VZCZCXRO9665
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1344/01 1571517
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061517Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3076
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, NSC/AFRICA FOR SHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - NRC RETURNS TO KALMA CAMP, SOUTH 
DARFUR 
 
REF:  A) Khartoum 0824 
      B) Khartoum 0797 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  On May 31, 2006, the South Darfur State Security 
Committee approved an agreement to permit the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC) to resume camp coordination 
responsibilities at Kalma internally displaced persons 
(IDP) camp and food security programs in South Darfur for 
one year.  NRC staff immediately returned to Nyala to 
meet with other actors and gain knowledge of current 
conditions inside and outside Kalma camp.  Several other 
IDP camps in the Nyala vicinity lack camp coordinators 
and suffer from a lack of management.  The U.N. Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is 
exploring whether NRC may be assigned responsibilities 
for additional camps. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2.  Located approximately 11 kilometers east of Nyala, 
Kalma is Darfur's second largest IDP camp with a 
population of 90,000.  NRC assumed Kalma camp 
coordination in July 2004 under a memorandum of 
understanding with OCHA and a letter of agreement with 
the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC).  NRC's 
responsibilities at Kalma camp included coordinating 
humanitarian programs and protection for the camp's 
residents and serving as a liaison for community leaders, 
government officials, the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS), and humanitarian agencies. 
 
¶3.  As reported per reftels, NRC has had a contentious 
relationship with the Sudanese Government of National 
Unity (GNU).  On three separate occasions, NRC has been 
forced to withdraw from Kalma, with the longest period 
lasting three months from mid-August to November 2005. 
 
¶4.  Most recently, NRC withdrew from Kalma camp on April 
4, 2006, after the GNU refused to renew NRC's letter of 
agreement.  The GNU did not provide an official 
justification for not renewing NRC'S mandate.  However, 
many observers within the humanitarian community consider 
the decision a result of the GNU's disapproval of NRC's 
human rights advocacy, monitoring of sexual violence and 
abuse and humanitarian protection activities. 
 
¶5.  During NRC's two-month absence from Kalma, insecurity 
and tension rose among IDPs, the GNU, Arab nomads, 
humanitarian agencies, and AMIS officials.  During this 
period, the breakdown of social cohesion culminated in 
the killing of a Sudanese AMIS interpreter during the 
visit by U.N. Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian 
Affairs Jan Egeland on May 8, 2006. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Conditions Placed on NRC's return to Kalma 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  On May 31, 2006, the South Darfur State Security 
Committee approved an agreement allowing NRC to resume 
camp coordination of Kalma camp for one year.  This 
agreement is similar to the 2004 memorandum with one very 
important distinction:  NRC is not to occupy itself with 
"security issues" in the camp.  The condition reflects 
the GNU view that NRC had impeded government control over 
security matters in the past.  NRC has assured the 
humanitarian community that adherence to this provision 
will not hinder humanitarian protection activities. 
 
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Challenges Ahead 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  NRC faces several challenges in the resumption of 
camp coordination duties.  NRC must balance the need to 
 
KHARTOUM 00001344  002 OF 002 
 
 
ensure the safety of IDPs and a secure setting for 
humanitarian work, while also working within the GNU- 
imposed limitations to abstain from active involvement in 
"security issues."  NRC is encouraging Sheikhs and youth 
leaders to contribute positively to the environment of 
the camp.  NRC is also prioritizing planning and camp 
infrastructure preparations for the rainy season, 
expected to start in the coming weeks. 
 
¶8.  Additionally, AMIS has developed a distrust of the 
Kalma camp community leaders, stemming from the killing 
of its interpreter.  In response to the incident, AMIS 
suspended operations and established three preconditions 
for return:  1) Sheikhs commit to investigate the 
incident; 2) Sheikhs assist AMIS with the recovery of 
looted equipment; and 3) Sheikhs provide security 
guarantees that similar incidents will not reoccur.  Thus 
far, the response from Kalma camp leaders has been 
unsatisfactory in addressing the AMIS preconditions for a 
return to the camp. 
 
¶9.  Currently, Kalma lacks a policing presence, as 
neither AMIS nor GNU forces are present in the camp. 
Residents remain at increased risk of abuse without AMIS 
oversight and monitoring.  On behalf of Kalma IDPs, OCHA 
formally requested the AMIS Civilian Police Commissioner 
to resume firewood patrols at the camp, and the matter is 
pending in El Fasher. 
 
STEINFELD