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Viewing cable 06WARSAW1171, POLISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE REFORM: CASTING OUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06WARSAW1171 2006-06-14 12:07 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Warsaw
null
Anne W McNeill  10/20/2006 02:48:48 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
UNCLAS        WARSAW 01171

SIPDIS
CXWARSAW:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   AMB ORA ODC ECON AGRI MGT PASC RSO FCS DCM DAO
            CONS

DISSEMINATION: POLO
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: POL:MCURTIN
DRAFTED: POL:JGORKOWSKI
CLEARED: DAO: HNOWAK

VZCZCWRI554
PP RUEHC RUEHZG RUEHKW RUEKJCS RHMFISS RUEKJCS
DE RUEHWR #1171/01 1651207
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141207Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1036
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKW/AMCONSUL KRAKOW PRIORITY 1149
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ACFT TABLE// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 001171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EUR AND EUR/NCE 
SECDEF FOR ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR J5 
EUCOM FOR ECJ4 AND ECJ5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MASS MCAP PGOV MARR PL
SUBJECT: POLISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE REFORM: CASTING OUT 
SIN WHILE MAINTAINING CAPABILITIES 
 
REF: WARSAW 497 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 9, President Lech Kaczynski signed 
into law three bills that will liquidate Poland's existing 
Military Information Services (WSI) on September 30, 2006 in 
order to create two new services on October 1, 2006, the 
Military Intelligence Service (SWW) and the Military 
Counterintelligence Service (SKW).  The laws were a 
centerpiece  of PiS's campaign promise to eliminate the 
vestiges of communism and corruption from Polish military 
intelligence.  The laws do not appear to eliminate any 
existing military intelligence functions and so Post sees no 
reason to fear disruption of any ongoing cooperation with 
Polish military intelligence.  Zbigniew Wassermann, Minister 
Coordinator for the Special Services (MKSS), will define the 
scope of operations for the two new services in consultation 
with the Minister of Defense (DefMin), Radek Sikorski, under 
guidelines approved by the Prime Minister (PM), Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz.  True to their Law and Justice (PiS) inspired 
roots these fundamentally practical reforms are cast in the 
language of purifying the state.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
New PiS Rulers Saw Sin in Old SLD System 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz first tabled 
legislation to liquidate WSI (Military Intelligence Service) 
in November 2005 at the behest of the Law and Justice Party 
(PiS) which was then recently victorious in national 
elections.  PiS insiders, such as Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the 
President's brother and party leader, openly declared that 
abolishing WSI was necessary to repair the Polish state.  In 
their eyes, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the leading 
party in Poland's previous governing coalition, had shielded 
the WSI from oversight so that the WSI could protect the SLD 
from political enemies through espionage.  According to PiS 
cadres, this arrangement lead to "pathologies" within the WSI 
that not only stifled political dissent but also enriched WSI 
operatives at state expense.  They argued that WSI officers 
exploited their unsupervised access to sensitive information 
about government privatization of state run enterprises (such 
as the privatization of WSK Mielec) and pending procurement 
orders to earn personal profit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
New Laws Begin An Inquisition With Confessions 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (SBU) Under the new legislation, WSI will vanish on 
September 30, 2006 while SKW and SWW will emerge on October 
1, 2006.  The MKSS, Zbigniew Wassermann, will define the 
scope of operations of the two new services in consultation 
with the DefMin, Radek Sikorski, under guidelines approved by 
the PM, Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz.  The two new "civilian" 
services will operate as "central agencies of government 
administration," except in times of war when they transfer to 
the Polish armed forces.  The continuity of agreements with 
allies is assured by Article 74 of one of the three laws on 
the WSI reform which states: "Decisions, security 
confirmations, certificates as well as agreements and accords 
concluded and signed by the head of the Military Intelligence 
(WSI) maintain their validity unless they expire or are 
revised." 
 
4. (SBU) Together, the two new services might employ up to 
1,300 people.  The DefMin will propose candidates for each 
service's chief.  However, the PM offers final approval in 
consultation with the government council for special services 
and the relevant Sejm committee.  What's more, according to 
the new law, former WSI servicemen who want to work in SKW or 
SWW must declare, among other things, that they neither 
revealed nor profited from state secrets.  Interestingly, a 
24-member "Verification Commission," half appointed by the PM 
and half by the President, stands ready to investigate these 
applicants. 
 
5. (SBU) Interestingly, the new laws do not require a MKSS, a 
position PiS reinstated after coming to power last fall. 
But, they consistently say, "in the case of the appointment 
of a Minister Coordinator for Special Services," and then go 
on to define his/her duties in the given case.  Should there 
be no MKSS, all his/her duties revert to the DefMin.  In 
February 2006, these laws, then in draft form, went to 
President Lech Kaczynski after a much publicized split 
between MKSS Wassermann and DefMin Sikorski over who would 
lead the two new services.  The final text allows the MKSS to 
define the scope of operations of the two new services in 
consultation with the DefMin and so seems a compromise 
between the MKSS and DefMin.  But it reflects the leading 
role that Wassermann personally plays in PiS' plan to reform 
Poland by cleaning out the security services. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: Questions remain about how the government 
will implement the law, in particular how draconian it will 
be in forcing out officers with communist pasts. However, it 
appears that the rigors of the legislative process and strong 
DefMin advocacy have enabled PiS to understand the imperative 
to maintain a serious military intelligence capacity able to 
operate with its allies.  END COMMENT. 
HILLAS