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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM1594, DARFUR FORUM AIRS GRIPES ABOUT DPA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM1594 2006-07-09 11:06 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3284
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1594/01 1901106
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091106Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3573
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR FORUM AIRS GRIPES ABOUT DPA 
 
 
1. (U) Summary:  Members of the Darfur Forum conveyed their 
dissatisfaction with the DPA to S/CRS team, focusing largely on the 
issues of compensation and security, but offered few concrete 
suggestions on how to improve the document or other support 
solutions.  End summary. 
 
-------------------- 
DARFUR FORUM'S FOCUS 
-------------------- 
 
2. (U) ARC officers met July 5 with members of the Darfur Forum, a 
loose umbrella organization established in 2003 to "find a solution 
to the Darfur crisis."  Acting Chairman Khalil Adam Abdelkarim led 
the discussion, which also included acting Secretary Mohammed Al 
Nour Abbakar, Mohammed Nour Tagal (lawyer) and Zahra Mineim (present 
at the Abuja talks).  Abdelkarim briefly explained that the Forum 
pursued its goals by organizing dialogues and conferences within 
Sudan and abroad to bring attention and solutions to the crisis in 
Darfur.  He claimed that the Forum represented all the stakeholders 
and factions in Darfur and sides neither with the GNU nor the rebel 
movements.  He added that his organization, with its headquarters in 
Khartoum, also has an executive body in each Darfur state. 
Abdelkarim explained that the Forum has five core tenets:  First, 
Darfur must be a unified state retaining the 1956 boundaries; 
second, Darfur is entitled to equitable wealth and power sharing 
within the country; third, all janjawiid must be disarmed; fourth, a 
vice presidential office should be established at the national level 
and be filled by a Darfurian; fifth, the Forum is open to discussion 
with all parties. 
 
---------------------- 
NO SUPPORT FOR THE DPA 
---------------------- 
 
3. (U) Abdelkarim, who speaks English well, opined that roughly 
eighty percent of Darfur's population is not supportive of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  In particular, he stressed that 
Darfurians were skeptical of the government's claims that it would 
pay compensation and noted that his group would like to see specific 
guarantees of "individual compensation."  He argued that it was 
impossible for average Darfurians who had lost land, family members 
and livestock to return to their villages and start life again 
without first receiving compensation - a prospect, he contended, 
that was not sufficiently articulated in the DPA.  He added that the 
$30 million GNU compensation fund in the DPA was a pittance. 
Embassy field officers pushed back, noting the specific processes 
and mechanisms put in place by the DPA to provide reconstruction and 
development funding, as well as the possibility of additional GNU 
investment into the compensation fund. 
 
4. (U) On security, several members of the Forum expressed their 
doubts about janjaweed disarmament and the government's willingness 
to carry out its related obligations.  Especially troubling, they 
noted, was the janjaweed's incorporation into the GNU police and 
security services and the fact that the DPA did not address a 
justice process to deal with janjaweed crimes.  (Note:  A number of 
the group's assertions on security were factually incorrect - for 
example, that the timelines associated with the security mechanisms 
were not set in stone, but could be modified based on conditionality 
of progress with janjaweed disarmament.  The S/CRS team sought to 
better inform the group and refute the inaccuracies of their 
arguments concerning security mechanisms outlined in the DPA text. 
End note.) 
 
5. (U) The S/CRS team repeatedly stressed that the DPA, while not 
re-negotiable, is a compromise document representing a starting 
point rather than the final answer to Darfur's problems.  The field 
officers pointed out that mechanisms such as the Darfur-Darfur 
Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) could provide a venue to work out 
more specific modalities to address perceived shortcomings in the 
agreement.  Abdelkarim remarked that since one DDDC objective was to 
affirm support for the DPA, it would not even be possible to have 
the DDDC, based on its lack of popular support.  He added that his 
impression of the DDDC was a tool to discuss tribal reconciliation, 
not to deal with the most important issues of security, wealth and 
power sharing, and justice. 
 
6.  (U) Pressed to provide not only their critiques of the DPA but 
also some ideas on solutions, Abdelkarim and his colleagues finally 
suggested creating a "supplementary document" that would clearly 
confirm Darfur's 1956 borders as a region, ensure neutralization of 
the janjaweed, guarantee individual compensation, and place 
executive power within Darfur.  Abdelkarim commented that "without 
additional documents and processes, the DPA will not work." 
Finally, he questioned the inherent utility of opening an African 
Union-led DPA Implementation Office when the agreement had such 
scant popular buy-in. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
 
KHARTOUM 00001594  002 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
 
7. (U) While all of the Darfur Forum representatives were clearly 
articulate and intelligent, it was surprising that they conveyed 
such gross misperceptions of key provisions of the DPA.  Part of 
their outlook was colored by a stated distrust of the GNU to fulfill 
any of its obligations, though it appears too that they simply want 
more - more power, more guarantees of compensation, more action - 
than was provided in the DPA.  While all of the Darfur Forum 
representatives live in El Fasher, it is unclear how well connected 
they are to the broader civil society in Darfur and whether their 
views are consistent with those of members in Khartoum. 
 
HUME