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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1674, NO. DARFUR UNMIS OFFICE ON DDDC, SECURITY, & HUMANITARIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1674 2006-07-16 11:10 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9932
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1674/01 1971110
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161110Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3715
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001674 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG AND S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO PREL PREF PHUM UN AU US SU
SUBJECT: NO. DARFUR UNMIS OFFICE ON DDDC, SECURITY, & HUMANITARIAN 
ISSUES 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The North Darfur UNMIS office is moving 
cautiously in promoting the DDDC, acknowledging a lack of 
coordination between the UN and the AU.  Local UNOCHA staff express 
concern that the international community's "preferential" treatment 
accorded to Minni Minawi is further undermining the DPA and 
exacerbating tensions on the ground.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
UNMIS THINKING AND ACTION ON DDDC 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Active Response Corps (ARC) officers met July 9 with UNMIS 
Civil Affairs officers Amin Bakhsh and Insaf Idris to discuss the 
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process and UN 
efforts to promote it in North Darfur.  Bakhsh offered that the best 
prospects for encouraging the DDDC were through the local "elites," 
to include sheiks, omdas, and select IDP leaders.  He noted that 
UNMIS is attempting to meet with this group on a regular basis to 
hear its views on the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and political, 
humanitarian, and security environments.  Bakhsh and Idris echoed 
the common view that with renewed fighting in North Darfur and a 
perceived lack of clarity regarding key provisions of the DPA - 
namely on compensation - implementation of the document will be 
difficult.  Darfurians' skepticism of the DPA compensation mechanism 
is compounded by the utter inefficacy and lack of follow-through 
demonstrated by the GNU National Compensation Committee that visited 
Darfur in 2005. 
 
3. (SBU) Responding to ARC officer's query on UNMIS thinking about 
promoting the DDDC, Bakhsh noted that progress in South Darfur was 
further along than in the North.  He reiterated Darfurians' concerns 
that the process, which itself might be viewed as an affirmation of 
the widely criticized DPA, would be manipulated by the GNU.  Bakhsh 
opined that the success of the DDDC would be largely dependent on 
the Preparatory Committee and the extent of its consultations with 
Darfurian stakeholders.  Some key open questions that have yet to be 
answered, Bakhsh remarked, was weight would any recommendations and 
findings made by the DDDC have, and how would they be implemented. 
He underscored the preference of many of his interlocutors that the 
DDDC's recommendations be incorporated as additional provisions to 
the DPA (or included as a separate addendum to the agreement). 
 
4. (SBU) Bakhsh further noted that there was effectively no 
coordination between the African Union (AU) and the UN on 
DPA-related activities, adding that the AU was not seen by most 
Darfurians as a credible partner in DPA implementation.  (Note: 
This contradicts reports from South Darfur that the AU and UNMIS 
have agreed to a joint plan on preparatory meetings for the DDDC and 
have already held joint workshops on DPA implementation.  End note.) 
 Nonetheless, UNMIS is proceeding, although at a slower pace in 
North Darfur, with plans to promote the DDDC through a variety of 
workshops.  The first venue will be a UNDP-sponsored Sufi conference 
on July 21-22, during which UNMIS will deliver a presentation on the 
DDDC.  Bakhsh further explained that his office has received funding 
to support a series of future symposiums (dates TBD) on 
"reconciliation and dialogue" organized by the Darfur Forum.  Bakhsh 
invited ARC officers to attend these events. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
OCHA STAFF: MINAWI FAVORTISM UNDERMINES DPA, SECURITY 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
5.  (SBU) ARC officers later attended the UN Office of the 
Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)-run interagency 
coordination meeting.  On security, the briefings, like others 
attended by ARC officers and as widely reported in the press, 
focused on recent fighting around Korma, Tawila, and nearby 
villages, and the accompanying humanitarian effects.  On the margins 
of the meeting, senior OCHA Protection Officer Cate Steains 
animatedly conveyed to ARC field officer her opinion that the DPA is 
having a detrimental effect on the security of civilians on the 
ground.  Nonplussed by arguments that killings and attacks on a 
wider and more violent scale have decreased since the DPA, Steains 
contended that the international community's "blind support for 
Minni Minawi" is misplaced, given that he has only spotty support 
throughout Darfur (based on her information from local NGOs and 
contacts) and is "as big a criminal" as the other faction leaders. 
 
 
6. (SBU) Steains added that recent reports of joint GNU-SLA-Minawi 
attacks in Birmaza only hardened most Darfurians' views against 
Minawi and the DPA, which she alleged is now being used as 
justification to carry out military operations.  Steins acknowledged 
that she viewed the security issue primarily through a "protection" 
lens, and not necessarily a political one.  Pressed to provide her 
views on a viable solution to the current situation, she ceded that 
the international community must work with the signatories to the 
DPA, but that more effort must be paid to hearing out the other 
 
KHARTOUM 00001674  002 OF 002 
 
 
factions and seeking their inclusion.  Finally, Steains remarked 
that many Darfurians' distrust of the DPA has been augmented by G-19 
claims that AMIS was involved in the Birmaza attacks, presumably 
because of unconfirmed reports (NFI) that a white helicopter was 
viewed circling the area.  (NOTE:  The SAF has been observed and 
photographed using white, or even AMIS-marked, air assets on several 
occasions in violation of agreed livery differentiation.  The rumor 
of AMIS involvement in Birmaza was repeated in a separate 
conversation ARC field officer had with Sudan Social Development 
Organization (SUDO) head Khalil Dukran on July 10.  END NOTE.) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7. (SBU) Steains' views - colored by the imperative she places on 
neutrality in providing protection to the civilian population - have 
not been as stridently expressed by other UNMIS staff.  Her 
opinions, however, are transmitted to UNMIS head Jan Pronk and will 
likely influence the outlook in Khartoum.  She made a direct appeal 
for the United States and other international actors take a more 
"balanced" view on Minawi, emphasizing that without the buy-in from 
SLA-Abdel Wahid and the broader Darfurian population, the DPA was 
not viable. 
 
STEINFELD