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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA2042, SOMALI PERMREP BRIEFS AU PEACE AND SECURITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA2042 2006-07-25 13:53 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO0520
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2042/01 2061353
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251353Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1751
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 002042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO AU SO
SUBJECT: SOMALI PERMREP BRIEFS AU PEACE AND SECURITY 
COUNCIL ON UIC VIOLATIONS 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 2041 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On July 24, the African Union's Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) met to discuss the situation in 
Somalia and upcoming elections in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.  Prior to closed door deliberations, Somalia's 
Permanent Representative to the AU Amb. Abdulkarim Farah 
briefed PSC members on why Somalia's Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) had decided not to participate in July 15 
talks organized by the League of Arab States between the TFG 
and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).  Farah explained that 
the TFG was concerned about the accession of Sheikh Hassan 
Dahir Aweys to replace Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as head of 
the UIC.  From July 1-14, the UIC had captured Mogadishu's 
airport, seaport, and other sites, thus violating the June 22 
ceasefire agreement signed between the TFG and the UIC.  Over 
100 had been killed, and 500 wounded, as a result, he said. 
Following these developments and the UIC's advance toward 
Baidoa, the TFG had decided to "temporarily" suspend 
participation in talks that were to be held in Khartoum, 
while reiterating its commitment to dialogue.  Acknowledging 
the need to coordinate efforts among IGAD, the AU, and the 
League of Arab States, Farah requested that IGAD members be 
granted observer status at League of Arab States meetings on 
Somalia.  Farah reviewed previous AU and IGAD decisions 
authorizing the deployment of an IGAD peace support operation 
(IGASOM) in Somalia and requesting that the UN Security 
Council modify the arms embargo on Somalia.  Farah concluded 
his presentation to the PSC by underscoring the legitimacy of 
the TFG and its "sovereign right" to establish police forces 
and an army to "preserve the charter, the laws of the land, 
and unity of the country."   END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) Following his presentation to the PSC, Ambassador 
Farah met separately with Charge, DCM, and poloffs to discuss 
current political and military developments in Somalia, 
prospects for the deployment of IGASOM to Somalia, and the 
TFG's need for international assistance to build capacity, 
including outreach to the Somali populace (reftel).  As of 
July 25, the AU PSC had not issued any new public statement 
or communique on Somalia. 
 
3. (SBU) Text of Somali Ambassador to Ethiopia and Permanent 
Representative to the African Union Amb. Abdulkarim Farah's 
July 24 presentation to the African Union Peace and Security 
Council, as provided by Amb. Farah to DCM, follows below. 
 
BEGIN TEXT. 
 
 
SOMALIA:  ONE PEOPLE; ONE COUNTRY 
 
July 24, 2006 
 
Excellencies, 
 
I have the honor and privilege to address to Your 
Excellencies this afternoon upon instructions of my 
government and expressing first and foremost the deep 
gratitude of the Somali people and government for the 
unrelenting and continuous commitment of support that IGAD 
member states, the African Union, the European Union, the 
United Nations and the League of Arab States are showing to 
consolidate the prospects of lasting peace and stability in 
Somalia and the TFIs.   It's also worth mentioning here our 
unlimited appreciation for the attention and keen support 
that the Peace and Security Council of AU devotes to the 
problems of Somalia. 
 
In recognizing these noble efforts and the concern constantly 
displayed, the TFG of Somalia reiterates to Your Excellencies 
its firm adherence to the principle of national dialogue to 
solve whatever difficulties crop up in the process of state 
institutions building to save Somalia from un-necessary 
further bloodshed, perpetuation of civil-war and 
institutional vacuum of the past years. 
 
It is in this spirit, that the TFIs, out of goodwill, at the 
highest institutional leadership level, has accepted the 
invitation of H.E. Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, in his capacity as 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002042  002 OF 005 
 
 
current Chairman of League of Arab States and as a brotherly 
Head of State of the Republic of Sudan, to open dialogue with 
the Union of Islamic Sharia Court (sic), though still in 
their early inceptional stages in the political forefronts of 
Somalia and despite their self proclaiming non-political 
civil society character bent on crime combating, to secure 
peace and stability to the urban societies of some parts of 
the capital Mogadishu, with limited applicability confined to 
un-armed minority communities of the country, unfortunately, 
rather than serving the cause of justice and the need for 
restoration of law and order in general. 
 
It is worth mentioning that some of the notorious warlords in 
the country, such as Yusuf Indha-Ade, who has been leading a 
clan occupation and armed conquest politics in Lower Shabelle 
Region, for almost twelve years, is accepted, surprisingly, 
to be part of the Union of Islamic Sharia Court, as a cover 
up, to enjoy impunity, relying on clan solidarity. 
 
The blatant act deeply reveals the discriminatory and 
unbalanced attitude of UISC in their fight against warlords 
in the capital and its surroundings, let alone speaking about 
suspects of international terrorist connected associates. 
 
The path of reconciliation does not go through co-option of 
such elements or groups, bur rather through reforms, non 
expansion, redemption with renunciation of all forms of 
violence and belligerence. 
 
To shed more light on the whole situations, the TFG considers 
the Mogadishu case as volatile and unsettled from the 
political point of view, and it is more obvious than the UISC 
is suffering from internal crises of leadership and lack of 
homogeneity of political orientation, and is being used as a 
cover up design for extremist groups linked to international 
terrorist networks, who actually represent serious threats to 
Somalia, the region and the international community as a 
whole as records indicate. 
 
What happened in the immediate aftermath of the signature of 
the KHARTOUM DECLARATION OF COMMON GROUND between the TFG and 
UISC is a clear proof of the correct assessment that TFG is 
giving herein as an explanation, since the leader of the UISC 
delegation in Khartoum was dismissed right after, and when 
Hassan Dahir Aweis (sic), the declared leader of Al-Itihad 
Al-Islami, described as an international linked terrorist 
organization, operating in this sub-region and Somalia 
specifically, as acceded to the top leadership of the UISC, 
instead of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who was the much press 
heralded spokesman of UISC, leaving all conclusions open for 
everybody's guess. 
 
This confirms that the situation remains fluid, tense and 
predictable could trigger further bloodshed in the capital 
and its surroundings, since the political repercussions are 
still in the making and contending political leaderships are 
taking shape within the same UISC umbrella, not to mention 
the possibility of clan conflict renewal, stemming out of 
such a situation, with all its political dimensions and 
humanitarian damages. 
 
In the light of this background and though being open for 
positive contributions, the TFG feel obliged to state that it 
is committed to the following three policy formulations in 
its dialogue approach strategy: 
 
A)  Total respect for the outcome of the two years-long 
IGAD-sponsored national reconciliation process and for the 
legitimacy of the TFIs now in place and therein agreed, 
beyond any doubt. 
 
B)  Total respect to the cardinal points of the DECLARATION 
OF COMMON GROUND signed between the TFIs and UISC in Khartoum. 
 
C)  Total adherence to the principle of the dialogue with 
UISC, as established by the IGAD special Foreign Ministers; 
Council Meeting in Nairobi. 
 
Due to the still fluid situation and political metamorphosis 
occurring in the capital and its surroundings, and in 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002042  003 OF 005 
 
 
consideration of the fact that the UISC has postured itself 
as a replacement of the TFIs and expressed non-compliance to 
the outcome of the national reconciliation process led by 
IGAD and International community partners, and since UISC 
still remains in pursuance of violence and non-cessation of 
hostilities, and in consideration to the organically 
inter-entangled political aspects of UISC leadership 
structures up to now, causing great perplexity and 
credibility confusion at local, regional and international 
circles about the un-stable political evolutionary and 
formative trends of UISC, the TFG totally declines to be 
instrumental in encouraging emergence of new brand of 
warlords or sub-clans power portrays (sic), to allow the 
growth of extremisms (sic) and renewed inter-clan warfare of 
any kind in Somalia. 
 
The disarmament exercise claimed by UISC is more deceptive 
than being credible, since the shift is from the warlord 
sub-clan based possession of the arms to an equal clan-based 
UISC. 
 
It is our belief that the genuine disarmament program could 
only be achieved through the implementation of the NSSP, 
whereby the TFG and the international community can play the 
central role, with the help of the deployment of Peace 
Support Mission (PSM) led by AU and IGAD. 
 
Excellencies, 
 
UISC have signed ceasefire and non-cessation (sic) of 
hostility agreement with TFG on 22nd June 2006 in Khartoum, 
Sudan.  Between 1st and 14 July 2006, UISC started capturing 
more territory, like Mogadishu main airport, Mogadishu main 
Seaport, and started war (against) those people in Mogadishu 
who (are) opposing the Taliban style administration, and over 
100 people been killed and 500 wounded, and UISC forces 
started advancing towards Baidoa, the temporary seat of the 
TFG, for invasion. 
 
Therefore, the TFG temporarily drops its initial readiness to 
participate at this stage, in the agreed second round 
dialogue meeting scheduled to be held in Khartoum on 15th of 
July 2006, since all substantive elements of the COMMON 
GROUND DECLARATION AGREEMENT have been violated by UISC. 
 
However, this will not compromise the TFIs strong willingness 
to pursue the path of dialogue, following assurances that all 
elements of constraint will be removed and constructive 
approach, in all its components, will be adopted by UISC, in 
order to save Somalia from recurrent inter clan blood letting 
and true prospects open for the possibility of dialogue 
resumption. 
 
The TFG would like to underline (that) the agreed 
coordination and common role of IGAD, the AU, and the League 
of Arab States be fully respected.  Consequently the TFG 
would strongly insist that, since the LAS, as a partner of 
IGAD, is allowed to assist IGAD forum meetings, as an IPF 
observer; similarly IGAD member states should be given 
equivalent right to have full observer status, within all 
Arab League originating initiatives regarding Somalia, 
without counteracting the IGAD primary role as far as 
Somalia's peace process is concerned, as confirmed by the AU 
and UN Security Council in all their deliberations of mandate. 
 
In all these inter-connected multidimensional roles, the TFG 
would like to underline that, the IPF status within IGAD 
platform, how much supportive and friendly it is, should not 
, however, confer outright prerogatives of dictate within the 
established IGAD framework agreed partnership cooperation, 
with overruling status to the TFI's decision-making instances. 
 
Therefore, it would be inadmissible to accept that any 
initiative or role could be undertaken as a substitute to 
overall regional and sub-regional decisions vis-a-vis the 
situation in Somalia and without taking into account the 
political national stand of the TFIs as legitimate state 
institution expression, with all constitutional attributed 
prerogatives of a sovereign State. 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002042  004 OF 005 
 
 
In this context, the deployment of a peace stabilization 
mission in Somalia, as approved by TFIs is unrelinquishable, 
and TFIs' Transitional Charter should remain the fundamental 
basis, as accepted by the national all-inclusive plenary 
delegates of the National Reconciliation Process (NRP) to 
conduct any dialogue. 
 
Excellencies, 
 
I would like to recall IGAD and AU Decisions on the situation 
on Somalia and in particular, the decisions by the Peace and 
Security at its 29th meeting held on 12 May 2005, in which it 
authorized the deployment of IGASOM to Somalia, as agreed 
upon by the 24th ordinary session of the IGAD council of 
Ministers held in Nairobi, on 17 - 18 March 2006 and 
requesting exemption to the arms embargo imposed on Somalia 
by UN Security Council Resolution 733 of 23 January 1992 to 
facilitate the deployment of IGASOM. 
 
I further recall the UN Security Council Presidential 
Statement of 14 July 2005, 15 March 2006 and 13 July 2006, in 
which the Council, inter alia, took note of the AU request 
for the authorization of the exemption on the arms embargo, 
and the Security Council expressed its readiness to be worked 
out by AU and IGAD in close coordination with the broad 
consensus of the TFIs and consistent with a national security 
and stabilization plan (NSSP). 
 
The ongoing developments in Somalia have far reaching 
implications not only for peace and security in Somalia, but 
also for the region as a whole; the challenges resulting 
therefrom should not be underestimated. 
 
Like any other situation, the new developments in Somalia 
presents challenges, but also opportunities, to move the 
peace and reconciliation process forward; accordingly no 
effort should be spared (sic) to ensure that the window of 
opportunity that exists now is fully exploited. 
 
I also recall the communique of the IGAD council of ministers 
meeting on 13 June 2006 held in Nairobi, the communique of 
the International Somalia Contact Group of 15 June 2006 and 
17 July 2006, and Peace and Security of the AU decision on 17 
June 2006 and 19 June 2006, and declaration of the heads of 
the African states in Banjul at the African Union Summit are 
within the overall framework of the Transitional Federal 
Government Charter. 
 
Excellencies, 
 
The Somali Transitional Federal Charter, Chapter X, Article 
65, reads as follows: 
 
"The Somalia Republic shall have a National Armed Forces 
consisting of the army.  The armed forces shall faithfully 
abide and preserve the charter, the laws of the land, and 
unity of the country.  The law shall regulate the structure 
and function of the armed forces and the system of 
cooperation and coordination amongst them in the fulfillment 
of their institutional duties." 
 
Excellencies, 
 
The need to restore basic security in Somalia to jump-start 
law and order and reconstruction is (of) paramount concern to 
Somalia and (the) international community until the 
capacities and reliability of Somalia's security institutions 
are sufficiently developed to sustain themselves.  The 
absence of the security institutions along Somalia's borders 
and coastline 3300 km raises an obvious concern that domestic 
radicals, international terrorists, waste dumping practices, 
drug and narcotics movement, and arms proliferation may take 
advantage to advance their agenda. 
 
My government's priority it is to protect and secure its 
borders and long coastline to tackle the above problems; 
re-establishing Somali security institutions is a challenge 
that requires recalling back former solders and police 
officers, while new recruits come from DDR programs to 
provide means of support to disarmament and demobilized 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002042  005 OF 005 
 
 
ex-combatants. 
 
It is important to reminded in this house that Somalia has a 
legitimate Government, and, in line with the Transitional 
Federal charter, has the sovereign right to establish, train 
and equip its law enforcement agencies; therefore Somalia is 
seeking your strong support and (that you) reiterate all your 
decisions for an exemption of the UN arms embargo. 
 
END TEXT. 
HUDDLESTON