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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 000588 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: TEN PLUS APPROVES TWO-YEAR STRATEGY 
 
 
MINSK 00000588  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: The Ten Plus Coalition's Political Council on 
May 22 approved a two-year plan aimed at removing Belarusian 
dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko and promoting democracy.  The 
plan concentrates most of its energy in the "For Freedom" 
movement, which calls for pro-democratic civil society groups 
and NGOs to join forces with the Ten Plus.  Although the plan 
states that the Ten Plus is to abide by resolutions set forth 
by the October Congress of Democratic Forces, former 
Coalition presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich and 
his team appear to be assuming the executive position in 
implementing the plan and controlling the "For Freedom" 
movement.  United Civic Party (UCP) leader Anatoly Lebedko 
abstained from voting, fearing the plan would weaken the 
UCP's internal power structure and Lebedko's position within 
the Coalition.  End Summary. 
 
"For Freedom" Priorities 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (U) On May 22 the Ten Plus Coalition's Political Council 
approved the opposition's two-year strategy aimed at removing 
Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko from power and 
promoting democratic reform via the "For Freedom" campaign. 
(Note: The strategy, in Belarusian, is located on 
Milinkevich's website http://by.milinkevich.org.) The 
campaign's political objective is to shape an independent and 
democratic Belarus, prevent Belarus' political and economic 
islation, and ensure separate legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches that "honor freedom and huan dignity." 
The strategy calls for democratic pesidential and 
parliamentary elections and peaceful means to force 
Lukashenko to resign. 
 
Mobilization 
------------ 
 
¶3. (U) The "For Freedom" campaign begins with opposition 
forces identifying and finding solutions to the potential 
economic and social consequences following price hikes in 
imported Russian energy.  The opposition is then to inform 
Belarusians about the potential crisis and mobilize the 
public should the government fail to alleviate the problems. 
 
The Troops 
---------- 
 
¶4. (U) The two-year strategy relies on three groups to 
implement the "For Freedom" campaign.  The first group 
includes the political parties and civil-society 
organizations of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) that 
worked "effectively" during the 2006 presidential campaign 
and have the "knowledge," "motivated members," 
"administrative resources," and an "established information 
distribution system."  The second group is former Ten Plus 
presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich-who, according 
to the strategy, "must be recognized as the alternative to 
Lukashenko"--and his campaign team.  The final group includes 
entrepreneurs, students, contract employees, religious 
groups, and others who participated in the elections, but 
were not affiliated with the "official" opposition.  The 
strategy acknowledges that the main obstacle in working with 
the last group would be transforming its "protest energy" 
into preparedness and coordination (translation: keeping them 
under the UDF's control). 
 
New Members 
----------- 
 
¶5. (U) The strategy encourages pro-democratic individuals and 
groups to work together with the Ten Plus Coalition.  Leaders 
of democratic political parties would be invited to join the 
UDF and civil society representatives (i.e., Protestants, 
intelligentsia, and business circle initiatives) are invited 
to serve as advisors.  Chairpersons of civil NGOs that 
support the "For Freedom" campaign but are not represented at 
the Political Council would be invited to a monthly civil 
forum. 
 
Continued Support 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The campaign stresses the need to provide "rapid and 
real" support to victims of GOB repression.  The opposition 
must continue demanding the release of all political 
prisoners, the suspension of politically motivated criminal 
cases, and access to independent press and alternative 
sources of information. 
 
MINSK 00000588  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
Defining the Leadership 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) The two-year strategy directs the UDF leadership to 
abide and operate in accordance to resolutions passed by the 
Congress of Democratic Forces, but the Political Council 
(currently headed by Milinkevich) would implement the "For 
Freedom" campaign.  Although the plan orders the Political 
Council to elect a leader and committee members by June 15, 
it is construed to give Milinkevich a clear advantage, 
allowing him to transform his established network of regional 
and local election campaign headquarters into branches of the 
"For Freedom" executive committee. 
 
A Unanimous Vote(Nearly 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) deputy Ales 
Yanukevich on May 24 told Poloff that UCP deputy Aleksandr 
Dobrovolsky, Milinkevich campaign team member Viktor 
Kornyenko, and leader of the BPF Vintsuk Vyachorka drafted 
the strategy.  The Political Council reviewed it twice before 
passing it almost unanimously.  According to Yanukevich, UCP 
leader Anatoly Lebedko abstained because he feared the plan 
would weaken the UCP's power structure and, most importantly, 
his high position within the UDF.  The Political Council 
voted down Lebedko's motion to hold another Congress of 
Democratic Forces to launch the "For Freedom" campaign and 
define the Coalition's leadership. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The two-year strategy could be a step forward in 
promoting opposition unity, although some observers complain 
the strategy should have been adopted much earlier if the 
opposition wanted to capitalize on the momentum of the 2006 
presidential elections.  Milinkevich told Ambassador on May 
22 it was disappointing it took the Ten Plus two months after 
the elections to formulate a strategy and reach out to civil 
society and other pro-democratic groups.  The clauses that 
more or less consolidate Milinkevich's position as leader of 
the Political Council and, hence, the Coalition could fan the 
flames of the power struggle between UCP's Lebedko and 
Milinkevich, as it is clear Lebedko does not entirely agree 
with the adopted strategy and may try to strike out on his 
own.  Such a division would damage opposition unity at a time 
when they need to be consolidating and cooperating.  Lebedko 
on May 23 told Ambassador, however, that he had no intention 
of leaving the Coalition and simply wants to strengthen the 
stra 
tegy by making it more specific and action-oriented than 
hortatory.  Our constant message to both Milinkevich and 
Lebedko and the opposition as a whole is to remain unified 
and not weaken themselves by divisions. 
 
Krol