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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1685, PRESIDENT BASHIR COMMENTS ON DARFUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1685 2006-07-17 13:33 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0695
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1685 1981333
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171333Z JUL 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3735
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001685 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT:  PRESIDENT BASHIR COMMENTS ON DARFUR 
 
1.  Following are excerpts from an interview with Sudanese President 
Bashir on July 15, 2006, as published by the local Arabic newspaper, 
Al Rai Al Aam. 
 
(Begin text) 
 
Q:  A major breakthrough has been achieved following your meeting 
with UN Secretary General in Banjul by extending the presence of the 
AU forces in Darfur for another six months.  What are your options 
if UN insisted on deployment of international forces in Darfur? 
 
A:  My meeting with the UN Secretary General came to crown meetings 
with his assistants who visited the Sudan, the last of these visits 
was by the UN Security Council.  All these meetings paved the way 
for the meeting with the UN Secretary General to find the way out 
for the Darfur issue.  Of course we demanded extension of the period 
of these forces in Darfur. 
 
Q:  What was the vision of the UN Secretary General? 
 
A:  He believed that even if AU forces were financed, UN cannot 
deploy forces before six months.  It is our conviction that within 
the six months, we can implement the DPA. If the DPA has been 
properly implemented, this will spare us the need for UN forces and 
even for the AU forces. 
 
Q:  Do you have other options? 
 
A:  As far as we are concerned, the peace agreement has availed us 
of very excellent option, that of forming integrated units 
comprising 4000 troops that will be absorbed into the armed forces 
and in addition to other 4000 to be absorbed in the Police forces. 
These integrated forces will be taken into confidence of the 
citizens whether they are on the opposition or from the government 
side. 
 
There are two categories of forces rejecting the peace agreement. 
One of these is Abdel Wahid group that has announced its commitment 
to ceasefire.  So long as it is committed to that there will be no 
serious security problem. In other words there will not be 
comprehensive security in the region of eastern Jebel Marra nor will 
there be military operations.  The second group has stayed outside 
this agreement and ceasefire protocol and has now called itself the 
redemption front.  It has transferred its operation to Hamra El 
Shiekh.  We as armed forces and armed movements are capable of 
wiping out that group.  We shall bring peace to Darfur after six 
months and we will not need even AU forces. 
 
Q:  After meeting Abdulrahman Mossa, what impression did he leave on 
you? 
 
A:  My first conviction was that he has come looking for peace and 
that he would work with the government to achieve that.  If all 
other Darfurian leaders come with the same spirit, I believe that 
within two or three weeks people will see quite a different 
situation in Darfur.  However malicious people and rumormongers who 
share the same agenda will continue talking about deterioration of 
security in Darfur although people there talk about the positive 
developments in this connection. 
 
Q:  In one of your recent statements you pointed out that 
negotiation of the Darfur file has ended.  That was considered by 
some opposition armed movements as declaration of war.  How do you 
look at that now and what did you really mean? 
 
A:  We believe that an agreement has been signed in Abuja.  Those 
who refuse to sign are the ones who declared war.  When war is 
declared, we are forced to reciprocate because the state is the sole 
party responsible for security. 
 
Q:  Do you have detailed information on the French draft resolution 
on Darfur which will be submitted to UNSC? 
 
A:  We don't have the details of that draft resolution. However it 
will be the same line that was adopted by the USA, Britain and 
France.  Irrespective of the resolution to be issued by the UNSC we 
will not accept the transformation of AU forces into UN ones and 
this is a final decision.  Regrettably, even if our partners did not 
back us, they will not impose on us another position because we have 
already agreed with them on a definite one. 
 
(End text) 
 
2.  Comment:  President Bashir's view that the DPA can be 
implemented within six months is wildly unrealistic, especially in 
light of the current deteriorating security climate and AU failures 
to date.  This is in addition to ongoing GNU manipulation of its 
commitments to disarm verifiably the Janjaweed, which is sure to 
sabotage any nascent trust between the parties.  With these latest 
statements, President Bashir has stayed on message, consistently 
voicing his strident opposition to a UN transition in Darfur. 
 
STEINFELD