VZCZCXRO6557
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH
DE RUEHHM #0732/01 1931240
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121240Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1105
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY 0813
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1163

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 000732 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PINR SOCI PREL KIRF PGOV VM
SUBJECT: THICH QUANG DO COMES TO DINNER 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000732  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Venerable Thich Quang Do, President of 
the banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, attended a small 
dinner hosted by the Consul General July 10 -- despite the 
monk's ongoing pagoda arrest. He welcomed the opportunity to 
talk at length about the need for political change in Vietnam 
and was clearly enjoying the company.  We had informed the 
External Relations Office about the invitation prior to the 
event.  The GVN sent a police escort but made no attempt to 
prevent Thich Quang Do's attendance.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Consul General extended an invitation for dinner to 
Thich Quang Do, President of the UBCV and his aide Thich Vien 
Dinh, Vice-President and General Secretary of the UBCV.  Also in 
attendance were British Consul General Deborah Clarke and Kim 
Depenham from the Australian Consulate.  (Invitations were 
declined by the EU Commission, Finnish EU presidency and French 
Embassy, all in Hanoi.)  CG Winnick informed ERO Director Le 
Quoc Hung about the invitation in mid-June; Hung protested the 
idea at that time, but no other GVN comments were communicated 
to us.  Two days prior to the dinner, Poloff alerted ERO about 
the time and place of the dinner.  On July 10, Poloff and 
Pol/Econ specialist met Thich Quang Do and Thich Vien Dinh at 
their pagodas and escorted them to the CG Residence.  Aside from 
the follow car of government minders the dinner took place 
without interference. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Over the course of three hours, Thich Quang Do 
explained UBCV concerns and objectives as follows: 
 
-- The majority of Vietnamese are starved for change in the 
political system.  They want a multiparty system and an end to 
the Communist Party's monopoly on power, and are looking to 
international community to push for this change. 
 
-- Vietnam has had the same single-party system for sixty years 
and the CPV will never give up its exclusive power.  Just before 
the Tenth Party Congress, there was some hope for change when 
the CPV asked for public comment on its draft political report, 
but the loosening never quite materialized.  For example, the 
GVN has prohibited public gatherings of more than five people. 
 
-- The UBCV hopes the U.S. will use WTO and PNTR to encourage 
the GVN to become more democratic, i.e. by setting up a 
multi-party system before WTO entry and the granting of PNTR. 
 
-- Examples of how WTO and APEC are making GVN show more 
apparent openness and tolerance are GVN reactions to new 
democratic movements.  The 8406 Manifesto on Freedom and 
Democracy for Vietnam has not resulted in any crackdowns by GVN 
on this movement or its leader Father Nguyen Van Ly. 
 
-- Another example of the GVN movement toward apparent openness 
is its toleration, thus far, of the Democratic Party of Vietnam. 
 This kind of openness needs to be nurtured. 
 
-- However, the GVN show of openness is a front.  Once APEC ends 
and PNTR is granted, the GVN will return to its normal 
operations and roll back any democratic gains.  In fact, the GVN 
is continuing its repressive acts in more subtle ways.  For 
instance, when the Democratic Party was reestablished the police 
set up blocks around Hoang Minh Chinh's home.  The Democratic 
Party of Vietnam, so long as it remains alive, is a threat to 
the Communist Party. 
 
-- In regards to the 8406 group, TQD said that the GVN allowed 
the Manifesto to be issued because it helped to show that 
Vietnam is more open; and also the manifesto served to identify 
GVN opponents.  He noted that among the 8406 members, there are 
likely to be some fake dissidents and provocateurs.  TQD put 
more stock in the DPV and its members. 
 
-- Social conditions in Vietnam are the worst in 1000 years of 
Vietnamese history.  Mothers sell their babies and Vietnamese 
girls are forced into marriages in Taiwan while GVN officials 
bet millions of dollars on soccer games, prostitution is rising 
and Vietnamese have to look for work as contract labor abroad. 
 
-- The Communist Party would not have to dissolve under a 
multi-party system.  It could exist among other parties and, in 
fact, would be in a good position because its leaders have 
experience governing.  The problem is they have had too many 
exclusive benefits for too long. 
 
-- Another concern for the future of Vietnam is the expansion of 
China into Southeast Asia.  The GVN and PRC are linked by 
ideology, but each has its own interests.  The U.S. and the EU 
are concerned about Chinese expansion and see support for 
Vietnam, even with the current regime, as a bulwark against 
Chinese expansion.  By the same token, TQD stated that GVN has 
to balance between these two forces - China and the West. 
However, there is no need for Vietnam to fear China, especially 
 
HO CHI MIN 00000732  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
so long as the U.S. and EU provide continuing support for 
democracy. 
 
-- China's leaders do not want Vietnam to become democratic, 
because they understand that if the Vietnamese people have 
democracy, the Chinese people will demand it as well. 
 
-- TQD demonstrated a powerful sense of nationalism in his 
distrust of China.  He faulted the GVN for not advancing 
Vietnamese interests in countering China's influence. 
 
-- The draft law on associations does not hold much promise for 
democracy because if GVN determines any association to be 
dangerous, it will put a stop to it.  The existence of 
Fatherland Front is another way the GVN will continue to control 
organizations.  TQD cited himself as an example, saying he would 
never be allowed to lead an organization. 
 
-- The UBCV is aware of GVN suggestions that it register under a 
different name and without TQD and Thich Huyen Quang, or that 
the UBCV and the official VBS might merge.  The UBCV was willing 
to support a merger if the merged entity were not part of the 
Fatherland Front.  The GVN would never permit this. 
 
-- The UBCV has established UBCV provincial boards in ten 
provinces with varying numbers of members.  The GVN has 
unsuccessfully tried to dissolve these boards (only I can 
dissolve them, TQD said) but the GVN has been able to block 
their operations. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Thich Quang Do also informed us about the conditions of 
his pagoda arrest.  He stated he does not have visitors except 
for a few UBCV monks because "no one else dares" to visit him. 
He only leaves the pagoda to see his doctor monthly to monitor 
his diabetes.  He stated he is reluctant to attempt to visit 
other pagodas because the police will then question and threaten 
the monks there.  In February he attempted to visit Patriarch 
Thich Huyen Quang, but he only made it to the train station 
before being forcibly returned to his pagoda.  He noted, 
however, that he is able to communicate with the Patriarch 
through other means and that he also communicates with the 
International Buddhist Information Bureau in Paris through 
friends who send messages on his behalf.  He spends most of his 
time in his room and is served his meals there.  He can move 
around the pagoda but cannot teach, preside over services, or 
participate in ceremonies.  He chuckled in recounting how a 
policeman was always on hand during services to ensure that he 
could not grab the microphone. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment: TQD's positions were consistent with our 
previous meetings with him in his room at the pagoda.  The 
remarkable aspect of the dinner was that it occurred at all, and 
with little fuss by the authorities.  Although Thich Quang Do 
predicts a clampdown following the GVN's achievement of its 
objectives, the more normal expanded political space becomes, 
the harder it will be to backtrack.  (Frankly, we expected more 
pushback from the GVN.  The only sign of nervousness came on the 
morning of July 4 when the ERO called us in for a final 
assurance that no dissidents would be attending our national day 
reception this year.  As it turned out, the GVN sent HCMC 
Chairman, Politburo member and just-elected Party Secretary Le 
Thanh Hai as its senior representative along with chairmen of 
seven nearby provinces.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment, continued:  Thich Quang Do's strong support 
for a multiparty system and an end to the Communist Party's 
"dictatorship" shows his resolute opposition to the GVN.  He has 
been consistent with this message.  However, he is beginning to 
acknowledge the existence of emerging democratic movements as a 
possible indicator of change.  He clearly sees his hope for a 
more democratic Vietnam as dependent on the international 
community, specifically the U.S. and EU. End Comment. 
WINNICK