VZCZCXRO6384
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2687/01 1640230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130230Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0802
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2602
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2756
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6038
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1427

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002687 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
REL NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/PAKTIKA  PAKTITA  FOUR DISTRICTS IN 
PAKTIKA  AN EARLY JUNE ASSESSMEN 
 
KABUL 00002687  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: An early June journey to and 
assessment of four districts in western Paktika 
ka 
revealed districts with generally little 
infrastructure and little support from the central 
government. Despite certain similarities, these 
districts differ in their support for the government 
and their ability to stand up to insurgent 
activities.  The one thing they all have in common 
is a need for more security from the Afghan 
government. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU)   In the first week of June, PRT Sharana 
conducted a four day overland trip to four of 
Paktikas 23 districts.  The PRTs Project team, 
Information Officer, Operations Officer, PRT 
Engineer, and DOS representative visited the western 
districts of Khair Kot, Shaklabad, Jani Khel, and 
Bak Khel, where they met with local leaders, 
assessed the security situation and viewed ongoing 
projects. The districts clustered on or near the 
western border of Paktika Province were all 
relatively poor and remote. The security situation 
and perception of the Afghan government in the 
districts varied from very poor in some districts to 
o 
relatively good in others. 
 
Khair Khot District 
 
¶3.   (SBU) Khair Khot is one of Paktikas 
westernmost districts and borders insurgent troubled 
districts of Ghazni province. The district has 25 
police, 19 AK 47 rifles, 45 to 60 rounds of 
ammunition per weapon, no radios, one Thuraya phone, 
and only one police vehicle, a Toyota pickup. 
Despite these police equipment shortages, Khair 
Kots district commissioner, Mohammad Hashim Qani, 
reported that there were few security problems in 
the district.  The people are apparently happy with 
projects under construction in Khair Khot. The 
Afghan Stabilization Program (ASP) is completing a 
government district center building and has already 
finished a district communications building which 
will bring telephone and internet service into the 
district. The Coalition has funded a cobblestone 
road and USAID is finishing the reconstruction of a 
primary health care clinic in the district center. 
Through these projects ASP, USAID, and the military 
y 
have employed large numbers of local people. 
(Comment: The projects and the employment related to 
them likely have had a positive effect on security 
and the local peoples attitude toward the present 
Afghan government. The recent stationing of a large 
(approximately battalion sized) Afghan National Army 
(ANA) presence at Khair Khot castle has also likely 
significantly contributed to the positive perception 
of security in Khair Khot. End Comment) 
 
Shaklabad District 
 
¶4.  (SBU)   Shaklabad district center, approximately 
a one hour drive southeast of Khair Khot over 
unimproved dirt roads, has few selling points.  It 
 
KABUL 00002687  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
is a very small crossroads mud building village of 
perhaps 200 people.  Located on a desiccated 
treeless plain with little or no agriculture other 
than animal herding, Shaklabad appears to be one of 
Paktikas poorest districts.  The chief of police, 
Mohammad Khan, stated that unemployment was very 
high and that nearly all disposable income was 
s 
generated by local men working in Pakistan or Iran. 
The district has 15 police, 15 Hungarian AK 47 
rifles, 15 to 20 rounds of ammunition per weapon, no 
radios, one Thuraya phone, and no vehicles for the 
police or district commissioner.  The police chief 
and district commissioner are the only Afghan 
government officials in the district. The police 
chief reported few security problems but admitted 
his range of influence was limited to the immediate 
vicinity of the district center due to a lack of 
vehicles. With only two projects in the district, a 
small Coalition-funded police building in the 
district center and an eight room USAID school 
outside the town, Shaklabad has little 
infrastructure.  The reach of the Afghan government 
and its security forces in Shaklabad is very 
limited. (Comment: It is likely that Shaklabads 
real security situation in relationship to anti- 
government forces is unknown to the police. The 
general population of Shaklabad at this point seems 
relatively unaffected by the Afghan government. 
However, it also does not appear to be overly 
influenced by anti-government elements. End Comment) 
 
Jani Khel 
 
¶5.  (SBU)   Jani Khel, located due south of Khair 
Khot and bordering Ghazni province on the west and 
Shaklabad district on the east, is a district 
gripped by fear of the Taliban. Remote from Afghan 
or coalition forces and close to Ghaznis troubled 
southeastern districts, Jani Khel presents a real 
challenge to the Afghan government and its security 
forces.  The district had 15 police until five quit 
in the last week of May after being threatened by 
local mullahs.  Mullahs in Jani Khel are actively 
preaching that the police are helping the coalition 
and that the coalition and the Karzai government are 
anti-Islamic. With only 10 policemen, 20 AK 47 
rifles, 20 to 30 rounds of ammunition per weapon, no 
radios, one Thuraya phone, and no operational 
vehicles, Police Chief Mohammad Talib admits that he 
is overwhelmed. The Governor has told him to hire 
more police but he claims no one from the district 
will join the police force. The district 
commissioner was recently transferred and has not 
been replaced.  This leaves the chief of police as 
the sole representative of the Afghan government in 
the district.  Talib stated that he believed around 
80 percent of the people in the district did not 
support the government. This is not because the 
people dislike the government but rather that they 
do not believe the government is strong enough to 
protect them.  The people know that the police are 
unable to protect them from the Taliban so they 
cooperate with the Taliban out of fear of being 
harmed. Twenty two of 23 schools in the district are 
reported to have closed in the last week due to 
 
KABUL 00002687  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Taliban threats against teachers and students. The 
police chief pointed out that the district elders 
have made only one request of him - additional 
security.  They want more police and they want ANA 
stationed in the district. There is basically no 
government infrastructure in Jani Khel.  There is 
only one project in the district, a cobblestone road 
funded by the U.S. military, and even this is 
contentious.  However, work has continued on the 
road, likely because it employs many local men. 
 
Bak Khel 
 
¶6.   (SBU)   Bak Khel, located approximately one 
hour due east of Khair Khot over very difficult 
unimproved roads, is one of four unofficial 
districts in Paktika.  As such it does not have a 
district commissioner.  The district has 17 police, 
17 Hungarian AK 47 rifles, 45 to 60 rounds of 
ammunition per weapon, 1 Thuraya phone, no 
operational vehicles and the police have not been 
paid in five months. Bak Khel also has no government 
infrastructure other than a recently renovated small 
mud building housing a primary care clinic and an 
eight room primary school, both USAID projects.  The 
police chief, Haji Nasurla, stated that security was 
good, that the people were cooperating and keeping 
the peace.  Haji Nasurla and all of his police are 
from Bak Khel and all are from the Kasir Khel tribe. 
Haji Nasurla is a tribal elder as well as police 
chief and this unity, along with the fact that Bak 
Khel district is predominately populated by people 
from the Kasir Khel tribe, may account for the lack 
of security problems and lack of Taliban influence 
in the district.   The people were very interested 
in seeing Coalition troops and the police chief said 
that it had been quite a long time since any 
Coalition forces had visited Bak Khel.  The people 
of the area were happy about the new school and were 
extremely interested in educating their children. 
The contractor reported having no difficulties with 
security and the school will likely be finished as 
scheduled. (Comment: The strong natural leadership 
evident in Haji Nasurla and the tribal unity of the 
people of Bak Khel appear to explain why Bak Khel 
has maintained security despite the lack of 
government investment, security forces, and 
attention. End Comment) 
 
¶7.   (SBU)   Comment: These districts have one thing 
in common: they all need security so they can begin 
the development process, and so they can begin to 
appreciate their new government.  In Khair Khot, 
Afghan government influence is relatively high due 
to a large government investment in troops and 
projects.  In Shaklabad there is little government 
influence but also little overt evidence of 
insurgent presence.  Remote, poor, and with a widely 
scattered population, Shaklabad likely serves as a 
transit area for anti-government elements but 
nothing more.  Jani Khel is home to an insurgent 
population and will remain so until they are 
displaced by another stronger element - either 
coalition or Afghan government. Baki Khel is an 
example of an older style area, where security is 
maintained by the unity of the people and the 
 
KABUL 00002687  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
traditional tribal structures of this district 
populated largely by a single tribe. Insurgents 
likely do not use the area, as outsiders are obvious 
to and are not tolerated by the traditional forces 
now re-branded as Afghan National Police.  Paktika 
is a poor, large, remote, and undeveloped province. 
The extreme poverty of the districts is 
unfortunately also reflected in most of the district 
government and police forces.  In the nearly five 
years since the Taliban were removed from power in 
Afghanistan, almost nothing has been done for the 
people in many parts of Paktika.  If the government 
is to counter Taliban influence they must improve 
security and with it the lives of the people of 
Paktika.  Until security is gained on the 
governments terms there will be little development, 
education, or advancement of any kind in Paktika. 
 
NEUMANN