of the Darfur-Darfur 
Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) as a mechanism to resolve many of 
the "gaps" in the DPA, and emphasized that the DPA is not the final 
answer to Darfur's problems but rather a framework for a process. 
Tribal leaders expressed appreciation for this clarification, but 
noted it would have been useful for the AU to have made this more 
clear to months ago.  However, they articulated their fear that 
without proactive organization by the AU and UNMIS, the GNU would 
quickly hijack the dialogue.  Many of sheiks and omdas stressed the 
necessity of genuine inclusiveness in any regional dialogue - 
meaning that non-signatories to the DPA must be encouraged to 
participate and provided some political incentive in so doing. 
(NOTE:  One tribal leader held that closing the door on the 
possibility of non-signatory political participation effectively 
excluded those groups and made them more likely to play spoiler 
roles.  He echoed the sentiment of others that a Darfurian should 
hold a vice president position in the GNU.  END NOTE.) 
 
------------------------------- 
FRUSTRATION WITH AMIS CONTINUES 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  Numerous tribal leaders underscored their frustration with AMIS. 
 They remarked that not only did the force lack the capacity to 
ensure security, but that it also was increasingly viewed as a party 
to the conflict rather than as an impartial body.  Nonetheless, 
several sheiks and omdas urged their peers to take a more balanced 
and realistic view of the peace process and AMIS, given its mandate 
and resource constraints.  "After three years of war, we cannot have 
peace in only three months," one participant observed.  The group 
unanimously expressed its support for UN peacekeepers in Darfur and 
urged the United States and other members of the international 
community to continue pressuring the GNU to accept such a force. 
 
¶6.  The group offered little specifics on the impact of recent 
fighting in North Darfur, except to note the increase in the IDP 
population and reluctance to return to home villages.  Responding to 
Field Officer's query about the means of transmitting news, leaders 
related that most information was conveyed by word of mouth and 
little stock was put into either the local radio or newspapers, 
which are government controlled.  None of the participants were 
willing to offer opinions or perspectives on the G-19 or National 
Redemption Front. 
 
¶7.  COMMENT:  The tribal leaders appreciated airing their views to 
USG officials -- an opportunity, they claim, they have not fully had 
 
KHARTOUM 00001764  002 OF 002 
 
 
with AMIS.  Their cautiously supportive comments on the DPA could 
represent a shift from earlier positions that were anti-DPA. 
Contrary to many anecdotal accounts, the sheiks and omdas were 
clearly interested in better understanding the DPA and the plan for 
implementation.  Furthermore, they understood the importance of 
educating the IDP population about the accord and, when offered a 
few copies of the USAID-translated Arabic summary of the DPA, they 
snapped them up without hesitation.  They even requested additional 
copies, which were later provided, to disseminate at the Abu Shouk 
IDP camp, encouraged a structured DPA education campaign in the IDP 
camps.  The lack of credible information in the camps should serve 
as additional impetus to launch a "DPA outreach" campaign focused on 
the IDP population.  While many tribal leaders' guardedly positive 
attitude on the DPA might be reason for some optimism, this 
perspective will undoubtedly reverse direction if concrete actions 
to implement the agreement and demonstrate peace dividends are not 
taken in the near-term.  END COMMENT. 
 
STEINFELD