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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA
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DE RUCNDT #1149/01 1572041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 062041Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9262
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0352
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0883
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0725
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1113
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0674
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY 0222
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0281
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0862
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0450
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0176
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0636
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0759
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0839
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 8798
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0979

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU KPKO
SUBJECT: CHINESE LOOK FOR INCREASED COOPERATION AS SC 
MISSION TO SUDAN DEPARTS 
 
REF: 02JUN2006 BRUNO-DEPARTMENT EMAIL 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001149  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General (A/SYG) Annabi 
gave the Security Council June 2 an overview of the current 
situation throughout Sudan in advance of the UNSC's Mission 
to Sudan, Addis Ababa and Chad.  The most notable part of the 
meeting, however, came on its margins, when the Chinese 
delegation approached USUN privately to solicit our 
'partnership' in convincing the Sudanese Government of 
National Unity (GNU) to accept the eventual UN operation in 
Darfur, building off the example provided by the UN Mission 
in Sudan (UNMIS) in support of the Naivasha Agreement.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
BRAHIMI-ANNABI TRIP 
------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) According to Annabi, President Bashir told Special 
Envoy Brahimi that the GNU was still concerned about 
international community's approach toward the eventual UN 
operation in Darfur, especially its failure to 'congratulate' 
the GNU on signing the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), instead 
'punishing' the GNU by invoking Chapter VII in UNSCR 1679 
(2006).  Bashir complained the GNU had not been consulted in 
the transition process leading up to 1679 and made 
comparisons to similar UNSC action on Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Bashir told Brahimi that resolution 1679 took pressure off 
non-signatories to DPA.  Brahimi assured Bashir that the UN 
operation in Darfur would be built on the work the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had already done and that it 
would be an 'extension' of the operation in southern Sudan, 
which was a peacekeeping mission conducted with GNU consent. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Annabi described the general itinerary of the SC 
Mission, which, as he and Brahimi had assured Bashir, would 
be undertaken without prejudice to future UN, AU, UNSC 
decisions.  Some UN participants would depart the weekend of 
June 3, with most (including DPKO U/SYG Guehenno) departing 
June 5, for initial consultations in Addis Ababa, where the 
UN team would be joined by the AU group headed by Ambassador 
Djinnit.  From Addis the team would go to Khartoum before 
proceeding to Darfur to consult with local authorities and 
parties on the ground to assess immediate AMIS needs and to 
work on a concept of operations for, in Annabi's words, the 
'possible' transition.  Finally, the team would revert to 
Khartoum for exit consultations before returning to New York 
during last week of June, when it would prepare its report 
for UNSC consideration.  The overall transition, Annabi said, 
once the UNSC adopts a resolution, would take between six and 
nine months to complete. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Noting the 'deep ambivalence' felt by the GNU toward 
an eventual UN operation in Darfur, Annabi said that the GNU 
had agreed only to the joint assessment team but not to the 
transition itself.  He recommended the UNSC use its upcoming 
Mission to Sudan to assure the GNU that the UN Darfur 
operation would be a 'peace operation' for DPA 
implementation, which would require GNU partnership.  The GNU 
does not want to be seen as a 'spoiler' or 'failed state,' 
but rather as a 'partner' with the rest of the international 
community. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Following up on a question posed by Ambassador 
Sanders on a possible Chapter VII mandate for the eventual UN 
Darfur force, Annabi recounted 'lots of emotion, confusion 
and hostility on the part of the GNU toward any mention of 
Chapter VII, which Sudan regards as equivalent to invasion 
and occupation, despite Brahimi's efforts to convince 
otherwise.  Brahimi and Annabi told Bashir that the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001149  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
forthcoming mandate for UN Darfur operation would have both 
Chapter VI and Chapter VII elements, like UNSCR 1590 (2005) 
because of nature of Darfur conflict. 
 
PEACE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION 
------------------------------ 
¶6. (SBU) Annabi expressed the SYG's regret over the passing 
of the May 31 deadline for non-signatories to sign the DPA. 
He added that at least 10 ceasefire violations had occurred 
over the past week, resulting in several casualties.  Such 
violations, Annabi insisted, could not be left unaddressed if 
the parties were to believe that the DPA were truly 
'different' from its predecessors.  He went on to express how 
struck he had been in his recent travel to Sudan by the 
disturbingly high level of ignorance among the general 
population about the DPA, citing continued delays in UNMIS' 
ability to transmit via radio as part of the problem.  Annabi 
urged the SC on its Mission to Sudan to address the 'acute 
need' to explain the content of the text to the local 
population, predominantly members of the Fur tribe, who 
remained opposed to the DPA largely because of 'active 
misinformation campaign' led by non-signatories.  The 
observed level of cooperation with DPA implementation, in 
Annabi's assessment, should determine how the UNSC dealt with 
non-signatories. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Turning to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 
Annabi reported that implementations was proceeding slowly 
because of a lack of capacity and political will, 
'distractions' from the Darfur crisis, and an absence of 
'critical' security arrangements, including Other Armed 
Groups Collaborative Committee, Joint Integrated Units and 
regular convening of the Joint Defense Board.  Annabi 
recommended the UNSC Mission press for establishment of 
security arrangements.  Peace in Sudan, according to Annabi, 
was 'indivisible,' and just as the international community's 
work on Darfur should not impeded DPA implementation, neither 
should it prevent international partners from ensuring 
resources for reconstruction and development needs in 
southern Sudan. 
 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF TALKS ON LRA AND EASTERN SUDAN 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶8. (SBU) Annabi reported that during the course of talks 
between Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) Vice President 
Riak Machar and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph 
Kony, Kony indicated he wanted to meet with Government of 
Uganda officials.  GOSS leadership would mediate such 
discussions, an idea the GNU reportedly endorsed, and LRA 
leaders would be exempt from ICC prosecution during the 
talks.  Annabi said the first round would take place during 
the week of June 5. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In response to UNMIS' urging, the Eastern Front and 
the GNU will engage in peace talks as soon as possible (given 
the withdrawal of the Sudan People's Liberation Army), and 
Annabi confirmed that the Government of the State of Eritrea 
would host preparatory 'talks about talks' in Asmara June 13. 
 Annabi urged that all parties fully participate and that the 
outcome be compatible with CPA.  Annabi was concerned about 
the potential problem that could arise should the GNU ask 
UNMIS to leave once the SPLA completes its withdrawal, making 
the 'talks about talks' all the more critical for prevention 
of conflict.  Annabi was also worried about continued GNU 
obstacles to UN work in Eastern Sudan, where such 
restrictions hampered UNMIS' ability to monitor CPA 
implementation. 
 
CONTINUED CHAD VIOLENCE AND HUMANITARIAN RESTRICTIONS 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001149  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶10. (SBU) While Annabi reported no new attacks on the Chadian 
side of the border, he acknowledged the situation was still 
tense, with sporadic acts of violence, reports of possible 
rebel activity, and spillover effects in CAR.  Annabi urged a 
reduction of Chad-Sudan tensions whose negative effect on the 
already deteriorating humanitarian situation could become a 
'genuine disaster.'  Humanitarian assistance in Sudan 
remained restricted, especially in the north, with travel 
permits and prior notification still in effect, forcing 
suspension of some UN programs. 
 
MEMBERS' COMMENTS 
----------------- 
¶11. (SBU) Chinese Counselor Li told PolMinCouns that the 
Chinese succeeded in 'calming the Sudanese down and 
correcting some misperceptions' about UN operation in Darfur. 
 Li said the Sudanese now appeared to accept that a UN 
operation was inevitable and that they would best be served 
by fully cooperating and helping to guide the operation.  Li 
noted that Sudanese suspicion remained strong as a result of 
continuing concern over the Chapter VII mandate in UNSCR 1590 
(2005).  Li said the Sudanese could be brought fully on board 
by using the 'Naivasha Model' for the Darfur operation.  Li 
recognized and believed the Sudanese would accept that there 
were Chapter VII aspects to the proposed operation, 
especially in dealing with spoilers of the peace and the 
ceasefire.  PolMinCouns added that ensuring protection of 
civilians and humanitarian access could also raise Chapter 
VII issues, and Li agreed.  Li added the Chinese hoped to 
work closely with the U.S. and other P-5 Members in crafting 
an operational Darfur resolution which would keep the GNU 
'fully on side.'  In a separate intervention after Annabi's 
briefing, Chinese PR Wang noted that the Council should 
recognize Brahimi's visit and GNU acceptance of the joint 
assessment team, and that it should treat the GNU as a 
'partner.' 
 
¶12.  UK PR Jones Parry proposed the SC Mission meet with 
Guehenno's assessment team June 7 in Addis.  Jones Parry 
recommended the SC Mission endorse GNU and AU action taken so 
far and reassure the GNU about the UN's intentions for an 
eventual operation in Darfur, but 'coax, cajole or kick' 
Sudan to avoid any appearance of appeasement and to improve 
the chances of an effective UN Darfur operation.  Russian DPR 
Dolgov agreed with all but the 'kicking' part of Jones 
Parry's intervention, stressing instead the need for the 
Council to maintain a 'partnership' with the GNU to secure 
AMIS transition.  Without such cooperation, Dolgov warned, a 
UN Darfur operation would be 'impossible.'  Dolgov urged the 
UNSC to seek a 'constructive relationship' with the GNU on 
all issues, not just transition. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Qatari rep seconded PR Wang's comments about 
the need for the UNSC to possibly acknowledge the GNU's 
efforts in the peace process, especially given the GNU's 
'dissatisfaction' with the future deployment of UN forces on 
account of the Chapter VII reference in UNSCR 1679.  Qatar 
stressed that everything related to the transition should be 
done with GNU consent.  The real problem, according to Qatar, 
was the non-signatories to the DPA.  In response to a 
question from Slovakian PR Burian, Annabi relayed that the 
pledging conference would be in Brussels but that no date was 
yet set; June 20 proved impossible but now rumors were 
circulating of a July 7 date, for which the AU would 
eventually issue invitations. 
BOLTON