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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 003479 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/22/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Survey shows only 35% of restaurant chains, retailers ready to 
use US beef, sharp drop from previous survey 
 
(2) Review of SDF deployment in Iraq (Part 1): Turning point in 
Japan's international cooperation 
 
(3) Review of SDF deployment in Iraq (Part 2): Information on 
"actual combat" obtained on foot 
 
(4) SDF dispatch to Iraq: Japan-US honeymoon saddles Japan with 
heavy responsibility; Japan searches for suitable international 
contribution 
 
(5) GSDF pullout from Iraq and Japan-US alliance: Symbols out, 
challenges in 
 
(6) Poll on Murakami Fund flap 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Survey shows only 35% of restaurant chains, retailers ready to 
use US beef, sharp drop from previous survey 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 3) (Full) 
June 22, 2006 
 
Following an agreement reached between the governments of Japan and 
the United States yesterday on Japan's resumption of US beef 
imports, only one third of major restaurant chains and retailers are 
considering using or selling US beef, according to a survey by the 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun. In a survey last November, nearly 60% of 
respondents said they would use US beef. The latest survey showed 
that companies are becoming more cautious about buying US beef. They 
are expected to decide to use the product while watching the 
situation for a while. 
 
The survey looked at 60 leading restaurant operators and retailers 
in mid-June, with replies sent by 54 companies. 
 
Of the companies surveyed, 35.2% said they would use American beef, 
with 7.4% (4 companies) saying they would use it immediately and 
27.8% (15) saying they would use it after watching the situation. In 
the previous survey conducted last November just before Japan 
removed its ban on US beef imports, 59.1% of 50 companies surveyed 
said they would use it. 
 
Asking those who said they would wait and see about their conditions 
for buying US beef, the survey showed that 12 companies cited 
purchase price and profitability, and 10 cited improvements in 
safety. Their cautious stance toward US beef is considered to 
reflect concerns about high prices due to a limited volume of 
imports, as well as the experience of vertebral columns, a specified 
risk material, found in a shipment in January. 
 
In the survey, 27 firms, or 50% of all the respondents, said they 
would not use American beef for the time being. As for why, 12 
companies said they were already using Australian beef, while 
another 12 cited safety concerns. By business sector, 41.7% of 
restaurant chains and 22.2% of supermarkets said they intend to use 
US beef. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003479  002 OF 008 
 
 
(2) Review of SDF deployment in Iraq (Part 1): Turning point in 
Japan's international cooperation 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 21, 2006 
 
At a news conference yesterday afternoon, Prime Minister Koizumi 
announced he would start pulling out Ground Self-Defense Force 
(GSDF) troops from Iraq and reiterated in a firm tone: "I'll make 
efforts for international cooperation while acknowledging the 
importance of the Japan-US alliance. This is my position. I have 
kept it, keep it now, and will keep it." 
 
Back in December 2003, when Koizumi decided to send GSDF troops to 
Iraq, he told then Defense Agency Director-General Ishiba and other 
staff: "It's only natural for Japan to trust the United States, but 
the question is whether Japan can become a country that the US can 
trust. I'd like you to do your job, bearing this in mind." 
 
Making the Japan-US alliance and international contribution 
compatible is Japan's basic diplomatic guideline. Japan's 
participation in reconstruction assistance to Iraq, along with 40 or 
more other countries, such as the United States, Britain, South 
Korea, and Thailand gave Japan an opportunity to prove through its 
action that that guideline is not a mere hollow phrase. 
 
Japan's participation in international peacekeeping operations 
started with its dispatch of mine sweepers to the Persian Gulf in 
1991 after the end of the Gulf War. Since then Japan has sent a 
total of 5,300 SDF personnel abroad for the participation in nine 
United Nations-led peacekeeping operations (PKO), for instance, one 
in Cambodia and one in East Timor. 
 
But the dispatch of SDF personnel to Iraq was not the same as the 
past dispatches because of the high risk of their being targeted by 
terrorism, which occurs frequently in that country. 
 
On June 23 2005, when four GSDF vehicles were running in outskirts 
of Samawah, an explosion occurred on the roadside. The explosion was 
caused by a remote-controlled bomb that targeted GSDF troops. 
Although no one was injured in the explosion, the incident came as a 
great shock to the government because a terrorist act had been 
committed in broad daylight, even though until then terrorist 
activities always occurred at night. 
 
"Nearby regions were suspected of hiding the perpetrator, and we 
were on alert every day against a possible attack," a government 
official said, looking back on those days. 
 
Four months later, as a measure against an attack by a remote 
controlled-bomb, the GSDF secretly installed a jamming device in 
each vehicle. 
 
"Should unforeseen accidents occur, the SDF's international 
cooperation could roll back to where it was 10 years ago," the 
government official explained. 
 
The Defense Agency (JDA) continued its steady efforts to nip danger 
in the bud one by one. Owing to these efforts, the GSDF is going to 
successfully complete its two years and a half of missions in Iraq 
without suffering a single casualty or firing a single shot. 
 
This success may be attributable mainly to Japan's choice of 
 
TOKYO 00003479  003 OF 008 
 
 
Samawah, where the security situation is relatively stable. In 
contrast, US forces have seen the number of deaths exceed 2,500 
persons since the beginning of the war. 
 
In June 2005, Koizumi revealed to his aides frankly: "I'd like to 
withdraw GSDF troops from Iraq while I am in office." Early this 
year, a proposal for a withdrawal of the troops at the end of March 
was floated in the government. 
 
British and Australian troops, who are in charge of public security 
in Samawah, also wanted to do the same as Japan. In addition, a GSDF 
officer who returned from Samawah suggested: "The daytime 
temperature in the summer in Samawah exceeds 50 degrees centigrade. 
Physical labor is tough. The local public's discontent also grows at 
that time. In view of security factors, we hope a withdrawal will be 
completed before we experience the third summer there." 
 
But the establishment of a new Iraqi government was delayed widely 
from the initial schedule in which the establishment of a new 
government was planned for the end of 2005. This delay prompted 
Japan to turn its plan around. Japan then said: "It's not possible 
for only Japanese troops to return home, leaving British and 
Australian troops behind." 
 
Koizumi hoped Japan would act in concert with other countries on 
international cooperation to the last moment. 
 
On May 20, the new Iraqi government was established, and on the 
afternoon of June 19, it chose Muthanna Province, where Samawah is 
located, as the first province to which security control will be 
transferred to Iraqi police. This development came, reflecting an 
accord in political implications between Iraq, which wants to 
quickly restore sovereignty, and Japan and Britain, both of which 
hope for an early pullout, although the security situation there has 
yet to turn for the better. 
 
Several hours before Japan announced its decision to withdraw its 
troops from Iraq, Iraqi Prime Minister Malik met with Japanese 
Ambassador to Iraq Hisao Yamaguchi at the presidential office in 
Baghdad and told Yamaguchi: "We have deeply appreciated the SDF's 
contributions. We earnestly hope the friendship between Japan and 
Iraq will be strengthened further in the future." 
 
The dispatch of GSDF troops to Iraq that is certain to be taken as a 
successful case of "human contributions" entailing risks never 
experienced in the past has marked a turning point in Japan's 
international peacekeeping cooperation. How Japan will make good use 
of this experience for future cooperation remains to be seen. 
 
(3) Review of SDF deployment in Iraq (Part 2): Information on 
"actual combat" obtained on foot 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) 
June 22, 2006 
 
In August 2004, six months after Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 
troops arrived in Iraq, US forces raided Iraq's southern city Najaf, 
one of holy cities in the country and Shiah cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's 
militia's strongpoint. This raid put Samawah, where most of the 
population are Shiites, in a volatile situation in no time. In fact, 
the GSDF camp was exposed to threats of terrorist attacks four times 
in only two weeks. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003479  004 OF 008 
 
 
Found at the scene of the attacks were mortar shells and other bombs 
that impacted closely in one spot. "Their firing accuracy is high. 
Their aim was to warn us, so they intentionally avoided targeting 
the camp itself," a senior GSDF officer said.  Dutch troops, who 
were responsible for public security in Samawah, asked the GSDF to 
allow the installation of a communication device in the GSDF camp so 
that they could monitor communications between terrorists. Dutch 
troops installed intercepting systems each in their camp as well as 
the GSDF camp. The purpose was to monitor radio signals coming from 
terrorists and their supporters. Once it was identified where the 
signals came from, a raid would be made without delay. 
 
Yuki Imaura, leader of the GSDF's second contingent to Iraq for 
reconstruction assistance, now revealed that the GSDF had accepted 
the above Dutch request: "If GSDF troops acted in concert with Dutch 
troops, following information obtained through the monitoring 
system, that would be a problem, but information sharing itself is 
not a problem in legal terms. Doing so is urgently necessary for our 
troops." For two weeks since then, Dutch personnel continued 
eavesdropping on cell phone conversations exchanged in Samawah, 
Imaura said. Every time the GSDF camp came under attack, Dutch 
troops provided information, such as the locations of shooting and 
anti-SDF forces in the region, to the GSDF. 
 
Masahisa Sao, leader of the GSDF's advance troops in Iraq, met with 
the chief of the police station in Muthanna Province the day after 
he arrived in Samawah and set up a hotline to link his camp and the 
police station. Sato cited the reason why he did so this way: 
"Samawah has a population of 140,000 persons. If they feel antipathy 
toward the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), our 600-strength unit is 
powerless because they outnumber us. If we become the target of 
their attack, we will surely suffer causalities." Sato made extra 
efforts to gather information at the grassroots level. 
 
Three months later, when Sato was driving an armed truck, a powerful 
local figure who was waiting for GSDF vehicles to pass on the 
roadside stopped him and said: "Disquieting moves lie in the road 
ahead. SDF troops are certain to be involved in trouble. Do not go 
ahead." Sato's unit stopped their activities of the day. 
 
Ahead of starting activities in Iraq, GSDF troops underwent rifle 
drills that assumed various situations. This is because, given the 
chaotic situation in Iraq, where suicide terrorism has yet to cease, 
it is highly probable that the troops will be attacked and suffer 
causalities. In the firing range, they pulled the trigger shouting, 
"Self-defense firing." 
 
When they arrived in Samawah, they first patrolled the area and each 
made a map by hand and put down the names of hospitals, schools, and 
streets, and marked where they thought blind spots would be. Looking 
back on those days, a chief guard officer said: "Information 
gathering is the only way for us to secure our safety. A 
satellite-photo map showing an overall city is available, but in 
order to get information we actually need, we have to traverse the 
area and sense the mood firsthand." 
 
During training, information is provided, but in  "actual warfare," 
information is unavailable or is limited. For the GSDF, their 
two-and-a-half-year mission in Iraq has been a time for them to 
learn how to actually operate. 
 
(4) SDF dispatch to Iraq: Japan-US honeymoon saddles Japan with 
heavy responsibility; Japan searches for suitable international 
 
TOKYO 00003479  005 OF 008 
 
 
contribution 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 1) (Full) 
June 21, 2006 
 
While debate over the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces personnel to 
Iraq was continuing in Japan, a British veteran diplomat advised an 
influential lawmaker of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and urged 
Japan to dispatch its SDF. The British diplomat said to the LDP 
lawmaker: "It is impossible to navigate the huge tanker that is the 
United States from outside. Japan should accept the US request and 
copilot the ship." 
 
Britain has kept its assertiveness by acting in concert with the US, 
although there have been disagreements between the two countries. 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made a decision to send the SDF to 
Iraq based on a similar idea to Britain's. Koizumi made that 
decision to have Japan survive in the postwar international 
community. Koizumi explained that Japan would strive to stabilize 
the Middle East and eliminate terrorism, but it cannot be denied 
that his underlining goal was cooperating with the United States. 
 
Such an idea is not necessarily bad. "We will defend Japan at the 
risk of our lives if Japan is attacked," said a senior US government 
official. When considering the reality of the North Korean nuclear 
and missile issues and the continued tensions in the Taiwan Strait, 
Japan has no choice but to strengthen ties with the US. 
 
It is important for Japan to calmly assess what kind of national 
interests it has obtained through its cooperation with the US this 
time around. 
 
It is true that the Japan-US alliance has strengthened more than 
ever before. Japan has become a county with which the United State 
confers on important policy issues in advance. A government official 
who recalls the time when Japan and the US clashed over trade 
friction said: "The US has shared a great deal of its 
intelligence." 
 
Washington has now asked Japan's opinion on such issues as North 
Korea, China, and nuclear proliferation. 
 
Japan should not forget that it has now been saddled with 
responsibility because of its SDF dispatch to Iraq. Tokyo must deal 
seriously with the difficult issue of how far it should go along 
with the US security strategy. 
 
With the deployment of SDF troops to Iraq, the US has strengthened 
its expectations of Japan, according to a former official of the 
Bush administration. The US will likely expect similar or greater 
contributions in the future. Since US expectations of Japan are 
large, if Japan turns down a request, Japan-US relations will be 
seriously damaged. 
 
After endlessly repeating its legal position on the dispatch of SDF 
personnel to the Gulf War in 1991, Tokyo provided only money. As a 
result, Japan came under fire. 
 
The Koizumi government seemed to have decided to dispatch the SDF to 
Iraq without going through an in-depth debate due to the terrible 
shock of the Sept. 11 terrorist attack on the US. It is urgent for 
the next Japanese government to come up with a framework for 
overseas dispatch of the SDF. Even though Japan has no other option 
 
TOKYO 00003479  006 OF 008 
 
 
but the Japan-US alliance to protect itself, it is absolutely 
necessary to secure its national interests by taking advantage of 
that bilateral alliance. 
 
As the Blair government, which prioritizes cooperation with the US, 
has been suffering from low public support, it is not that easy to 
collaborate with the US. Superficial cooperation with the US will 
not continue long, and it may instead create anti-American sentiment 
in Japan. Three months are left in Prime Minister Koizumi's term in 
office. Koizumi's decision to withdraw the SDF from Iraq probably 
means that his administration is wrapping things up. The work of 
sketching out the shape of Japan's international contributions will 
become an assignment for the next government. 
 
(5) GSDF pullout from Iraq and Japan-US alliance: Symbols out, 
challenges in 
 
ASAHI (Page 1) (Full) 
June 21, 2006 
 
"Not only Iraq, I'm also aware of the importance of Japan's alliance 
with the United States. Bearing this in mind, Japan will fulfill its 
responsibility in the international community." With this statement, 
Prime Minister Koizumi underscored the "Japan-US alliance" in his 
press remarks yesterday after announcing his decision to wind up 
Japan's deployment of Ground Self-Defense Force troops in Iraq for 
about two and a half years. 
 
Koizumi will leave office in September. By then, the GSDF will 
complete its troop pullout from Iraq. As a result, two symbols for 
the Japan-US alliance will disappear. One is Koizumi's personal 
relationship with US President Bush. The other is Japan's deployment 
of mainstay troops as a US ally joining the US-led coalition of the 
willing. 
 
In September 2001, when the United States came under terrorist 
attacks, President Bush declared a "war on terror." Koizumi soon 
dispatched a Maritime Self-Defense Force squadron to the Indian 
Ocean under an antiterror special measures law and also sent GSDF 
troops to Iraq under an Iraq special measures law. Koizumi, 
upholding the "Japan-US alliance in the world," acted in concert 
with the United States in its global strategy. 
 
In December 2003, Koizumi made up his mind to send GSDF troops to 
Iraq. He cited the "Japan-US alliance" to account for his dispatch 
of GSDF troops to Iraq. The deployment of those GSDF troops in Iraq 
has been a symbol of the alliance. It has produced an unprecedented 
honeymoon relationship between the Japanese and US leaders. 
 
One government official said: "The prime minister is lucky. He sent 
GSDF troops to Iraq, and the United States feel something to pay for 
it." There is a relationship of mutual trust between the two 
leaders. It has worked as a stabilizer of bilateral relations, so 
the two countries have minimized their standoff over Japan's embargo 
on US beef and other bilateral trade issues. 
 
However, the price for it was not light. 
 
Japan sent troops to a warring country for the first time. This 
troop dispatch has changed Japan's Self-Defense Forces and their 
roles. Along with the MSDF' mission in the Indian Ocean, Japan has 
globalized the SDF's rear-echelon support for US forces. From now 
on, Japan would be asked to back up the United States in other 
 
TOKYO 00003479  007 OF 008 
 
 
regions with its dispatch of SDF troops. 
 
The gear wheel cannot be easily turned back. 
 
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party is also seeking to establish a 
permanent law allowing Japan's global dispatch of SDF troops. Japan, 
under the Koizumi government, has sent a number of SDF troops 
overseas. The grounds for those overseas SDF missions were 
time-limited ad hoc laws. 
 
In his press remarks yesterday, Koizumi said he was not thinking of 
creating a permanent law while his cabinet is in office. However, 
his Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe took a positive stance in a press 
conference yesterday about the idea of permanent legislation. The 
question is whether to create a permanent law and how to review the 
SDF's roles. These challenges will be handed over to Koizumi's 
successor. 
 
With the two emblems being lost, the post-Koizumi government will be 
tasked with a number of pending issues beyond what to do about the 
modality of SDF support for US forces. Another question is what to 
do about cost sharing for US troop redeployment in the process of 
realigning the US military presence in Japan. This is also an 
immediate, heavy challenge in store for the next government. 
 
Koizumi has kept up his deep commitment to US strategy. Post-Koizumi 
candidates running in the LDP presidential election should clearly 
answer whether they will take over or think twice about the 
commitment. They should also clarify their blueprints of the 
Japan-US alliance. 
 
(6) Poll on Murakami Fund flap 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
June 22, 2006 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage.) 
 
Q: The other day, Yoshiaki Murakami, who set up the Murakami Fund, 
was arrested by the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office on 
suspicion of violating the Securities Exchange Law, which prohibits 
insider stock trading. What do you think lies behind this incident? 
Pick as many as you like from among those listed below. 
 
Investors' lack of morality                         46.3 
Investors' pursuit of profits first                 50.1 
Flaws in stock trading rules                        36.3 
Shortfalls in stock market watchdog functions       36.0 
Money-is-everything climate                         51.8 
Other answers (O/A)                                  0.6 
Nothing in particular                                3.4 
No answer (N/A)                                      3.4 
 
Q: Do you think the arrests of former Livedoor Co. President Horie 
and Murakami will correct the money-is-everything climate? 
 
Yes                           18.4 
Yes to a certain degree       17.4 
No to a certain degree        19.9 
No                            41.4 
N/A                            2.9 
 
 
TOKYO 00003479  008 OF 008 
 
 
Q: Murakami demanded that corporations consisting of stockholders, 
employees, and clients give first consideration to the rights of 
stockholders. Do you agree to this way of thinking? 
 
Yes                            9.9 
Yes to a certain degree       15.2 
No to a certain degree        22.8 
No                            42.0 
N/A                           10.0 
 
Q: Murakami is depicted with the following two images. Which image 
is closer to yours? 
 
A: He urged hidebound corporate managers to change their way of 
thinking. 
B: He pursued short-term profits and tooled corporations for money 
games. 
 
A                           12.7 
A to a certain extent        8.8 
B to a certain extent       20.6 
B                           52.0 
N/A                          6.0 
 
Q: These days, the prosecution has been watching stock market 
players even more strictly for illegalities. Do you appreciate such 
efforts? 
 
Very much          50.9 
Somewhat           35.4 
Not very much       6.9 
Not at all          2.8 
N/A                 4.1 
 
Polling methodology 
Date of survey: June 17-18. 
Subjects of survey: 3,000 persons chosen from among all eligible 
voters throughout the country (at 250 locations on a stratified 
two-stage random sampling basis). 
Method of implementation: Door-to-door visits for face-to-face 
interviews. 
Number of valid respondents: 1,815 persons (60.5% ). 
 
SCHIEFFER