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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1431/01 1781253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271253Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6153
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001431 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING JUNE 23 
 
 
This is CWC-55-06. 
 
------------------------------------- 
U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST DRAFT DECISION 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (U) In preparation for Executive Council 46 and beyond, 
del continued to work with other delegations to build support 
for the U.S. extension request draft decision.  After initial 
discussions with allies, del offered general points on the 
elements of the extension request, and the fact that the U.S. 
is favorably considering site visits, at WEOG on June 21. 
Del was surprised by Germany's immediate (and public) 
insistence that visits in capitals are an essential element 
of the site visit concept.  A robust discussion ensued, 
during which del reps made clear that Washington believes it 
provides senior political and technical representation at EC 
sessions, and ample opportunity to ask questions between, and 
would question the value and intent of visits beyond those to 
CW destruction sites. 
 
¶2.  (U) Throughout the week, the UK and German dels 
(supported, in large part, by capitals) continued to press 
for visits to capitals, and the inclusion of more specific 
details on site visits in the draft decision text.  U.S. del 
reps offered Washington's concerns, and shared communications 
between capitals to provide additional insight.  Of the 
allies, France was by far the most supportive, expressing 
gratitude for the U.S. approach during WEOG, and offering 
balanced, insightful comments later.  (French view, at least 
locally, is that most concerns can be addressed through 
slight modifications of decision and site visit parameter 
language.) 
 
¶3.  (U) Del is beginning to sense an effort on the part of UK 
and Germany to raise support for capital visits in other 
regional groups as well.  Del members have been approached by 
delegations inquiring as to the U.S. position on, or simply 
the underlying reason behind, visits in capitals as well as 
to destruction facilities.  Although the German del in 
particular has predicted a hard-line approach on this from 
the NAM, del read is that this is being driven by an 
uncompromising position in Berlin and London. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶4.  (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) held a June 15 
informal session to discuss the advance copy of the Progress 
Report and to begin debate on EC-46 report language. 
Delegations thanked the Technical Secretariat for the latest 
report, but noted that the last date for inclusion of 
information was May 31 and requested that the TS update the 
tables just prior to EC-46.  New Zealand noted that Keith 
Wilson would be attending a meeting of the Pacific Island 
Forum in Fiji the week of June 19 to assist implementing 
states with their legislation.  New Zealand expected that 
progress would be made and requested that this information be 
included in the report. 
 
¶5.  (U) The United States also reported on the outcome of its 
recent African Technical Assistance Visits and requested that 
the report also include this information.  It also noted the 
Conference decision required states to have drafted 
legislation by EC-47.  However the Progress Report only 
indicates where legislation has been implemented and 
requested (with support from India, Iran, Mexico, Germany, 
and Tunisia) that the TS provide delegations information on 
the critical drafting progress. (The TS agreed to post this 
information on the external server). 
 
¶6.  (U) Tunisia reported on its progress, noting that its 
legislative process was slow and cumbersome.  Although it has 
had draft legislation for some time, the Ministries of 
Justice, Finance, Scientific Research, Trade and Defense all 
needed to complete their reviews and reach consensus.  The 
process is well on the way, although the Progress Report 
indicated that there had been no communications between Tunis 
 
and the TS since the Conference.  This is not the case, and 
the report should be accurate. 
 
¶7.  (U) The facilitator then called for guidance on the 
approach to take on EC-46 report language: would it be better 
to return to the EC-45 draft or his draft that more closely 
followed the CSP-10 text.  All the delegations that took the 
floor noted that they had no instructions from capital, but 
were willing to express their personal views.  Only Mexico 
supported a return to EC-45 language (Germany remained 
silent).  The UK, Japan, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, and the 
U.S. favored the second option.  The U.S. also requested that 
the facilitator arrange a second consultation the week of 
June 26, to allow delegations ample time to communicate with 
capitals and begin to reach consensus in order to prevent a 
repeat of the EC-45 problems.  The facilitator agreed to hold 
two consultations that week, one on the 26th and one on the 
29th. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
ARTICLE VII - SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8.  (U) Work supporting outreach and assistance to 
implementing states is being undertaken by a number of States 
Party.  SPs that have hosted U.S.-sponsored TAVs have by and 
large made great strides in their implementation efforts: all 
have interim or permanent National Authorities and draft 
legislation, enabling them to meet the requirements of the 
follow-on plan.  Although not always noted explicitly, the 
tremendous U.S. outreach effort is appreciated by other 
delegations.  Dividends are being paid through support on 
other issues critical to U.S. interests.  SPs that have 
received U.S.-sponsored TAVs do not always agree with U.S. 
positions on how best to advance Article VII implementation, 
but many have become active in OPCW affairs for the first 
time.  Some also have supported U.S. initiatives on other 
subjects.  Algeria informed delrep that it successfully 
argued for moderate NAM and Africa group EC-46 statements 
regarding the U.S. request to extend its CW destruction 
deadline to 2012. 
 
¶9.  (U) Other SPs have assisted implementing states.  Japan 
sent a legal expert (and former OPCW delegate) on a 
TS-sponsored TAV to Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Cambodia. 
 
SIPDIS 
Australia also sent a NA expert to PNG and Cambodia, and it 
may make a voluntary contribution to support former OPCW 
lawyer Keith Wilson's Article VII implementation support 
efforts of a number of Pacific Island Forum (PIF) states. 
New Zealand has made a substantial voluntary contribution to 
support Wilson's support efforts for TAVs to a number of PIF 
states in the eastern PIF region.  New Zealand also hosted a 
PIF meeting in Auckland and held Art VII-related bilateral 
meetings on its margins. 
 
¶10.  (U) Algeria privately informed delrep that its former 
OPCW PermRep participated in several TAVs.  In one instance, 
the state (Mauritania) drafted implementing legislation and 
established its National Authority, although Mauritania has 
yet to advise the TS of these advances.  Algeria also 
participated in several Article VII subregional meetings of 
National Authorities.  Iran privately informed delrep that it 
has offered assistance to Afghanistan, and is keeping in 
touch with officials in Kabul, encouraging them to enact 
legislation as soon as possible. 
 
¶11. (U) A number of other states have assisted implementing 
states through the venue of local outreach groups or hosting 
training courses for members of NAs.  Mexico established a 
regional outreach center, to support/assist GRULAC SP 
implementation efforts.  Spain also is supporting 
implementation efforts of GRULAC states.  South Africa 
participated in meetings of southern African states to 
support and assist implementation efforts.  Romania, in 
tandem with the U.S. Department of Commerce, helped develop 
the Implementation Assistance Program (IAP) used in support 
of TAVs to implementing states. 
 
¶12.  (U) The UK hosted a NA training course in early 2006, 
 
and France has hosted three NA training courses and will host 
another in fall 2006.  Portugal hosted two training courses 
for Portuguese-speaking states, the first contacts some of 
these states have had with the OPCW.  These meetings 
ultimately resulted in establishment of NAs and drafting 
legislation.  Portugal will host another more advanced course 
later in 2006.  Nigeria, one of the recipients of U.S. 
assistance, hosted a regional meeting of African NAs that 
focused on Art VII implementation.  Qatar offered to host an 
Art VII-related subregional meeting, and St. Lucia hosted an 
Article VII-related workshop for members of the Organization 
of Eastern Caribbean States.  Finally, numerous SPs 
(Australia, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands, to name a 
few) have shared their implementing regulations with 
implementing states. 
 
------------ 
UNIVERSALITY 
------------ 
 
¶13.  (U) Said Moussi (Algeria) chaired his first meeting as 
the new facilitator for universality on June 21. The meeting 
was well attended with over 25 delegations and the Director 
General and Deputy DG in attendance.  The substance of the 
meeting was largely the same as the universality POC meeting 
a week earlier - a summary of TS universality-related 
activities.  All of the delegations that spoke, including 
Iran and Pakistan, were supportive of the TS efforts to 
achieve Universality. 
 
¶14.  (U) The DG made a strong pitch for the Rome universality 
meeting to be held October 25-27 and urged delegations to 
encourage non-SPs in the Middle East to send high-level 
representation to the meeting.  Privately the TS shared with 
the Del the invitation letter (faxed to ISN/CB on 6/21/06) 
sent to the Israeli FM that is essentially the same in 
substance as the letters sent to the other non-SPs in the 
region.  The DG also encouraged delegations to provide any 
suggestions they may have regarding the program for the 
meeting.  Finland said that as the incoming EU President it 
would demarche all non-SPs on behalf of the EU to encourage 
high-level attendance at the meeting.  Italy said that the 
venue for the meeting would be the Aldrovandi Palace Hotel 
and that Italy would work closely to ensure that the meeting 
will be productive and well represented. 
 
¶15.  (U) The DG said that he and the TS have actively been 
pushing the universality agenda, noting that he had recently 
been in Jerusalem and also met with the Syrian, Lebanese, and 
Egyptian Ambassadors in The Hague. 
 
¶16.  (U) The U.S. and France urged the TS to consider 
combining the African Meeting for non-SPs scheduled to take 
place in Algiers on November 20-22 and the African NA meeting 
that will take place at some point in the fourth quarter of 
2006, in order to reduce costs and ensure significant 
attendance.  The DG said that he agreed in principle and 
would work in that direction. 
 
¶17.  (U) The rest of the meeting was largely the same update 
provided by Liu Zhixian, the Director of the External 
Relations Division, at the earlir POC meeting and generic 
statements from delegaions supporting universality. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CHALLENGE INSPECTION CONSULTATINS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (U) Facilitator Kang Yong (PRC) convened his last 
consultation on challenge inspections on June 20.  Kang 
opened the session by recalling the suggestion of several 
delegations in recent consultations that the EC be involved 
in (or develop their own) challenge inspection exercise. 
Kang said he had raised this possibility with the Vice Chair 
of the cluster for this topic (Amb. Gevorgian of the Russian 
Federation), who did not believe that "the time was ripe." 
 
¶19.  (U) Kang then turned to the focus of the consultations, 
yet another of the "unresolved issues," the issue of specific 
 
lists of equipment for challenge inspections.  TS 
representatives Per Runn and Faiza Patel King introduced the 
topic by giving what they believed to be the background -- 
concern that analytical equipment would compromise 
information unrelated to the CWC.  Patel King noted that this 
issue has already been addressed by the use of blinding 
software, and that the TS position is that all equipment 
available for a routine inspection should be available for 
challenge inspections as well. 
 
¶20.  (U) Iran then noted that the overall list of approved 
equipment is still actually under discussion, and that if we 
assume that all approved equipment can be brought on site, it 
would naturally mean that we should have resolution on the 
overall list of equipment.  Iranian del also referred to 
"reservations some SPs have voiced on certain items within 
the approved equipment list" and, citing Part II, para 27-28 
of the Verification Annex, stated that the TS should not be 
able to select among equipment. 
 
¶21.  (U) Several delegations requested clarification on the 
statement that SPs still had reservations on certain pieces 
of equipment, and more details on equipment that might cause 
specific concerns.  Discussions then ranged from POE 
procedures used to inspect equipment to the need (or lack 
thereof) to differentiate between equipment used for a 
challenge inspection and that used for a routine inspection, 
with most delegations expressing support for giving the TS as 
much flexibility as possible to carry out their mission. 
Iran insisted that para 29, Part II of the Verification Annex 
does provide for reservations on types of equipment.  U.S. 
del rep expressed strong support for allowing maximum TS 
flexibility, and offered a different interpretation of the 
intent of para 29. 
 
¶22.  (U) Consultations concluded with no clear "way forward" 
expressed by the facilitator, likely to the delight of many 
delegations, who see the consultations as a waste of time, if 
not actually detrimental to TS efforts to maintain a state of 
readiness to conduct a challenge inspection.  Del rep was 
later approached by Russian del rep, who, on behalf of Amb. 
Gevorgian, is obviously considering what action, if any, to 
take following Kang's departure this summer.  Russia del does 
not seem opposed to continuing consultations, but stated 
frankly that they do not believe challenge inspections are a 
 
tool that should ever actually be used. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CHALLENGE INSPECTION PRESENTATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶23.  (U) On June 20, the German delegation gave a 
presentation on the challenge inspection exercise conducted 
March 26-31, 2006, at the Lechfeld Air Base.  Representatives 
from the German National Authority gave an overview of the 
various ministries/offices involved in such an exercise, 
focusing in particular on the role of the Bundeswehr 
Verification Center and the Escort Team, and then explained 
the scenario and results (lessons learned) of the exercise. 
(Hard copy of all relevant briefings will be provided to 
Washington.) 
 
¶24.  (U) The TS then shared their impressions from the 
exercise, from both Inspector and Headquarters perspectives. 
TS objectives for the exercise included exercising the 
 
SIPDIS 
command and control element (inspection planning), using 
interviews as an inspection tool, and report writing.  The 
Inspection Team also focused on Non-Destructive Evaluation 
methods and on-site Sampling and Analysis.  An IT member who 
had participated gave a well-focused briefing, in which he 
explained the actions of the IT from receipt of the Challenge 
Inspection Request (CIR), through POE activities and 
perimeter negotiations, up to IT findings (related back to 
the CIR) and operational lessons learned. 
 
¶25.  (U) Policy Review Branch head Per Runn summarized the TS 
perspective, stating that the main lesson learned was that 
report writing would be extremely time consuming, even if 
started early.  He also noted a need for the TS to balance a 
 
desire to "hit the ground as soon as possible" with the 
benefits derived from more meticulous inspection planning. 
Finally, he noted that an exercise requires tremendous 
advance planning, and that in a real challenge inspection 
scenario, some routine inspections would almost certainly 
need to be foregone to free inspector resources. 
 
¶26.  (U) Reactions from delegations were mixed.  France asked 
how Germany was able to maintain a balance between 
transparency and respecting the rights of the Inspected State 
Party (ISP).  Other WEOG questions focused on on-site 
sampling, use of equipment, and managed access.  India stated 
that the exercise was too dependent upon artificialities, 
questioned the "value added" of such exercises for the TS, 
and suggested that it would be more useful in future to have 
an uncooperative ISP.  (Rep from the German NA noted that 
cooperation is fully consistent with German policy on 
challenge inspections.)  Iran expressed concern over the use 
of interviews, and requested that the TS provide the report 
from the exercise to member states, citing reports issued 
from earlier exercises.  TS rep acknowledged that while this 
would be useful, the TS is still developing a reporting 
format for challenge inspections, and is concerned that any 
initial, informal report provided might be construed as a 
proposed format. 
 
----------------- 
OEWG ON TERRORISM 
----------------- 
 
¶27.  (U) Facilitator Sophie Moal-Makame (France) chaired her 
final meeting of the Open Ended Working Group on Terrorism on 
June 23.  Most of the meeting was a presentation by 
Ambassador Les Luck, the Australian Ambassador for 
Counter-Terrorism, on Countering Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
Australia's Strategy and Approach.  After the presentation 
and questions and answers, John Makhubalo, Director of 
International Cooperation and Assistance, gave a brief update 
on recent TS activities related to terrorism.  The meeting 
was general and there was little of substance or new to come 
out of the discussions. 
 
¶28.  (U) The DG introduced Amb. Luck who outlined his role in 
the Australian government.  Luck said that he was primarily 
involved in Australia's external CT efforts with a special 
focus on regional cooperation with other Southeast Asian 
countries.  He listed several recent terrorist attacks in 
Southeast Asia including the Bali bombings, the bombings 
adjacent to the U.S. and Australian Embassies in Jakarta and 
said that Australia was working very closely with the 
Indonesian government to prevent further attacks.  He said 
that Australia was working on building its capacity and 
helping others in border security, transportation security, 
bomb site analysis, victim identification, and tracking 
terrorist financial transactions.  The Australian police also 
now have a presence in all countries in the region. 
 
¶29.  (U) In terms of the OPCW, Luck said that it was clear 
that international terrorist organizations would like to 
develop a WMD capability and that the OPCW and IAEA therefore 
had a role to play.  He said, for example, that while past 
non-proliferation efforts were focused on state actors, now 
they would also have to be oriented to deal with non-state 
actors.  Luck said that other organizations such as the 
Australia Group, Wassenaar, and initiatives such as PSI also 
had a role to play. 
 
¶30.  (U) Italy asked what specific role Luck envisioned for 
the OPCW.  Luck said that the two most obvious things the 
OPCW could do in the struggle against terrorism would be to 
push for the universality of the CWC and full and effective 
implementation by SPs.  The Austrian delegate highlighted the 
role that Assistance and Protection could play in the 
struggle against terrorism. 
 
¶31.  (U) Makhubalo told delegates that he and the Director of 
the Office of Special Projects had visited the African Center 
for the Study of Terrorism in Algiers on June 18 and 19. 
Makhubalo said the Center, which was established in 2004, was 
 
working on strengthening anti-terrorism cooperation amongst 
all African countries by encouraging them to join relevant 
international organizations and by acting as a clearing house 
for anti-terrorism related information.  The Center is under 
the African Union and its director reports to the AU 
Commissioner for Peace and Security.  The Center's 
representatives told Makhubalo that they were very interested 
in working more closely with the OPCW particularly in the 
area of Assistance and Cooperation.  While the two day 
meeting was an exploratory session, according to Makhubalo, 
he believed that there are potential synergies between the 
two organizations such as sharing information from the TS 
Assistance and Protection database with the African Center. 
 
¶32.  (U) Moal-Makame said in closing that she believes there 
is more to be done in the OEWG and she urged delegates to 
think of creative ways that Assistance and Protection 
activities could be used as part of the OPCW's contribution 
to global anti-terrorism efforts. 
 
¶33.  (U) On the question of Moal-Makame's successor, she told 
del rep privately that Paris has recommended that the new 
French delegate to the OPCW assume her responsibilities as 
the OEWG facilitator.  The Spanish delegate Tomas Lopez 
Vilarino had earlier expressed an interest in the position 
but is unlikely to push for the position should the French 
want to keep it. 
 
----------------------------- 
2005 DRAFT REPORT OF THE OPCW 
----------------------------- 
 
¶34.  (U) The Chairman of the Executive Council, Ambassador 
Mkhize (South Africa), chaired a June 22 meeting to review 
the 2005 Draft Report of the OPCW.  The report, which is 
largely a straight forward account of what the TS did in 2005 
and what happened, should have taken about thirty minutes to 
approve.  Iran, however, intervened repeatedly in an attempt 
to politicize what should have been a simple historical 
document.  The U.S., Germany, France, and the UK pushed back 
on most of the Iranian proposed edits.  Most of the Iranian 
suggestions were not accepted and on a few the TS agreed to 
study the language and try to make it clearer for delegates. 
Exactly how the document will emerge from the TS editors for 
EC-46 to consider is not clear and the del will have to 
closely examine the document to ensure that any problematic 
Iranian changes were not included by the TS. 
 
¶35.  (U) On page 1 of the document, Iran requested that all 
references to non-proliferation be deleted as 
non-proliferation is not mentioned in the CWC.  Del rep 
pushed back noting that many items mentioned in the report 
are not explicitly mentioned in the CWC, training and 
development for example, yet there are no calls for these 
items to be excised from the report.  Del rep also noted that 
non-proliferation is listed as a core objective in the 
program and budget.  The change was rejected. 
 
¶36.  (U) Iran also requested that paragraph 4 on page one be 
split so that Article VII would have a separate header and 
that "further progress" on line 3 be changed to "significant 
progress." There were no objections.  In paragraph 6, line 1 
Iran asked that "universal adherence" be replaced with 
"universality".  There was some weak opposition to this from 
the TS but eventually the change was accepted. 
 
¶37.  (U) Austria requested that special mention be made to 
the EU voluntary contribution in paragraph 7 on page 2.  The 
U.S. and Iran suggested that it was important to be 
consistent in the report and either mention everybody's 
contribution or nobody's contribution.  Austria withdrew its 
request. 
 
¶38.  (U) Russia and the UK proposed listing the 
non-submitting SPs in paragraph 1.1.  The TS responded that 
the information was available in the Verification 
Implementation Report.  India said it would like to submit 
unspecified editorial suggestions for paragraph 1.12 to the 
TS.  Russia asked that the last sentence in paragraph 1.21 be 
 
SIPDIS 
 
deleted.  There were no objections. 
 
¶39.  (U) Iran asked that the entire reference in paragraph 
1.31 and 1.32f be deleted. India supported.   The U.S., UK, 
and Germany pushed back.  The TS said it may seek to refine 
the language.  Austria requested that "inter alias" be added 
in front of "the ability" in paragraph 1.34.  There were no 
objections. 
 
¶40.  (U) India asked that the language in paragraphs 2.9 and 
2.17 be refined by the TS to make it clearer.  Iran asked 
that the word "effective national Authorities" be changed to 
"National Authorities" in paragraph 2.17.  Iran also asked 
that the introductory paragraph on Article VII that it had 
earlier called for be deleted and all references to Article 
VII be moved to paragraph 2.18.  Del rep objected strongly to 
both changes and they were dropped. 
 
¶41.  (U) The TS said it would correct the number of TAVs 
listed in 2.19, as it was incorrect.  Russia said that 3.3a 
needed to be corrected as the decision referenced was made in 
2004 and not in 2005.  Iran said it was unaware of any host 
country issues having been resolved as stated in 4.8 and 
asked that the TS check and correct the mistake. 
 
--------------- 
REPAYMENT PLANS 
--------------- 
 
¶42.  (U) Consultations were held on establishing a repayment 
mechanism for SPs in arrears.  The facilitators circulated a 
facilitators' paper (e-mailed to ISN-CB on 6/23) that was to 
serve as a basis for drafting decision language. 
Unfortunately, rather than offering general comments on the 
substance of the document Germany and Iran suggested 
reviewing the document paragraph by paragraph.  The whole 
exercise quickly devolved into a drafting exercise that will 
undoubtedly be repeated when delegates are presented with the 
actual draft decision language at the next consultation after 
EC-46. 
 
¶43.  (U) Japan said Tokyo would insist on a maximum five year 
repayment period in any repayment plant, as this was closer 
to the UN standard.  Japan also would prefer that an 
exception to financial regulation 5.6a be incorporated into 
repayment plans as opposed to amending the financial 
regulations.  The U.S., France, Ireland, and Germany 
supported Japan's position.  Iran said it would it reserve 
its positions and suggested that a ten year limit might be 
more appropriate, suggesting that the facilitators contact 
SPs in arrears and get their view.  (Note: No SPs that have 
lost their voting rights attended the consultation.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶44.  (U) Iran said it had problems with the first sentence in 
paragraph A, as it implied that all SPs in arrears had to 
submit a payment plan even if they did not want to enter into 
a repayment plan with the TS.  Other delegations tried to 
explain that this only applied to SPs that wanted to enter 
into a repayment plan, but Iran said the language would have 
to be refined for a draft decision.  Germany reminded Iran 
that the document was not decision text. 
 
¶45.  (U) Iran suggested that SPs who enter into a repayment 
plan with the TS and regain their voting rights and 
subsequently fail to adhere to the terms of the agreement 
should not lose their voting rights again until the 
subsequent CSP makes a decision.  All other delegations 
expressed the view that SPs that fail to abide by the terms 
of their repayment plans should automatically lose their 
voting rights again.  There was no consensus as to whether 
this should be stipulated in each individual repayment plan 
as approved by the CSP or in the CSP decision restoring 
voting rights.  The facilitators said they would study the 
issue and develop language for delegations to consider at the 
next consultation. 
 
¶46.  (U) Javits sends. 
BLAKEMAN