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Viewing cable 06BELGRADE1174, Election Outlook for Serbia -- Still

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BELGRADE1174 2006-07-21 14:30 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Belgrade
VZCZCXRO7792
PP RUEHAST
DE RUEHBW #1174/01 2021430
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211430Z JUL 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9052
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001174 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: Election Outlook for Serbia -- Still 
Potentially Worrisome 
 
 
BELGRADE 00001174  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (U) Two June polls in Serbia indicate that 
the Radicals and Socialists continue to be within 
reach of together winning a majority in future 
elections -- particularly if turnout is low.  A 
Kosovo outcome perceived as negative by the 
electorate could conceivable sap support for the 
democrats further, primarily through increased 
abstention by reform-minded voters. 
Nevertheless, pollsters believe that the next 
election could result in a democratic bloc 
victory, if the democratic parties can cease 
their infighting, strengthen their regional party 
structures, forge pre-election coalitions, and 
burn through a lot of shoe leather to win back 
the disillusioned democratic voters who coalesced 
to bring down Milosevic six years ago. End 
Summary. 
 
Party Support 
------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) In two recent polls conducted by SCAN 
polling agency and the International Republican 
Institute, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) 
emerged as the strongest party.  The Democratic 
Party (DS) came out in second place, with the 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) a distant third 
(and the only three who would certainly cross the 
5 percent threshold. With undecided and 
abstaining voters removed from the equation, G- 
17+ and SPS hover around the threshold - see para 
4.) 
 
--Question: If Republic Elections Were Held on 
Sunday, Which Party Would You Vote for (IRI): 
 
Party          Percent Support 
   Jan Mar June 
       ---  --- ---- 
SRS:       24 24 27 
DS:       17 19 19 
DSS:   8 8 7 
SPS:   4 5 4 
G-17Plus:  2 3 3 
LDP:   1 1 2 
PSS:   6 4 1 
Undecided: 34 32 33 
 
3.  (U) The numbers for the DSS and G-17+ follow 
the recent trend of declining support, but 
observers have noted that their figures are 
stabilizing and not likely to drop further. 
Pollsters also commented that support for the SRS 
has largely remained stable over the last few 
years, and a significant rise or fall is 
improbable, even in the event of a Kosovo outcome 
perceived as negative. 
 
Real Possibility of SRS-led Government 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Polls since the beginning of the year 
have consistently indicated the electoral 
potential of the SRS and SPS to form a 
government.  For example, the IRI poll among 
likely/decided voters showed: 
 
Party Likely Voters  Decided Voters 
 
SRS   35%    40% 
SPS   5%    6% 
DS   24%    28% 
DSS   8%    10% 
G-17+  4%    5% 
 
As no other parties would cross the current 5% 
parliamentary threshold, these results indicate 
that the SRS-SPS could theoretically win a 
majority of seats among decided voters (i.e., 
SRS-SPS could amass 46% of votes, versus 43% for 
the democratic parties).  Both polling agencies 
emphasized that this relative strength of the 
nationalists comes from reform-oriented voters 
abandoning the democratic parties in droves. 
They added that this trend is increasing. 
 
Turnout and Abstentions 
----------------------- 
 
BELGRADE 00001174  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
5.  (SBU) Another prominent trend is a rising 
number of Serbs who say they would not vote.  A 
May 2006 Gallup poll found this number to be 23 
percent, compared to 20.9 percent in January. 
The IRI found that the number of people who say 
they are personally interested in politics has 
fallen to 31 percent.  Milka Puzigaca of SCAN 
stated that the rise of abstainers is largely due 
to bickering among the democratic parties, and 
that the abstainers are likely to be reform- 
minded rather than sympathetic to the far right. 
The rising number of non-voters has helped 
inflate the numbers for the SRS when adjusted to 
only those who say they will vote, since the 
Radicals are generally not losing voters to 
apathy as the democratic parties are. 
 
6.  (SBU) Turnout is expected to be below 50 
percent, and Puzigaca predicted that turnout in 
Belgrade may not even exceed 40 prcent.  IRI's 
data, which only predicts trends in voting, 
suggested that turnout will be significantly 
lower than in 2003, which was about 59 percent. 
However, both groups emphasized that turnout is 
nearly impossible to predict, especially before 
elections are called.  Puzigaca was reluctant to 
talk about turnout and refused to even analyze 
results based on current turnout surveys, arguing 
that such analysis is unreliable. 
 
7.  (SBU) Alternatively, both highlighted that 
the SRS is also boosted by the number of 'sure 
voters' of each party, meaning those who will 
most certainly turn out for elections: 
 
Party     Percent 
SRS:  73.4 
DS:  55.8 
DSS:  47.1 
G-17+: 52.5 
LDP:  73 
 
This means that the SRS can secure representation 
in Parliament disproportional to their actual 
level of support due to the loyal enthusiasm of 
their voters. 
 
Possible Outcomes 
----------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Both polling organizations provided 
mixed answers on election outcomes.  Puzigaca 
remained confident that the SRS would not come to 
power and stated that they could never form a 
coalition with Kostunica, without the DSS' 
electorate abandoning the party.  However, she 
qualified her answer to say that, if overall 
turnout is below 44 percent, there is a potential 
that the SRS and SPS could themselves form a 
coalition.  She stressed that the best strategy 
for democratic parties is not to threaten voters 
with a Radical victory, but rather to maintain 
and promote their own unique identity and goals. 
The most important thing is that the democratic 
parties refrain from attacking each other. 
 
9.  (SBU) IRI provided a slightly different 
perspective.  They stressed that the democratic 
parties are not doing enough to prepare for 
elections, and they saw an outright SRS victory 
as a real possibility.  IRI's lead pollster 
emphasized that the democratic parties need to 
start working hard to make internal party 
reforms, develop a positive message, and reach 
out personally to the electorate, in order to 
motivate their base and reach out to disaffected 
voters (see SEPTEL).  He noted, however, that he 
had seen little movement in this direction and 
was decidedly skeptical that the democrats could 
make sufficient strides to be victorious if 
elections are held before 2007.  He added that a 
victory in parliamentary elections could give the 
SRS enough momentum to secure the presidency as 
well.  When asked, IRI generally agreed with 
Puzigace's analysis that turnout would need to 
drop below 44 percent for the SRS to come to 
power, which its polls envision as a possibility. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
BELGRADE 00001174  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
10.  (SBU) Analysts agree that the key to a 
democratic victory is more a factor of turnout, 
than of Kosovo status.  If the democratic parties 
develop a positive message, continue to pursue 
internal reforms, and reduce their infighting in 
order to boost turnout, the Radicals will have a 
difficult task to score an election victory, even 
if Kosovo becomes independent.  Naturally, a 
well-planned and funded GOTV program will be 
crucial to helping the democrats make up for lost 
time and past mistakes. 
MOORE