VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #2755/01 1741019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231019Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2658

UNCLAS NAIROBI 002755 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
H FOR MATTHEW RENOLDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM KE
SUBJECT: KENYA: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DREIER 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Welcome to Kenya, a country that stands 
out among African nations as a country of special interest to 
the United States.  With substantial existing infrastructure, 
a well-educated work force and a diverse economy, Kenya could 
become East Africa's engine for economic growth.  In a test 
of Kenya's electoral maturity, a first-ever constitutional 
referendum was conducted in November 2005, the results of 
which demonstrated that voters could freely express their 
opposition to a government initiative.  These positive 
elements, however, are tempered by ongoing high-level 
corruption and internal political rivalries that have 
dramatically slowed some areas of our bilateral cooperation 
and Kenya's own economic development.  Years of ecological 
mismanagement have put Kenya on the brink of an ecological 
catastrophe that will reverberate through the economy and 
will impact issues as diverse as health care and regional 
stability. 
 
¶2. (U) In spite of a sense of gloom on the macro level, there 
have been significant advances in some sectors.  Impressive 
results under the President's Emergency Program for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) include increasing the numbers of 
U.S.-supported anti-retroviral (ART) treatment sites from 
three to over 180 in under two years, improving the quality 
of treatment, and achieving a 100-fold increase in the number 
of Kenyans on ART in the 24 months since the PEPFAR scale-up 
began.  The Government of Kenya progressed in the area of 
economic reform, passing two critical reform bills central to 
our economic advocacy.  Our environmental activities, 
conducted in collaboration with other donors, have increased 
the number of Kenyans using sustainable land management 
practices.  Our strong support of Kenya's long-standing 
partnership with the African Contingency Operations Training 
Assistance Program (ACOTA) will continue to enhance Kenya's 
capacity to contribute to multi-national peace support 
missions in Africa.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Terrorism 
--------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Terrorism looms largest on our bilateral agenda with 
the Government of Kenya.  The bombing of our Embassy on 
August 7, 1998 and the subsequent November 2002 terrorist 
attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel and Israeli chartered 
aircraft within Kenya have been linked to Al-Qaeda, which 
retains the ability to operate in and around Kenya.  Kenya's 
posture in the war on terrorism is, unfortunately, not as 
favorable as in the past.  The Government of Kenya still has 
not established the necessary legal tools nor organized a 
joint task force of police and prosecutors, despite 
significant U.S. financial support.  Nevertheless, we have 
had some modest successes.  We have provided training to the 
Department of Public Prosecutions and airport security staff. 
 We have established a coastal security program, combining 
the efforts of RSO (DS/ATA), KUSLO, DAO, and the Economic and 
Political sections, that promises to improve Kenya's capacity 
to secure its extensive coastline.  Cooperation within the 
Mission and with the Kenyan Government on this program is 
excellent and should serve as a model for such multi-sectoral 
projects.  However, without an overarching Kenyan 
counter-terrorism strategy and legal framework, our efforts 
will carry on in a piecemeal fashion and will lack the impact 
of a fully integrated program.  Military aspects of our 
counter-terrorism activities, particularly training, suffered 
a loss of funds due to Kenya's failure to conclude an Article 
98 agreement.  CJTF-HOA Civil Affairs teams 
have been active in Kenya since 2003, providing humanitarian 
assistance and supporting development projects throughout 
North Eastern Kenya and Coast province. 
 
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Political Overview 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (U) Kenya's democratic development continued to falter in 
¶2005.  Campaigns for and against the draft constitution 
descended into ethnic animosities, and the Government used 
substantial incentives in its (unsuccessful) attempts to lure 
voters to support the draft.  The brightest spot in the 
referendum process was the affirmation of the independence 
and effectiveness of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), 
but this body is likely to come under increasing pressure in 
the run-up to the 2007 elections.  Coverage of the referendum 
and high-level corruption, and professional organization of 
broadcast debates, demonstrated the growing maturity and 
professionalism of the media sector.  Individuals at the 
highest levels of government turned a deaf ear to most 
accusations of corruption, closing their ranks in an effort 
to protect themselves from legal action or political 
fall-out. 
¶5. (SBU) Media freedom in the country suffered a set-back 
when the police carried out a midnight raid the Standard 
Media House in March 2006 citing national security concerns, 
destroying and confiscating property and setting the day's 
newsprint ablaze.  Also troubling for Kenyans is the still 
unfolding mystery of two so-called "Armenian" brothers whose 
purpose for being in the country is unclear but widely 
thought to be illegal.  Following a serious security breach 
in early June 2006 involving the brothers at Kenya's main 
airport, it has been alleged that the two are connected to 
and supported by politically powerful individuals. The 
subsequent power struggle ensuing between the Executive and 
Parliament to control inquiry into the mystery surrounding 
the pair amply demonstrates the limitations the Executive 
continues to place on the Legislature's powers. 
 
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Economic Overview 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The Kenyan economy grew by 5.8 percent in 2005.  This 
modest expansion is fairly broad-based, and is built on the 
resilience, resourcefulness, and improved confidence of the 
private sector.  Growth at this rate, however, will never 
pull the vast majority of Kenyans out of poverty.  To realize 
its economic potential, Kenya will need to rebuild the 
country's decrepit infrastructure, reform the 
telecommunications sector, off-load failed parastatals, 
deregulate the economy, and improve economic governance 
generally (see below).  The Privatization Act, passed in 
2005, should enable privatization's to occur more easily and 
rapidly, but implementation of the Act has yet to begin. 
Kenya continues to benefit from the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), but must diversify out of the apparel 
industry if it hopes to avoid losing out to its global 
competitors. 
 
¶7. (U) Kenya has been impacted by on-going drought 
conditions, and significant portions of the population will 
likely require emergency food assistance in the coming year, 
as they did in 2005. 
 
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Corruption 
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¶8. (U) Corruption is the greatest challenge facing the Kenyan 
economy.  In the first year after taking office, the new 
government took some bold action, including passing state of 
the art anti-corruption legislation and removing nearly half 
of the country's judges following allegations of corruption. 
However, the momentum of those early actions has been largely 
squandered and there have been virtually no prosecutions of 
senior officials from either the former or the current regime 
for corruption, despite ample evidence of wrongdoing in both 
cases and mass public outcry, in particular following the 
publication of reports in early 2006 detailing the extent of 
the rot. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Failure by the Executive to take serious action on a 
number of recent cases involving breach of security and 
corruption allegations have seen an increase in the number of 
committees taking up investigations into corruption scandals. 
 Parliament has also questioned the effectiveness of the 
anti-corruption institutions, and several committee chairs 
expressed interest in conducting a workshop where all 
anti-corruption institutions, key executive representatives, 
and MPs will meet to review their performance and discuss the 
challenges they face in their work.  The growing 
assertiveness of Parliament and the fact that MPs are taking 
their watchdog role more seriously have alarmed the 
Executive, which is now accusing Parliament of overstepping 
its mandate. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Confronting corruption in the government is a high 
priority for the U.S. Mission in Kenya, as our initiatives on 
all fronts are frustrated by malfeasance and mismanagement. 
Although the Government's rhetoric has improved, corruption 
remains pervasive at all levels.  Government reform efforts 
have been disappointing, but we are encouraged that Kenya's 
press, civil society, Parliament, and general public have 
shown that they will not suffer quietly while the country's 
coffers are emptied.  Recent corruption scandals (commonly 
referred to by the name of the fictitious financial 
corporation involved - i.e., Anglo-Leasing) are noteworthy 
not only because they signify the continuation of high-level 
corruption within the current regime, but also because their 
revelation (by an opposition MP and the press) signifies a 
more open climate for public criticism in Kenya. 
 
--------------------- 
Environment: Amboseli 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) On September 28, 2005, the Minister for Tourism and 
Wildlife published a legal notice, which changed the status 
of Amboseli National Park to a National Reserve.  This meant 
that the management of the park would be removed from the 
Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) and placed under the authority 
of Kajiado County Council.  The move is a controversial one, 
coming at a time when it could only be construed as a 
desperate political maneuver to gain support for the proposed 
constitution, and may have jeopardized the KWS's revenue base 
and its momentum for effective reform.  One of the most 
pressing worries concerning the change in control over 
Amboseli's management, is whether the Council will be able to 
enforce the current practice of minimal livestock grazing 
within the park.   The Amboseli move is a dangerous 
precedent, possibly clearing the way for more of the kind of 
land grabbing and gifting that characterized the economically 
disastrous Moi era.  If the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife 
can unilaterally degazette a park, it, or other ministries, 
could claim the authority to create new public land 
designations without the input of local communities or wider 
stakeholders and without observing the rule of law. 
 
¶12. (U) In October 2005, a group of Kenyan civil society and 
tourism associations successfully applied for and were 
granted a Court Injunction stopping the County Council and 
the Government of Kenya from acting on Legal Notice 120 until 
the case is determined by the High Court. The first full 
proper Hearing will be held in the High Court on July 14, 
2006 to determine whether the Government acted illegally in 
moving to degazette the Park in the way it did.  In the 
interim, KWS remains in full management control of the park. 
 
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HIV/AIDS and the President's Emergency Plan 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
achieved impressive advances in 2005.  Kenya this year had 
the largest single-country PEPFAR program in the world.  Five 
Mission elements coordinated their activities to implement 
nearly USD141 million worth of activities in the areas of 
prevention, treatment and care in 2005.  Thanks in part to 
our efforts with our Kenyan partners, the HIV prevalence rate 
among 15-19 year old women declined from 7 percent to 6.7 
percent.  PEPFAR funding made possible anti-retroviral 
treatment (ART) for 34,913 Kenyans, an increase from our 
starting point of 389 individuals.  This translates into 72 
more Kenyans starting ART every day.  The Mission is 
implementing a USD208 million PEPFAR program for 2006 and is 
actively planning a USD324 million program for 2007. 
 
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Somalia 
------- 
 
¶14. (U) Kenya took the lead, through the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), in the Somali National 
Reconciliation Conference that took place over 23 months in 
Kenya.  Since the conclusion of this conference, Kenya has 
remained active in supporting the strengthening of the 
institutions which emerged from the conference.  A Somali 
Transitional Federal Assembly, President, and Government have 
been established and in the past three months have begun work 
in earnest, but remain extremely fragile.  A union of Islamic 
courts has taken control of Mogadishu.  Many members of this 
union are moderates, but a handful of courts that have been 
driving the agenda are linked to known extremists.  Somali 
pirates operating off coast of Somalia have attacked cargo 
and cruise ships alike, prompting U.S. military attention to 
the threat posed to international shipping. 
 
¶15. (U) Without sustained stability in Somalia, our 
anti-terrorism activities throughout the Horn of Africa will 
be continuously undermined.  Establishment of democratic 
institutions will be critical to ensuring long-term peace and 
eventual economic development.  Stability will also enable us 
to engage more broadly and effectively with communities 
inside Somalia. 
 
 
 
ROWE