VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1287/01 1801457
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291457Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9459
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1367
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0140
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 0125
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 0177
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1169
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2192

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001287 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC KPKO NP IN
SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIA SUPPORTS UN ROLE IN MAOIST DDR BUT IS 
CAUTIOUS ABOUT UNSC INVOLVEMENT 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1576 
 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 1617 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Indian Mission to the UN diplomat Harsh 
Shringla told Poloff June 20 that while his government 
supports the early establishment of a UN mission in Nepal to 
monitor Maoist disarmament, New Delhi would greatly prefer to 
avoid adding Nepal to the UNSC agenda for discussion -- lest 
it set a precedent for broader UNSC involvement in other 
regional conflicts such as Kashmir.  He expressed hope that 
either the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) in Nepal could expand its mandate to include arms 
monitoring, or if UNSC authorization is required, that the 
Council could adopt a Presidential Statement (PRST) without 
formally discussing Nepal.  During subsequent conversations 
with Mission staff, however, Secretariat officials confirmed 
that UNSC authorization -- most likely a resolution -- would 
be required for the UN to undertake such a mission.  They 
said the Nepali PermRep had assured the Secretariat that the 
Government of Nepal (GON) would submit a formal request for 
assistance to the UN the week of June 26.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Poloff met Indian Mission Political MinCouns Harsh 
Shringla on June 20, at Shringla's request, to discuss 
possible UN involvement in Nepal.  Characterizing 
coordination between the U.S. and India on Nepal in the past 
several months as positive, Shringla said New Delhi had 
instructed him to engage the U.S. on a possible role for the 
UN before contacting the Secretariat or other delegations. 
He noted with some exasperation that the GON had reached an 
eight-point understanding with the Maoists on June 16 to 
dissolve parliament and form an interim government with 
Maoist participation (ref A) -- without sufficient 
consultation with either the Nepali political class or India 
-- and reluctantly admitted that "a third party" would be 
needed to ensure that the Maoists disarm before they enter 
government.  Since neither India nor third countries could 
fill that role, the UN would have to step in. 
 
India Supports UN Role in Maoist DDR... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Shringla said India would support a limited role for 
the UN in supervising and monitoring Maoist disarmament.  He 
conceded that the eight-point understanding only refers to UN 
"management" of arms and asserts that Maoist and Nepalese 
Army arms should be treated the same way, but he said India 
was troubled by this lack of specificity and implied parity 
between the Maoists and the GON.  India, Shringla averred, 
would need "assurances" that the Maoists would not be able to 
resume violence if participation in the political process 
proves unsatisfactory.  Although he predicted the interim 
government would not be formed for 3-4 months, Shringla said 
the UN would have to move quickly to ensure the disarmament 
process can be completed in this timeframe.  He agreed that a 
speedy deployment of monitors would likely mean that the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) would have to 
assume responsibility for logistics, rather than the 
Geneva-based Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), which supports the OHCHR office in Nepal. 
 
...But is Cautious About UNSC Involvement 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Although India wants the UN to take on this new task 
and do it quickly, Shringla continued, it would greatly 
prefer to avoid adding Nepal to the agenda of the UN Security 
Council for discussion.  He said New Delhi is concerned that 
Council discussion of Nepal could lead the UN to take on a 
broader role in the peace process than necessary and set a 
precedent for broader UNSC involvement in other regional 
issues such as Kashmir.  Instead, if UNSC authorization is 
needed for such a mission, he suggested that the Council 
could adopt a Presidential Statement (PRST) authorizing SYG 
Annan to create a small political mission and deploy monitors 
without formally adding Nepal to its agenda.  (Note: USUN 
believes the Council would have to put Nepal on its agenda to 
adopt even a PRST.  End Note.)  Alternatively, the OHCHR 
mission in Nepal could expand its mandate and thereby 
preclude a role for the UNSC, but the UN would still need to 
ensure the job is done in 3-4 months.  If the OHCHR mandate 
is expanded, Shringla agreed that the mission would not be 
able to draw on funding from assessed contributions for 
UNSC-authorized peacekeeping operations.  In that case, he 
 
 
predicted India would be willing to make a significant 
contribution to a voluntary fund to fund such an operation. 
After some probing, Shringla implied India would be flexible 
on the issue of how the UN mission is authorized, but it 
would greatly prefer to "avoid the UNSC route." 
 
Secretariat Speculates UNSCR Will Be Necessary 
 
SIPDIS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (SBU) During a conversation with PolMinCouns on other 
issues June 23, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi speculated 
that a UNSC resolution would be necessary for the Secretariat 
to deploy personnel to Nepal to monitor Maoist and GON arms. 
He cautioned that the scope of the UN's mission would depend 
on the GON's request -- and an agreement between the Maoists 
and the GON on arms management -- but he noted that DPKO 
military planner Colonel Ian Sinclair had developed options 
for a monitoring missions during his visit to Nepal several 
weeks ago (Note: Sinclair returned to New York June 27; USUN 
will arrange a meeting with him as soon as possible.  End 
Note.).  Pending the request from the Nepalis, Annabi also 
said the Secretariat is considering shifting responsibility 
for Nepal from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to 
DPKO. 
 
¶6. (SBU) DPA Asia and Middle East Division Director Michael 
Williams confirmed to DeputyPolCouns on June 27 that UNSC 
authorization would be necessary for the UN to launch an arms 
monitoring and electoral assistance mission in Nepal.  He 
reported that the Nepali PermRep had assured DPA U/SYG 
Gambari that the GON would send the UN a formal request for 
assistance during the week of June 26.  Speaking about the 
peace process in Nepal, Williams expressed concern that PM 
Koirala was making too many concessions to the Maoists due to 
his advanced age and ill-health. 
BOLTON