VZCZCXRO2754
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1961/01 2000448
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190448Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1613
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001961 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: JULY 13 AU DITF BRIEFING HIGHLIGHTS 
AMIS SHORTCOMINGS 
 
REF: (A) STATE 111612 
 
      (B) BANJUL 411 
      (C) ADDIS ABABA 1738 
      (D) ADDIS ABABA 1736 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  African Union planners state that 
USD 440 million will be needed to extend the AU 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the end of December 2006 
and have it implement the additional tasks required by 
the May 5 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  The degree of 
AMIS enhancement will depend largely on the outcome of 
the July 18 pledging conference.  On the security 
front, some AU officials are concerned that Government 
of Sudan forces are now engaged in a de facto military 
alliance with fellow DPA signatory SLA/Minni Minawi, 
while the recent ambush and surrender of an entire 32- 
person AMIS patrol highlight deficiencies of AMIS 
capabilities in the field.  DPA implementation is 
hampered by AMIS delays in releasing a public 
diplomacy strategy, in providing final comments on the 
report of the joint AU-UN technical assessment mission 
completed in June, in establishing a forward joint 
mission headquarters, and in determining when the next 
meeting of the DPA Joint Commission will occur to 
review ceasefire violations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) Poloffs and DAO TDYer attended a two-hour 
briefing on July 13 by the African Union Commission?s 
Darfur Integrated Task Force (AU DITF) to the AU 
Partners Liaison Group (chaired by the EU, and 
comprised of Canada, the US, UK, UN, and NATO). 
 
-------------------------------- 
JULY 18 AMIS PLEDGING CONFERENCE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) EC POLAD observed that AU Commissioner for 
Peace and Security Ambassador Said Djinnit had 
recently affirmed to the EU Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) in Brussels that despite press reports to the 
contrary, the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) would end in October, consistent with the June 
27 AU PSC decision (ref B).   Nevertheless, AMIS would 
present two budgets at the July 18 EU-hosted AMIS 
Pledging Conference in Brussels. 
 
¶4. (U) NOTE: Budget documents provided by the AU to 
partners (forwarded to AF/FO and AF/SPG) estimate a 
total of USD 441 million is needed for AMIS: 
-- USD 170.3 million for AMIS 2-E (i.e., to maintain 
current strength from April 1 to September 30, 2006); 
-- USD 76.3 million for AMIS 2-E extension (i.e., 
extending AMIS at its current strength from October 1 
to December 31, 2006); 
-- USD 194.4 million for AMIS 3 (i.e., ?tasks 
specified and implied in the DPA... required for 
strengthening AMIS during the transition? from October 
1 to December 31, 2006). 
Of these budget items, USD 88.6 million is for 
?facilities and infrastructure? (primarily camps for 
AMIS personnel, which the USG has been funding).  In 
addition, AU officials have identified an additional 
USD 16.5 million needed to establish a secretariat and 
conference facilities for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue 
and Consultation, envisaged to involve 1,000 delegates 
in 90 days of talks.  END NOTE. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
AMIS ENHANCEMENT DEPENDS ON FUNDS AVAILABLE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Head of the AU Darfur Integrated Task Force 
(AU DITF) Ambassador Ki Doulaye Corentin reported that 
AMIS would present the concept of operations (CONOPS) 
for AMIS at the beginning of the July 18 pledging 
conference.  AMIS enhancement would depend on the 
outcome of the pledging conference.  Currently, 
funding only existed for AMIS through June.  He noted 
that extending AMIS from October 1 to the end of 
December would require ?a completely new budget? that 
would also have to address additional tasks from the 
implementation of the DPA.  AU member states had 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001961  002 OF 004 
 
 
reportedly committed to sending 2-3 additional 
battalions, pending availability of funds, although 
six additional battalions had been requested.  While 
AMIS was ?telling people on the ground to make do with 
what they have,? without enhancement of its logistics, 
AMIS would face difficulty implementing the DPA tasks 
accepted by the June 27 PSC, Ki Doulaye said. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The report of the June AU/UN technical 
assessment to mission to Sudan had been provided by 
the UN to the AU, but was still awaiting comment from 
AU Special Representative for Sudan Ambassador Baba 
Gana Kingibe and others, Ki Doulaye said.  Separately, 
the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) 
was preparing a report on UN transition, for the UN 
Secretary-General to present to the UN Security 
 
SIPDIS 
Council. (NOTE:  On July 14, the UN distributed a 
?Final Report of the Joint United Nations-African 
Union Assessment Mission to Darfur,? dated June 22; 
copy has been forwarded to AF and AF/SPG.  END NOTE.) 
 
---------------------------------------- 
MILITARY ALLIANCE BETWEEN GOS AND MINNI? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Amb. Ki Doulaye announced that the Government 
of Sudan (GOS) had written to the AU and the UN 
Security Council to condemn the July 3 attack by the 
National Salvation/Redemption Front on the town of 
Hamrat el-Sheikh in Kordofan.  The GOS paper had noted 
that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), but not 
SLA Abdul Wahid, was part of the Front.  AU DITF POLAD 
Dr. Solomon Gomes highlighted the need to consider 
ways to engage the Front:  an attack by the front on 
AMIS areas of operation (vice Kordofan) would 
complicate matters for AMIS, as would a military 
alliance between SLA Minni Minawi and the GOS. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Amb. Ki countered that there was no military 
alliance between SLA Minni Minawi and the GOS, citing 
political differences between them.  On the other 
hand, he acknowledged that the GOS was ?closing its 
eyes? to military operations by Minni in his 
stronghold (AMIS Sector 1, headquartered in El 
Fasher).  Implementation of the DPA would bring the 
GOS and Minni closer together (as they were the only 
signatories).  Amb. Ki said that the AU DITF had 
requested that AMIS staff in Khartoum meet with 
Minni.  The AU was concerned about a growing number of 
IDPs, he said;  some 15-20 villages have been emptied, 
with their inhabitants fleeing to IDP camps. 
 
-------------------------------- 
AMIS PATROL SURRENDERS IN AMBUSH 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) AU DITF Operations and Plans Team Leader Col. 
Guy Y. Mahunu reported a recent incident in which a 
32-person AMIS escort patrol was ambushed in Sector 6 
(near Kutum), possibly by SLA Wahid forces.  Ambushers 
seized four vehicles, weapons, and two PAE fuel 
tankers.  The 32 AMIS personnel were detained but 
released later the same day; an interpreter was just 
released July 12.  Amb. Ki said the AMIS Force 
Commander (FC) had established an investigation team, 
and was concerned that South African troops had 
abandoned a vehicle in a previous incident.  South 
Africa was also dispatching its own board of inquiry. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Mahunu also reported that SLA Minni forces 
had stopped an AMIS escort, and that President Bashir 
had visited Nyala; otherwise, it had been ?quiet? for 
the last two days. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Responding to poloff?s comments on June 10 
underscoring USG concern that AMIS needed to deploy 
full-time guards to prevent the theft of jet A-1 fuel 
from GOS facilities used by AMIS in El Fasher (ref A), 
Ki Doulaye said an investigation into the theft had 
been inconclusive:  ?those guarding it (were) taking 
the fuel.?  A UN DPKO official noted that the theft 
was ?routine,? despite seals.  Ki Doulaye asked Col. 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001961  003 OF 004 
 
 
Mahunu to pursue the issue. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Ki Doulaye also reported that the AMIS team 
investigating allegations of sexual abuse was now in 
Addis.  Separately, a report on an attack on a Skylink 
manager had been forwarded to Canada.  An AMIS board 
of inquiry had been established, but its report had 
not been received. 
 
---------------------------- 
DPA IMPLEMENTATION: ON HOLD? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Amb. Ki had nothing new to report on 
contacts with non-signatories to the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA), nor on any progress made in launching 
the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.  Asked to 
clarify when the Darfur Peace Agreement entered into 
force, as it would effect timelines for 
implementation, Ki Doulaye explained that the May 15 
PSC had specified May 16 as ?D-day,? while the 
deadline for non-signatories to sign the DPA had been 
extended to May 31. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Similarly, AMIS public diplomacy activities 
appeared to be on hold.  While the UK had volunteered 
three communication experts who were now in Darfur, 
Germany was still awaiting a formal note verbale from 
the AU on specific information activities that Germany 
could fund.  Ki Doulaye recommended Germany following 
up in both Addis and Khartoum, as the DPA 
implementation team was under AU Special 
Representative Kingibe, was to have its own 
secretariat, but did not coordinate closely with AU 
 
SIPDIS 
DITF in Addis.  AU DITF needed to consult with Darfur 
mediators Ambassador Sam Ibok and Boubou Niang, prior 
to release of a public information strategy, Ki 
Doulaye said.  No decision had been taken yet on 
whether AMIS would support UNMIS establishing a radio 
station in Darfur; the governor of North Darfur had 
earlier stopped daily hour-long AMIS radio broadcasts 
from El Fasher but had now allowed their resumption, 
Ki Doulaye said. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Ki Doulaye said setting the next meeting of 
the DPA Joint Commission would require further 
consultations with the GOS and SLA Minni faction, and 
would depend on AU Special Representative Kingibe. 
The UK suggested that if the AU needed technical 
assistance, the AU should raise this with partners at 
the July 18 AMIS Pledging Conference.  (NOTE: Per ref 
C, the June 23 inaugural meeting of the Joint 
Commission failed to review ceasefire violations, as 
both GOS and SLA Minni representatives objected to the 
participation of DPA non-signatories.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶16. (SBU) Commenting on a UK proposal to provide 
experts on disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) (in response to a June 5 request 
from AMIS to partners), Col. Mahunu said it was not 
advisable to conduct training now; rather, training 
should occur after the September rotation in order to 
benefit incoming troops.  Gomes said he hoped the UK- 
led scoping mission would occur in mid-August: 
visiting 3 sectors accompanied by an AU DITF 
representative.  NATO military liaison officer 
expressed NATO?s desire to participate in the scoping 
mission as well, citing DDR experience in Bosnia. 
Amb. Ki Doulaye also called for including GTZ, which 
he said was working on a DDR plan for the GOS.  UK 
affirmed it would prepare terms of reference for the 
mission. 
 
-------------------------------- 
GOS PLAN FOR DISARMING JANJAWEED 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) According to Amb. Ki Doulaye, Sudanese 
generals had briefed the AMIS Force Commander on a 
draft GOS plan to disarm the Janjaweed (as stipulated 
by the DPA), the day after the June 23 Joint 
Commission meeting.  However, AU Peace and Security 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001961  004 OF 004 
 
 
Commissioner Said Djinnit had wanted to wait until 
after the July 1-2 AU Summit to provide official 
comments on the GOS plan.  Ki Doulaye asserted that 
the plan had not been officially presented to the AU, 
and that the AU was now awaiting submission of an 
amended version from the GOS.  (COMMENT: The AU 
reportedly considered the original plan provided by 
the GOS to be insufficient, prompting the revisions. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
------------------------- 
FJMHQ NOT YET ESTABLISHED 
------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Partners reported on the status of the six 
expert/advisors being sent to the AMIS Forward Joint 
Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ) to be established at El 
Fasher in response to a May 18 request from the AU 
(ref D): 
-- EU:  Danish police advisor was in Addis; Italian 
colonel and UK J-3 advisor were still in Europe, 
awaiting visas for Sudan; 
-- US:  With visas in hand, USG J-2 and J-9 experts 
were traveling to Khartoum the weekend of July 16; 
-- UN: J-5 expert is already in Sudan. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Col. Mahunu reported that facilities for the 
FJMHQ?s Joint Operations Center (JOC) were ?almost in 
place... awaiting kickoff,? and expressed optimism 
that AMIS would receive joint situation reports later 
this week.  However, the Zambian general appointed as 
the AMIS Joint Chief of Staff (to whom the partner 
experts would report) was still awaiting approval.  UK 
underscored the importance of providing ?concrete 
information? to partners at the pledging conference, 
on the FJMHQ and on efforts to strengthen AMIS command 
and control. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Canada announced that as of August 11, the 
AU DITF?s Information Analysis Cell (IAC), which had 
received technical assistance from Canadian military 
intelligence, would be handed over to the AU.  (NOTE: 
Canadian poloff noted privately that support was 
ending due to disagreement between the Canadian 
ministries of defense and foreign affairs on the value 
of continuing such assistance to the AU.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶21. (SBU) COMMENT: The weekly AU DITF briefings 
highlight that a range of political, logistical, and 
capacity-building challenges continue to hamper the 
efficiency of the AU Mission in Sudan and 
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.  AU 
planning reflects the ambiguity of the future of AMIS. 
While the AU PSC has officially stated that AMIS?s 
mandate will end in October, the AU has prepared 
budget estimates for the July 18 pledging conference 
that go through the end of December.  With May 15 as 
?D-day? for the entry into force of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement, the DITF briefing also underscores that 
many of the DPA?s timelines for implementation are 
long overdue: 
-- e.g., ?development of a sensitization strategy and 
dissemination of the DPA? was to occur within 5 days, 
but AMIS still has not released a public information 
strategy to donors willing to fund such activities; 
-- cessation of hostilities were to occur within 72 
hours, but AMIS patrols continue to report skirmishes 
and clashes; 
-- submission by the GOS of a comprehensive plan for 
disarming Janjaweed and armed militias was to occur 
within 37 days, but, as Ki Doulaye notes, AMIS is 
still awaiting revisions from the GOS.  END COMMENT.