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Viewing cable 06MUSCAT990, COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS KEY TO GULF AIR PURCHASE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MUSCAT990 2006-06-19 12:56 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Muscat
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS MUSCAT 000990 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, EB/CBA (B.BEHRENS) 
COMMERCE FOR ITA (C.OBERG) 
MANAMA FOR S.SIMPSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP EAIR ECON ETRD PREL BA MU
SUBJECT: COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS KEY TO GULF AIR PURCHASE 
OF AIRCRAFT 
 
REF: MUSCAT 896 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Conversations with the Minister of Transportation 
and Communications and the Under Secretary for Civil Aviation 
Affairs indicate that Gulf Air's upcoming purchase of 
aircraft will be based on purely commercial grounds, with 
fuel efficiency being the top concern.  While careful not to 
tip their hands, both appeared to lean towards Boeing.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Fuel Efficiency Important 
------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) On June 18, the Ambassador raised Gulf Air's plans 
to purchase new long and medium-range aircraft with Minister 
of Transportation and Communications Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Abdullah al-Harthi.  The Minister responded that Gulf Air's 
Board of Directors had decided to leave the decision to Gulf 
Air's management so that it would be made on commercial 
rather than political grounds.  Al-Harthi continued that Gulf 
Air's most important consideration was fuel consumption, 
given that the airline's losses primarily resulted from the 
use of older, less fuel-efficient aircraft.  Al-Harthi 
expressed optimism that Gulf Air's upcoming acquisitions 
would enable the carrier to compete in the region, and 
commented that Manama-based Gulf Air CEO James Hogan has not 
raised any concerns regarding Boeing's proposal.  He closed 
with the comment that the "pressure is now on Airbus." 
 
--------------------------- 
Treat Your Customers Nicely 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) On June 17, the DCM raised the upcoming purchase 
with the Ministry of Transportation's Under Secretary for 
Civil Aviation Affairs Muhammed Sakhir al-Amri.  Al-Amri 
responded that deliberations were underway and that an 
announcement would be made soon.  He further dismissed 
Airbus' recently reported woes (stock scandals, production 
delays) as being immaterial to Gulf Air's decision. 
 
4. (SBU) Al-Amri then recounted his difficulties in traveling 
to Seattle on behalf of Oman Air (33% government-owned) to 
finalize the purchase of new Boeing 737 aircraft in February 
2002.  He expressed dismay at being denied boarding 
privileges by authorities stationed in Amsterdam over a 
three-day period, then having to be re-routed, on order of 
U.S. immigration, through Detroit, rather than direct to 
Seattle.  Upon arrival in Detroit, al-Amri was held for 
questioning in secondary inspection for several hours, 
resulting in a missed connection.  Upon al-Amri's departure, 
immigration officials argued in front of him as to whether he 
should be escorted to his flight.  A U.S. graduate and a 
former pilot with Gulf Air, al-Amri noted that he understood 
the concerns of the U.S. authorities, but objected to the 
disrespectful manner in which he was treated. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
5. (SBU) While both Gulf Air board members were careful not 
to tip their hands, Post is cautiously optimistic that Oman 
is favorably disposed to Boeing, in spite of the Under 
Secretary's unpleasant travel experience in 2002.  Al-Amri 
 
SIPDIS 
had a hand in Oman Air's previous decision to go with Boeing 
in a region that has, until recently, been dominated by 
Airbus.  (Note: Oman Air recently ordered 2 more Boeing 
737's, and is eyeing 787's for long-haul expansion.  End 
note.) 
GRAPPO