VZCZCXRO8165
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1753/01 2022025
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 212025Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3829
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS KPKO US SU
SUBJECT: SLM/W Splinter Leader Musa Declines U.S. Visit 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  A conversation with SLM/A-Wahid break away and 
Declaration of Commitment signer Abdulrahman Musa revealed Musa's 
ambition to organize and lead the splinter group.  Musa refuses to 
accompany SLM/A leader Minni Minawi to Washington, concerned that 
this would jeopardize his position among his supporters.  He 
advocated self-defense assistance for villages in Darfur and asked 
the international community to support capacity training for future 
committee nominees.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Abdulrahman Musa Declines Invite to United States 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) During a July 19 meeting with S/CRS Senior Security Advisor 
Tod Wilson, Abdulrahman Musa gracefully declined his invitation to 
join SLM/A-leaders Minni Minawi's delegation to the United States. 
His stated reason was that the SLM/A-Wahid pro-DPA group had neither 
received a direct invitation nor been allowed to choose its own 
representatives.  Therefore, it would be politically unseemly to 
participate in the visit.  Privately, Musa indicated that it would 
cause considerable difficulties for him within the group and with 
his efforts to develop a base of support in Darfur.  At a separate 
meeting with Mohammad Adam, an in-house rival and senior 
representative to the Ceasefire Commission, Adam told Wilson that 
Musa could participate in the visit if Minawi personally invited 
him, but not as a representative of the SLM/A-Wahid splinter group. 
 
¶3. (SBU) COMMENT:  Musa is trying hard both to demonstrate his 
leadership and organizational abilities, as well as to shore up his 
support within the splinter group.   He approaches issues associated 
with the SLM/A-Wahid splinter group strategically, has good 
organizational skills, and a sound understanding of the DPA. 
However, members of his group complain that he is an academic that 
has spent most of his time in France.  He has no militia force or 
popular following within Darfur, though to remedy the latter, Musa 
is starting to hold a series of meetings, beginning with his family 
first, followed by his clan, and then broadening the effort to 
include the IDP camps.  He recently spent several days visiting 
family in his home town of Korma and the surrounding villages.  He 
planned to discuss the DPA, including why he supported while 
SLM/A-Wahid did not, with umdas and sheiks of his tribe in the 
nearby IDP camps.  (NOTE: Wilson provided Musa with copies of the 
USAID-produced Arabic DPA summary, which he greatly appreciated. 
END NOTE.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED:  Musa had also met with Embassy officers 
prior to traveling to El Fasher and presented an ambitious plan to 
hold a series of meetings in the three Darfur capitals culminating 
in a conference which would reorganize the SLM into a true political 
movement with a charter and elected officials.  He asked the Embassy 
for USD 5 million to fund this proposal, though he had reportedly 
also shopped the proposal to a least two other embassies for a cost 
of USD 3 million and USD 7 million, respectively.  END COMMENT. 
 
SLM/A-Wahid Splinter Group Setting Up Offices 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Musa has also begun to setup offices for his splinter 
group.  He opened an office in Nyala a week ago and hopes to open 
offices in El Fasher and El Geneina in the coming weeks.  The group 
is also looking for a suitable location in Khartoum, but indicated 
that they would only need a small office there as they preferred to 
work DPA implementation issues in Darfur - implying that they 
preferred to keep their distances from the GNU.  Wilson informed 
Musa of the two DPA Implementation Offices the Embassy was helping 
the AU establish in El Fasher and Khartoum, and that it was the U.S. 
intent that his group would have some office space in both.  Musa 
hopes that his group would ratify its nominations for the DPA 
commissions next week in Khartoum.  He stated that they would focus 
the nominations on four or five organizations and not attempt to 
place members on every commission and committee. 
 
Security Priority - Promoting Village Self-Defense 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Musa said that his first priority was improved security. 
He stated that he and his colleagues were assisting their people in 
the Korma area to improve their security posture.  When queried how 
his efforts would stay within the parameters of the DPA, he quickly 
clarified that there were plenty of weapons already in all the 
villages and that they intended to improve the villages' self 
defense capacity by developing routine early warning posts, 
immediate reaction groups and training drills, etc.  His group did 
not intend to continue to fight with SLM/A-Minawi forces.  In fact, 
he claimed that his tribe had already formed a restitution group and 
was arranging a meeting to start traditional negotiations.  Musa 
concluded that in addition to improving self defense capacity, AMIS 
had to start more proactive patrolling and visibility in the IDP 
camps.  AMIS did not need to try to protect everyone.  They only had 
to be recognized by the population as improving the security 
environment in order to demonstrate their value. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001753  002 OF 002 
 
 
Int'l Community Should Provide Capacity Training 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Asked what the international community could do to move the 
implementation process forward, Musa focused most of his answer on 
increasing the capacity of nominated commission members.  He was 
adamant about providing all of them with English language training. 
(Note:  The UK is offering some ESL training.  End note.)  He 
mentioned management, negotiation, and organizational skills 
training so that they could hold effective meetings.  Musa also 
mentioned the need for some small reconstruction programs in 
populated villages, including training programs such as animal 
husbandry and home economics to prepare IDPs for their return home. 
 
 
STEINFELD