VZCZCXRO5796
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHML #2777/01 1810908
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O 300908Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1828
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 002777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PTER PHUM PINS PREL RP
SUBJECT:  GRP LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN AGAINST COMMUNIST INSURGENTS 
 
REF: 05 MANILA 5506 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  In In June 2006, President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo approved a new strategy for defeating 
Asia's longest-running communist insurgency by the 
Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People's 
Army (CPP/NPA).  Under this plan, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP), with a subsidiary role for the 
Philippine National Police (PNP), will launch multiple 
offensives to "eliminate" the NPAew People's Army in 
critical areas, including Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, 
parts of Northern Luzon, and the BicolSorsogon 
regionProvince.  The new campaign will simultaneously seek 
socio-economic development, lack of which has fueled the 
Communist insurgency over almost forty years.  U.S. experts 
working with the AFP on Philippine Defense Reform are so 
far convinced that the new anti-NPA campaign will not be a 
distraction.   While total victory over the CPP/NPA in the 
foreseeable future remains unlikely, the new campaign could 
over the next couple of years contribute to improvements on 
the ground, although at the risk of higher AFP casualties 
that may be politically difficult to sustain, especially 
with elections due in May 2007. 
  End Summary. 
 
-------------- 
"New" strategy 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) The New People's Army (NPA), with an estimated 
strength of 7,400 members and 130 guerrilla fronts, 
continues to threaten the the Philippines' internal security 
and impede economic development (reftel).  In a Cabinet 
meeting in Isabela province on June 16, President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo rejected an estimate by the Department of 
National  Defense of 10 years to defeat the communist 
insurgency as "too long," and set a target of two years 
instead.  Under a "new" strategy entitled the Internal 
Security Operations (ISO) Oplan Bantay Laya,  President 
Arroyo announced a special new budget allocation of P1 
billion (approximxately  US$18,870,000), effective 
immediately (ref A). 
 
¶3.  (U)  According to media accounts, the AFP will receive 
P400 million (approximately $7,550,000) of the new fund, 
primarily to purchase attack helicopters but also to fund 
overall anti-NPA military operations.  The AFP reportedly 
has redeployed three Army battalions from Mindanao -- about 
1,500 soldiers -- to areas in Luzon to assist in military 
operations against the NPA: the 3rd Infantry Battalion (IB) 
to Central Luzon and parts of Northern Luzon; the 4th IB to 
Tanay, Rizal in Southern Luzon; and, the 9th IB to the Bicol 
regionProvince.   The AFP has announced that an additional 
3,000 troops now assigned to other duties (notably, security 
details of VIPs and other civilians) will also join the new 
campaigns. 
 
¶4.  (U) The PNP will receive P300 million (approximately 
$5,660,000), reportedly mostly to beef up protection of and 
capabilities of police outposts in remote areas, but also to 
resume the counterinsurgency role in metro Manila ofby its 
elite Special Acton Force (SAF). 
 
¶5.  (U) The remaining P300 million (approximately 
$5,660,000) will be part of a major "hearts and minds" 
campaign, led by the AFP, to wean away remote and under- 
served parts of the Philippines from CPP and NPA control or 
influence.  The still-unpassed 2006 budget had included 
special funding for a "500 barangays" project by the AFP 
with this same goalto this intent by the AFP; this funding 
could also become available if the Senate and Lower House 
approve a budget once the two houses of Congress resumes 
their sessions in late July.  President Arroyo has also 
announced a plant to commit an additional P75 billion 
(approximately  $1,415,000,000) over the next three years to 
generate investment and development in Northern Luzon in 
particular. 
 
¶6.  (U) GRP leaders have separately also indicated a new 
effort to  target CPP/NPA "sympathizers and financiers," 
stating publicly that anyone who provides comfort or aid to 
the insurgents will be subject to counterinsurgency 
operations.   Leftists have already expressed concern that 
the AFP or PNP could go after local farmers already 
 
MANILA 00002777  002 OF 002 
 
 
"squeezed" by the NPA's revolutionary taxes, possibly 
leading to an increase in extrajudicial killings allegedly 
involving security forces.  However, GRP officials have 
claimed that they will also investigate and prosecute 
business firms that pay "revolutionary taxes" to the NPA, 
with the objective of restricting the flow of funds to the 
communist insurgents, although they have not publicly 
targeted the largest suspected "victims" - cell phone 
companies whose remote relay stations are often at risk if 
they do not pay up. 
 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
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¶7.  (SBU) The NPA indeed remains a deadly threat throughout 
the Philippines; its elimination would tangibly improve the 
prospects for peace and development nationwide.  The NPA 
has suffered significant losses during the Lombat-Bitag 
campaign in 1989-1993,, and have then resortedcommitted to 
traditional guerrilla tactics since their its reemergence 
in 1996 as a serious threat.  Likewise, Due to with the 
designation by the U.S. and the EU as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization, the CPP has had to adopted more 
diversifiedsophisticated methods to raise funds from their 
legal front support base, methods difficult if not 
impossible to prove evidentiary.  The NPA havse also had to 
recommitted to Netherlands-based CPP leader Joma Sison's 
original strategy of being self-sufficient units, making 
them less easy targets for the AFP.Early campaigns have 
scattered NPA forces into ever-smaller operating units 
(making them more difficult targets for AFP or PNP 
offensives), while the listing of the CPP/NPA by the U.S. 
Government and EU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization has 
led to a major cutback on foreign funding, forcing the NPA 
into its current role as a serious extortion gang.    Apart 
from the announced AFP troop redeployment from Central 
Mindanao (where observers sayth theey were no longer 
needed), other elements of the new "strategy" remain vague, 
with no clearer prospect for success than earlier 
campaigns.  However, AFP programs with the U.S. Joint 
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSTOF-P) in 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago - notably in Basilan and 
now in Jolo - have enhanced the skills of AFP troops in 
conducting civil/humanitarian programs, which that could 
improve the likelihood of success in this larger "hearts 
and minds" campaign nationwide.  U.S. experts working with 
the AFP on Philippine Defense Reform are so far convinced 
that the new anti-NPA campaign will not be a distraction 
from PDR initiatives, and actually reflect some of the 
priorities enunciated in the first-ever DND Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG), DND planning guidelines issued in 
¶2005.  While total victory over the CPP/NPA in the 
foreseeable future remains unlikely, the new campaign could 
over the next couple of years contribute to improvements on 
the ground, although at the risk of higher AFP casualties 
that may be politically difficult to sustain, especially 
with elections due in May 2007. 
KENNEY