VZCZCXRO1938
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1361/01 1591017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081017Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3127
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001361 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - SLA HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR'S ARREST 
 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
¶1.  On May 20, the Minni Minawi faction of the Sudanese 
Liberation Army (SLA) faction allegedly arrested former 
SLA humanitarian coordinator Sulayman Jamus for the 
second time since February 2006.  Initial conflicting 
reports on his arrest and speculation on his current 
situation are a main topic of discussion in Darfur.  The 
general sentiment is that this event could signify a 
setback with regards to the Zaghawa tribe's participation 
in Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation and 
further complicate peace efforts.  Despite the absence of 
Jamus, USAID's Darfur Field Office (DFO) has detected no 
observable change in humanitarian activities, travel, or 
programming.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
-------- 
Overview 
-------- 
 
¶2.  According to the U.N. Department of Safety and 
Security (UNDSS), Sulayman Jamus is from the Bedeyaat 
faction of the Zaghawa and was an Islamist close to 
Hassan Al Turabi before joining the SLA in 2003.  He 
reportedly derives his power through his two nephews who 
are high-ranking officers in the Chadian Army and close 
to President Idriss Deby.  Recently, Jamus has served as 
the main point of contact for U.N. and international non- 
governmental organization (NGOs) conducting humanitarian 
operations in SLA-controlled areas, notifying SLA field 
commanders of planned movements and facilitating the 
delivery of aid to populations in zones outside the 
control of the Government of Sudan.  U.N. officials 
charged with coordinating humanitarian interventions in 
Darfur consider Sulayman Jamus to be an important 
interlocutor in reference to efforts to access SLA- 
dominated regions. 
 
¶3.  The SLA arrested Jamus in February 2006, after an 
apparent falling out between Sulayman Jamus and Minni 
Minawi.  With a great deal of pressure from the 
international community, the SLA set him free.  On May 
20, the SLA Intelligence Chief and brother of Minni 
Minawi allegedly arrested Jamus northeast of Kutum for 
supposedly breaking internal SLA military rules.  On May 
22, the SLA-Minawi faction arrested 12 of Jamus' 
relatives and supporters who were reportedly tortured, 
according to one NGO visiting the area.  The NGO reported 
that skirmishes between Jamus' and Minni's supporters on 
May 23 in Birmaza, North Darfur, left at least five 
people dead and an unknown number injured. 
 
¶4.  The NGO also reported that Birmaza is now under the 
control of the Group of 19 (G19) that supports Jamus.  On 
June 4, UNDSS confirmed G19's control of Birmaza.  [Note: 
Following the SLA Hashkanita conference in November 2005, 
19 field commanders formed the G19 as an effort to 
distance themselves from the SLA-Minawi faction, as the 
group maintains that Minni Minawi is overly influenced by 
foreigners.  While Sulayman Jamus had supported Minni 
Minawi, he was also a G19 sympathizer.  End Note.] 
 
¶5.  A U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) human rights team has 
received permission from SLA-Minawi leadership to visit 
Jamus, but two attempts to travel to his location have 
been stalled by uncooperative SLA-Minawi field 
commanders.  The UNMIS team will make a third attempt to 
visit Jamus on June 8. 
 
---------------------------------- 
SLA Motivations for Jamus' arrest 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  Observers fear that Jamus' arrest could signify a 
setback with regards to the Zaghawa tribe's participation 
in DPA implementation.  The motivation for the arrest is 
unknown, but two theories exist.  The first is that the 
SLA-Minawi leadership accuses Jamus of supporting the G19 
and also campaigning against the DPA.  The second version 
is that SLA-Minawi leadership is trying to weaken Jamus 
and promote other, more loyal fighters for positions such 
as SLA humanitarian coordinator. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Impact on Humanitarian Activities 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001361  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7.  Previously, the established system of advance 
notification that required humanitarian organizations to 
inform the SLA of planned movements into SLA-controlled 
areas did not prevent harassment of relief workers and 
looting of property while in SLA-controlled territory. 
Despite giving prior notification and gaining assurances 
for safe passage, SLA fighters regularly stop NGO 
vehicles, often stealing the vehicles along with other 
equipment. 
 
¶8.  Since May 20, SLA notifications have been unclear and 
often hard to obtain, but the impact on humanitarian 
access has been undetectable to date.  U.N. agencies and 
NGOs continue to travel to SLA-controlled areas to 
deliver assistance.  International NGOs report that SLA 
checkpoints seem to be abandoned and that SLA soldiers 
have made no effort to stop humanitarian convoys 
traveling through SLA-controlled territory despite the 
breakdown in communication with the SLA's humanitarian 
coordinator.  NGOs also report that SLA field commanders 
have been cordial and welcoming. 
 
STEINFELD