VZCZCXRO5963
OO RUEHAST
DE RUEHBW #1160/01 2010824
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200824Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9036
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1162
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RXFEAA/HQ AFSOUTH NAPLES IT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JULY 25 VISIT OF AMBASSADOR WISNER TO 
BELGRADE 
 
 
BELGRADE 00001160  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Ambassador Wisner, 
 
Since your last visit to Belgrade in mid-April, the State Union with 
Montenegro has dissolved, the SAA talks with the EU have stalled, 
there is a new Deputy Prime Minister, and Belgrade continues to 
voice reservations with the UNOSEK-led Kosovo status process at the 
highest levels in Contact Group capitals and in the press. 
 
Your visit on July 25-26 will provide an important opportunity to 
reinforce the very clear messages Secretary Rice and other senior 
USG officials conveyed to Kostunica in Washington last week.  You 
will also have the opportunity to (again) try to convince Serbia to 
accept our offers to help them in protecting the legitimate rights 
of Serbs in Kosovo and, just as importantly, to focus them on the 
big prize -- our sincere interest in facilitating their way to the 
Euro-Atlantic community.   You know as well as I do that this is not 
an easy sell to interlocutors such as the PM, but as our private 
messages increasingly (we hope) sink in, we need to do our best to 
bring along the more flexible Serbian leadership.   You will also 
have the chance to explore strategies with business and Church 
leaders on how best to support the "Serbia in Europe" vision during 
and after the resolution of Kosovo status. 
 
You will be arriving the day after the "Elephant Round" of status 
talks.  The GOS is very nervous about these talks -- which they 
themselves have been vocally advocating for months -- and Kostunica 
has not even confirmed his attendance as of the time of this 
writing.  In essence, the GOS is concerned that it has fallen into a 
trap of its own making.  By agreeing to the Elephant Round, they 
fear that they will give Ahtisaari a pretext for dispensing with 
further negotiations and proceeding more quickly to his status 
recommendation.  Ahtisaari's reply to the GOS that he is willing to 
pursue additional talks on key issues does not reassure Belgrade. 
 
Background: 
 
PM Kostunica is on a "diplomatic offensive" to convey to the world 
that Serbia cannot accept an independent Kosovo -- the message he so 
emphatically delivered at Gracanica on June 28 (the anniversary of 
the Battle of Kosovo Polje).  He has personally delivered this 
message in all the Contact Group capitals: Kostunica saw French 
President Chirac on April 11, German Chancellor Merkel May 15, 
Russian President Putin June 12, UK PM Blair on June 27, Italian 
Premier Prodi on July 5 and came to Washington on July 11.  In a 
rare public interview relating to Kosovo on July 5, Kostunica said 
categorically that he will never accept an independent Kosovo and 
reported that his recent engagement with Contact Group leaders "has 
shown results." Kostunica warned that an imposed solution in Kosovo 
"cannot remain without consequences" and will be a threat to Serbian 
democracy.  Like several other Serbian leaders, he has emphasized 
that Serbia will reject an "imposed" solution.  Most Serbs know 
little else about Belgrade's policy on Kosovo than what they hear 
from Kostunica. 
 
President Tadic, however, gave a more realistic viewpoint on the 
same television program one week later.  He said that although he 
would fight against independence for Kosovo, "preventing 
independence cannot be guaranteed."  FM Draskovic offered a 
similarly realistic viewpoint a day later, noting that "five of the 
six" CG members supported some form of "conditional independence." 
Tadic maintains his common policy on Kosovo with Kostunica, but you 
will likely again hear hints of a more realistic perspectives during 
your meeting with him. 
 
Political landscape: 
 
The dissolution of the State Union with Montenegro has been accepted 
by Belgrade, although Kostunica was predictably resentful and bitter 
over the results (indeed, he blames the EU SAA decision for the 
defeat).  Kostunica gave the ex-State Union Foreign Minister 
Draskovic, among others, a 45-day extension in his job - something 
of dubious legality that met with vehement protest by the Radicals 
and Socialists, who want badly to unseat him.  As it stands, 
parliament is set to reconvene in September to make the legislative 
changes necessary to bring the Foreign and Defense ministries in 
line with other Republic ministries, which could lead to changes at 
the top of both bodies. 
 
The unexpected resignation of Deputy PM Labus, the only principled 
stand by a Serbian leader in recent memory over Serbia's failure to 
cooperate fully with ICTY, had little long-term effect on the War 
Crimes and SAA issues, but did serve to solidify MINFIN Dinkic's 
position as undisputed G-17+ party leader.  Former Agriculture 
Minister Ivana Dulic-Markovic (G-17+) is now Deputy PM and has 
remained a progressive (if lonely) voice on Kosovo, ICTY and other 
critical issues. 
 
 
BELGRADE 00001160  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Regarding domestic politics, parties across the spectrum have begun 
to prepare for a chaotic political period and possible early 
elections in 2007 in the aftermath of a Kosovo settlement.   Across 
the board, democratic parties remain unprepared and divided, 
although they are undergoing an eleventh hour push to rectify their 
problems.  The nationalist parties remain strong (polling a possible 
majority, according to our own surveys) with a dedicated following, 
but have failed to attract additional supporters to their ideology 
of hate.  They are hoping that even a modest backlash to Kosovo 
independence could ensure for them a majority in the national 
assembly.  The results of the next parliamentary elections will 
likely be determined by voter turnout, and the ability of democratic 
bloc parties to rally a largely democratic electorate that feels 
increasingly disenfranchised by weak leadership from the government. 
 
 
Your meetings: 
 
Your official calls will be with PM Kostunica, President Tadic, FM 
Draskovic and DPM Dulic-Markovic.  You will also have a working 
lunch with GOS negotiators Leon Kojen and Slobodan Samardzic and a 
meeting with Orthodox Church representatives.  In addition to a 
press event and roundtable with Serbian business leaders, you will 
outbrief the Contact Group Chiefs of Mission. 
 
What to expect: 
 
PM Kostunica:  The Prime Minister is consistent Q he has never 
wavered from his assertion that he will never accept an independent 
Kosovo, and has indeed turned up the volume in recent weeks.  His 
op-ed in the Washington Post and remarks at the UNSC illustrate his 
continued intention to play the legal card with regards to Kosovo 
status.  He will likely stick to similar themes raised at the UNSC, 
and by extension what comes out in Vienna.  To him, the Serbs are 
the victims and the international community is treating Serbia as if 
Milosevic were still in power. 
 
President Tadic:  The President maintains the same position on 
Kosovo as the Prime Minister, but less convincingly.  Tadic will 
hint at a more realistic understanding of the state-of-play, but has 
so far been reluctant to engage on post-status strategizing.  To a 
significant degree, Tadic views the Kosovo question through the 
prism of domestic politics and the fortunes of his own party.  In 
contrast to the PM, President Tadic has said publicly that Kosovo 
independence might be unstoppable.    He may have signaled a further 
step in the right direction when he told the media in Brussels on 
7/19 that protecting the Serbs (i.e., not independence) in Kosovo 
was his "main demand."  Advisors Leon Kojen and Vuk Jeremic will 
attend. 
 
FM Draskovic:   Draskovic sincerely would like Kosovo to remain 
within Serbia and is still touting his idea of keeping the fig leaf 
of a Serbian flag on the external borders.  That said, he is more 
realistic than the PM.  The Foreign Minister echoed Tadic's public 
comments with an interview of his own.  Draskovic said that "five of 
six" countries in the Contact Group have decided on supervised 
independence, implying Russia has not agreed. Unlike Tadic, however, 
Draskovic has a faltering party and imperiled cabinet position.  SPO 
getting more than 5% of the vote and parliamentary representation 
remain a long shot.  He will likely have to partner with other 
party(ies). 
 
DPM Dulic-Markovic:  We are heartened by the Deputy Prime Minister's 
constructive approach to issues in the way of Serbia's path to 
Euro-Atlantic integration.   In fact, you may hear a more realistic 
view of Serbia's vision, and Kosovo's fate, from her than from any 
other GOS official.  Unfortunately, she wields little real power at 
present, with Finance Minister Dinkic the real shot-caller in her 
party.   The Radicals have attacked her viciously for her Croat 
background (calling her an "Ustasa" - basically, a Nazi collaborator 
- on the Parliament floor), but she has not withered.  She has 
called for Mladic to be arrested and is one of the only GOS 
officials to renew condemnation of the Srebrenica massacre during 
the recent anniversary.  To her and her G-17+ colleagues, an 
unresolved Kosovo represents an impediment to growth and investment 
in Serbia.  We are exploring ways in which the international 
community can bolster her and other progressive voices within the 
Government Q your meeting provides a significant opportunity. 
 
Kojen and Samardzic:  This working lunch with be an opportunity to 
discuss in details the results of the July 24 meetings, and next 
steps. 
 
Church leaders: Although he was just consecrated as Bishop to 
Australia and New Zealand, Iriniej Dobrievic will still be involved 
with Kosovo status talks on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
(SOC) in the near term.   Irinej of Backa, Bishop Artemije and 
 
BELGRADE 00001160  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Metropolitan Amfilohije will likely also attend.  The SOC's official 
stance is very close to the Prime Minister's.  Privately, we know 
moderate elements are committed to planning for the future of the 
SOC in a Kosovo separated from Serbia, and some have privately 
criticized the GOS' politicizing of their issues.   However, given 
its probable composition, this group will likely take a less 
enlightened approach. 
 
Business leaders:  In response to your successful meeting in 
Washington, we have arranged for a small group of business leaders 
in Serbia to convene for discussion with you on how best to help the 
Serbian economy and prospects for investment during and after the 
Kosovo settlement.  We will be assembling primarily Serbian, rather 
than international, businesspersons to give you a different 
perspective.  It will be off the record and without press. 
MOORE