VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #1124/01 1602226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 092226Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8251
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J5/J2/POLAD//

C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 001124

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF NORIEGA'S RETURN TO PANAMA

REF: PANAMA 0919

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM EATON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
-------

¶1.  (C) As Manuel Noriega's fall 2007 release from prison
draws closer, Embassy consensus is that Noriega's extradition
to Panama could lead to political instability and unrest.
Alternatively, his extradition to France may actually further
U.S. relations with the GOP, although the USG will need a
public relations strategy to counter negative public
reaction.  END SUMMARY.

Consequences of Noriega's extradition to Panama
--------------------------------------------- --

¶2.  (C) The likely fallout from Noriega's extradition to
Panama is political turmoil.  The GOP would face opposing
pressures: from the Panamanian people and international
community to handle the case properly and from former Noriega
cronies who are now part of the government and in a position
to help their former boss. (See Reftel.)  Noriega's
reappearance could polarize the country by opening old wounds
within the society.  The infighting and unrest within the PRD
could be extremely divisive and destabilizing.  At best,
Noriega's presence here would be an enormous and possibly
costly distraction.

¶3.  (C) If Noriega returned to Panama, he could also regain
access to his suspected stash of money and other resources.
Authorities recovered only a fraction of his alleged wealth
upon his arrest, and the potential implications of Noriega's
refound financial power are troubling.  With access to his
funds restored, Noriega could pay for an expensive defense,
potentially bribe his way free, or bankroll activities to
support his former allies or create further mischief.

¶4.  (C) Further, the Panamanian judicial system may lack the
maturity and good governance to handle such a case.  Negative
consequences from potential malfeasance or corruption in the
judicial process would be further divisions and unrest.
Those most likely to benefit from instability are the radical
trade unionists who could use Noriega's extradition as a
chance to advocate violence and fuel their anti-U.S. rhetoric.

GOP distancing itself from Noriega case
---------------------------------------

¶5.  (C) Given the volatile nature of the Noriega case, the
GOP does not want him to return to Panama.  Its hands full
with the Canal expansion referendum and other issues, the GOP
lacks the time, resources, and political will to deal with a
huge distraction like Noriega's potential extradition that
would divert media and public attention for months from its
preferred projects.  Nor does the GOP want to face the
resulting public scrutiny over its handling of the
proceedings or the costs.

¶6.  (C) On the other hand, the GOP cannot admit its
reluctance now that the public is aware of the previous
extradition requests.  President Torrijos has repeatedly said
the Noriega case is a judicial and not a political issue,
effectively giving judicial authorities the lead on the case
and washing the GOP,s hands of the matter.  When asked about
the case in a March 2006 radio interview, Torrijos refused to
discuss the Noriega extradition beyond repeating that "this
is a judicial issue" and that it was up to the judicial
branch to decide what to do.

What do the Panamanian people want?
-----------------------------------

¶7.  (SBU) The general public apparently does not have strong
feelings on the case, although the majority of Panamanians
probably want Noriega to face justice in Panama.  That
majority includes those directly affected by the Noriega
dictatorship, human rights activists, and civil society
groups.  A May 2006 Cid-Gallup poll showed 76% of respondents
wanted Noriega judged in Panama, while 13% wanted him
pardoned and 11% did not have a opinion.  Because the French
extradition request is not public knowledge, the poll did not
measure willingness to have Noriega judged by a third
country.  However, the preference to have Noriega judged in
Panama is tempered by the public's mistrust of the Panamanian
justice system.

If Noriega Goes to France
-------------------------

¶8.  (C) If Noriega is extradited to France, the U.S. would
face public criticism in Panama.  Noriega's extradition to
another country would be a clear vote of no confidence in the
Panamanian judicial system.  While this could serve as a
positive shock to the system, it will also prompt backlash.

¶9.  (C) The GOP would echo any such outcry in public, but
privately would be very relieved.  Noriega's extradition to
France would give the GOP a convenient "out" by allowing it
to maintain the public pretense of pushing for the
extradition without having to suffer its consequences.  A
U.S. decision for France is the most face-saving option for
the GOP and could help improve bilateral relations in the
long run.

¶10.  (C) Embassy believes that it would be best to inform the
GOP once a decision on Noriega's extradition is close to
being finalized.  This would also require local consultations
with the French.  On the public level, the U.S. would have to
be prepared to explain how Noriega,s extradition to France
would serve the interests of justice.

EATON