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Viewing cable 06BRATISLAVA601, SLOVAKIA'S POST-ELECTION STATE OF MIND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BRATISLAVA601 2006-07-25 12:00 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bratislava
VZCZCXRO0308
RR RUEHAST
DE RUEHSL #0601/01 2061200
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251200Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0105
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000601 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SOCI LO
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA'S POST-ELECTION STATE OF MIND 
 
REF: BRATISLAVA 594 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000601  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The June 17 parliamentary elections were 
characterized by low voter turnout: 54.67 percent.  Robert Fico's 
Smer was the clear winner across Slovakia, taking 29.14 percent and 
five of Slovakia's eight regions.  Mikulas Dzurinda's SDKU only won 
the Bratislava region, but it was pleasantly surprised at its 
best-ever showing.  SDKU voters cast more preferential votes for 
former Labor Minister Iveta Radicova and former Finance Minister 
Ivan Miklos than for Dzurinda.  Over a month after the election, the 
majority of Slovakia seems to be pleased with the results, including 
Fico's choice of coalition partners.  SNS witnessed an increase in 
its popularity, while former opposition parties ANO, KSS, and Free 
Forum were disappointed after failing to achieve the five percent 
necessary to receive seats in Parliament.  After dropping out of the 
ruling coalition in February, KDH got the lowest percentage of votes 
of the parties that have made it to Parliament.  Although HZDS is 
happy to be a partner in the governing coalition, it was shocked to 
earn only about a half of the votes originally expected.  The low 
voter turnout of this election may prove to be a regular trend in 
Slovakia, as the electorate has become tired of reform and 
disinterested in politics.  However, the election also signals a 
stabilization of Slovak politics, in which the number of political 
parties is tapering off.  END SUMMARY. 
 
EVERYONE BUT BRATISLAVA ELITE PLEASED WITH RESULTS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
2.  (U) With 29.14 percent of the vote, Smer was the clear winner in 
the June 17 parliamentary elections.  The party won five of 
Slovakia's eight regions.  In the eastern regions of Kosice, Presov, 
and Banska Bystrica -- where unemployment is high and the benefits 
of reform have yet to be felt -- Smer was the victor, with over two 
times greater support than SDKU in the Presov and Banska Bystrica 
regions.  The Bratislava region was SDKU's only stronghold, where it 
won 36.1 percent of the vote, and Smer won 21.4 percent. 
 
3.  (SBU) According to sociologists, recent polls, and our own 
personal observations, over a month after parliamentary elections 
the majority of Slovaks are content with the results, including 
Smer's choice of coalition partners SNS and HZDS.  Intellectuals, 
entrepreneurs, and urban dwellers in Bratislava seem to be the only 
ones with grave reservations about the new government.  Their 
largest fear is what some call the "devastation" of Slovakia's image 
abroad, although several Embassy contacts in the academic community 
have admitted that the situation in Slovakia will not be as bad as 
Smer's opponents are predicting. 
 
4.  (SBU) Fico and Smer have received criticism from Slovakia's left 
for not being "true leftists" and now even more so for forming a 
government with HZDS and SNS.  Former President of the Young 
Democratic Left (MDL) Ivan Stefunko has said that it is "not enough 
to call yourself a social democrat; you need to act on it and choose 
your friends accordingly," referring to Smer's choice of coalition 
partners.  Nevertheless, Stefunko and other leftists are optimistic: 
"[Smer's] politics doesn't have to be a catastrophe as long as from 
the beginning the party forms its policies on the basis of what 
Anglo-Saxons call a 'proper policy-making process.'" 
 
PLEASANT SURPRISES FOR SDKU 
--------------------------- 
5.  (U) Although Smer was the clear winner of the elections at a 
total of 29.14 percent, SDKU was pleasantly surprised to have 
reached 18.35 percent, surpassing its result in the 2002 election 
and gaining three additional seats in Parliament.  The party far 
surpassed pre-elections polls, which had predicted SDKU would win a 
mere 13 percent.  Internal party polls had predicted 17 to 18 
percent, but the campaign staff hadn't believed them.  Chairman 
Mikulas Dzurinda told the daily Sme that he attributed the positive 
outcome to a "good campaign" and the fact that the party had "proven 
itself to the people." 
 
6.  (SBU) A recent amendment to the Election Act affected the power 
of preferential votes.  According to the Central Election 
Commission, preferential votes helped seven candidates from low 
positions on party lists to make it to Parliament.  Preferential 
votes catapulted Labor Minister Iveta Radicova from her original 
third position on the SDKU list to the very top.  After the 
preferential votes were counted, SDKU's number one Mikulas Dzurinda 
fell to the third spot, behind Finance Minister Ivan Miklos. 
Radicova told the daily Sme that she did not think Dzurinda could 
perceive her success as a threat, and SDKU insiders say that the 
surprisingly strong election result solidified his leadership 
position.  However, as Slovakia's PM for the past eight years -- a 
period characterized by much perceived corruption -- Dzurinda was 
found to be Slovakia's "least trusted politician" in a recent public 
opinion poll. 
 
SLOTA HAS REASON TO CELEBRATE 
----------------------------- 
7.  (SBU) Although the Slovak National Party (SNS) remains a 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000601  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
relatively small party, its increased influence is noticeable, 
having risen to 11.73 percent in the June election and following 
Smer or SDKU by only a few percentage points in several regions. 
The majority of this xenophobic party's votes came from first-time 
voters.  Its largest support came from Chairman Jan Slota's home 
region of Zilina, at 18.8 percent -- second only to Smer.  The party 
had been split into two factions -- SNS and PSNS -- during the 2002 
parliamentary elections, preventing either side from gaining the 
minimum five percent to reach Parliament.  Since then, the reunited 
party has built strength by putting the blame on the Party of the 
Hungarian Coalition (SMK) whenever Dzurinda's government faltered. 
In addition, SNS picked up defectors from Meciar's HZDS who opposed 
a potential SDKU-HZDS coalition. 
 
8.  (U) The day after the election, Slota took great pride in the 
fact that his party had beat SMK -- which had earned 11.68 percent 
of the vote -- by a whole 0.07 percent.  SMK's strength -- followed 
closely by Smer -- came from the southern regions of Trnava and 
Nitra, where the populations are largely Hungarian, 
agriculturally-based, and lower to middle class. 
 
SOME PARTIES SHOCKED BY ELECTION RESULTS 
---------------------------------------- 
9.  (SBU) The defeat of Free Forum -- which had consistently polled 
over five percent in pre-election polls -- came as a surprise to 
many, with the party earning a mere 3.47 percent in the actual 
elections.  Pre-election reports had shown that many Slovaks did not 
know for whom they would vote until they entered polling stations on 
election day; if this was, in fact, the case, then it appears that 
last-minute pragmatism motivated Free Forum supporters to vote for 
the larger and stronger SDKU in order to counter leftist Smer.  The 
daily Pravda reported that the unsuccessful campaign of Free Forum 
had, in fact, helped SDKU.  In a recent interview, Free Forum 
Chairwoman Zuzana Martinakova told the press that she had most 
feared Meciar's inclusion in the government and had hoped her 
party's strength would outweigh his.  "Perhaps today the parties 
that had tried to prevent Free Forum's success are saying to 
themselves that they should have let us be," said Martinakova. 
 
10.  (U) Although Meciar's HZDS is delighted to have been included 
in the governing coalition, the party was disillusioned by its 
election results.  HZDS received the highest percentage of valid 
votes cast in the 2002 elections at 19.5 percent.  Leading up to 
this year's election, polls had consistently shown HZDS in the 
second or third position with 10 to 11.5 percent of the vote, and 
some members had even expected as much as 15 to 20 percent.  In 
actuality, HZDS won only 8.79 percent and 15 seats in Parliament. 
Meciar has said that the party will hire an independent agency to 
analyze reasons for the fall in HZDS support. 
 
11.  (SBU) Although the drop in popularity came as a shock to Meciar 
and his allies, other sources note that it had been expected.  The 
English-language weekly Slovak Spectator reported that Meciar had 
been "slowly burning out" over the past few years, and his 
otherwise-faithful voters had not understood "why the Father of the 
Nation would assist Dzurinda in his quest to sell Slovak state 
assets to foreign corporations, after having spoken so ardently 10 
years earlier of the need to create a Slovak domestic capital 
class."  Embassy contacts have called the former PM "a shadow of his 
former self," who voters had admired for his liquor-swigging, 
tough-guy persona of the 1990s.  SNS leader Jan Slota has retained 
this good-ol'-boy image, and many of HZDS's traditional voters have 
changed allegiances to SNS.  Frustrated by regional economic 
inequalities, other HZDS voters have been converted to Smer. 
 
KDH NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS DIRECTION 
---------------------------------- 
12.  (SBU) The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) received the 
lowest percentage of votes among the parties entering Parliament, at 
8.31 percent.  Following the elections, the party suffered internal 
disputes, mainly over coalition talks (reftel).  Several KDH leaders 
resigned from their positions.  Nevertheless, the former deputies 
remain in the party because splitting up would doom KDH for good. 
The party will need to rethink its priorities, as both its young 
voters and progressive clergy have become critical of its often 
ultra-conservative politics.  KDH held an extraordinary congress on 
July 22, in which Pavol Hrusovsky resigned as Chairman, but then 
regained his position through reelection anyway.  However, the fact 
that he did not announce his resignation sooner gave no chance to 
his critics to nominate an opponent. 
 
THE LOSERS 
---------- 
13.  (U) Feeble results led to changes in the leadership of several 
political parties that were unsuccessful in earning seats in 
Parliament.  The entire leadership of the Communist Party of 
Slovakia (KSS) -- including Chairman Jozef Sevc -- resigned after 
the party's poor showing in the election: 3.8 percent.  The daily 
Pravda reported that many KSS voters had switched over to Smer. 
(NOTE: 11 out of the 16 new Cabinet members are former members of 
the Communist Party.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
BRATISLAVA 00000601  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
14.  (U) ANO leader and former MP Eva Cerna announced her departure 
from the party and from politics shortly after the fruitless 
election, in which the party earned a trifling 1.42 percent.  After 
five years in politics, Cerna has decided to instead devote herself 
to social affairs and human rights in the third sector.  The future 
of ANO remains to be seen, although four years out of Parliament and 
out of the media may keep ANO out of mainstream politics as well. 
The party has already suffered disappointments in the past, and 
rumors about the resignation of Cerna and other leaders had been 
circulating since ANO's failure to win seats in the European 
Parliament in 2004. 
 
WHY SUCH A LOW TURNOUT? 
----------------------- 
15.  (U) Of over four million eligible voters, only 2,335,917 -- 
roughly 54.67 percent -- placed a ballot in June's parliamentary 
election.  This was the lowest voter turnout in a parliamentary 
election in independent Slovakia's history, with previous turnout 
ranging between a low of 70.1 percent in the 2002 elections and a 
high of 84.2 percent in 1998.  Pre-election polls had, in fact, 
predicted low turnout, but it ended up even lower than expected. 
The World Cup and long-awaited summer weather were partly to blame, 
as were voter discontent with the candidates and general 
disillusionment with Slovak politics.  For the first time in 
Slovakia's history, polls were only opened for a period of one day 
instead of two, which may also have contributed to the low turnout. 
 
16.  (SBU) Campaign analysts suggested campaigns had been boring and 
many politicians had simply thrown away their chances to persuade 
hesitant voters to go to the polls.  KDH leaders are among those who 
plead guilty.  Their low-key, "personal" approach to campaigning 
failed to reach most voters and left the leaders exhausted by the 
time coalition talks started.  Analysts criticized all parties for 
their political ads, which presented no inventive ideas.  No 
attempts were made to attract voters with controversial topics -- as 
each party had treaded softly to keep from alienating possible 
coalition partners. 
 
NEW TRENDS IN THE SLOVAK CONSTITUENCY 
------------------------------------- 
17.  (SBU) Lower turnout may be a future trend for the Slovak 
constituency, which has become largely disinterested in politics. 
Low turnout has been even more noticeable in regional and local 
elections over the past few years.  On a positive note, however, 
city voters -- who had traditionally been less likely to vote than 
their rural counterparts -- have become more enthusiastic, with the 
highest turnout in Slovakia occurring in the two largest cities of 
Bratislava and Kosice.  During most of the 1990s, educated city 
dwellers had been largely disinterested in politics, while people in 
agricultural areas and small villages had been the ones voting for 
candidates like Meciar on the basis of qualities such as "personal 
charisma."  Although this trend may not have reversed itself 
totally, it has at least equalized, so that voters from city and 
country alike are participating in elections. 
 
18.  (SBU) Another trend that Slovakia may witness in the near 
future is a "cleaning out" of the party pool.  Many voters had been 
frustrated in part by the overwhelming number of candidates, as 21 
parties ran in the election.  This number may begin to decrease and 
the political situation to stabilize, as voters behave in a 
pragmatic way rather than "throwing away" their votes on minor 
parties. 
 
COMMENT 
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19.  (SBU) COMMENT: In general, Slovaks are in favor of reform, with 
pro-reform parties collectively receiving a higher number of votes 
than Smer.  When HZDS, which has often supported reforms, is 
included, reform-based parties constitute a majority.  However, many 
voters had begun to feel left out, both from the benefits of 
economic reforms and from the political process itself, and many 
also complained that they needed "a rest" from the often painful 
reforms.  As a result, expectations for the new government are very 
high.  Fico's popularity in the polls is even stronger now than 
before the election, and many Slovaks are expecting economic 
miracles.  They may become disillusioned when they realize the Fico 
government will not make any drastic changes or create instant 
wealth.  This may be one reason why Fico named technocrat ministers: 
they can be easily sacrificed for the sake of Fico's popularity, 
with no political cost. 
 
VALLEE