VZCZCXRO6055
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ
DE RUEHHE #0505/01 1531224
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021224Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1962
INFO RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4610
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0230

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HELSINKI 000505 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SMIG EAID EU FI
SUBJECT: FINLAND'S EU PRESIDENCY PRIORITIES 
 
Summary and Introduction 
------------------------ 
¶1. (SBU) During its EU Presidency, Finland will generally 
be a cooperative partner for the US, keen to facilitate 
US-EU cooperation and improve overall trans-Atlantic 
relations.  We should expect no GOF-generated surprises; 
the Finns view their Presidency as a continuation of 
ongoing processes and will avoid introducing national 
political priorities into the EU agenda.  They will focus 
on fostering improved EU dialogue with Russia and on 
democracy promotion in Europe's "new neighborhood," 
although almost exclusively through multilateral 
mechanisms rather than via bold statements or risky 
initiatives.  They will work hard to help forge shared 
US-EU positions on energy security, but will challenge 
the US to re-engage in a climate change dialogue. 
Because the GOF's positions on JHA issues, EU 
enlargement, Iran, and many EU economic initiatives 
closely mirror our own, the EU Presidency offers genuine 
opportunities for cooperation in these areas.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Finland assumes the EU Presidency on July 1. 
Just one year ago, the Finns hoped their second semester 
2006 Presidency would focus on final ratification and 
implementation of the new EU Constitutional Treaty.  The 
French and Dutch referenda results quashed that 
possibility and temporarily dimmed Finnish hopes for a 
monumental, last-of-its-kind Presidency.  The sharp 
disappointment that the referenda engendered passed 
quickly, however.  With typical Finnish pragmatism and 
foresight, the GOF has worked proactively with the 
Commission and the Troika (and, in the Finnish view, with 
Washington) to settle on a solid agenda aimed at 
achieving realistic, substantive goals in several areas. 
There will be no GOF-generated surprises; the Finns are 
at pains to emphasize that they view their Presidency as 
a continuation of an ongoing process as opposed to a 
"separate module or era," and will discourage whenever 
possible the introduction of national political agendas 
or priorities into the EU agenda.  The Finns will also 
work toward maintaining the momentum for and process of 
continued EU integration despite last year's setbacks on 
the Constitution.  The GOF has indicated that the 
following areas will be priorities during its Presidency. 
 
Trans-Atlantic Relations 
------------------------ 
¶3. (SBU) In general terms, the US will find Finland to be a 
willing and competent partner with which to facilitate US- 
EU cooperation -- a role the GOF welcomes.  In the run up 
to the Presidency, the GOF sent an array of top diplomats 
to Washington to ascertain US priorities, identify areas 
for cooperation, and avoid misunderstandings.  Prime 
Minister Vanhanen is a committed trans-Atlanticist.  Since 
Finland began its Presidency preparations, he has 
repeatedly emphasized the priority Finland attaches to 
strengthening trans-Atlantic ties.  Vanhanen has told us 
frequently that he wants Finland to help the EU take the 
"last step" beyond the rancor over Iraq and focus fully on 
a wide range of issues of shared concern such as security 
cooperation, energy security, the environment, and the 
Middle-east.  He reiterated this view during his initial 
meeting with Ambassador Ware earlier this year.  This said, 
the Finns will, on the one hand, at times look for US 
guidance on concrete projects or initiatives.  On the 
other, they will not embrace US initiatives that put them 
on a collision course with counterpart EU governments or 
the Brussels bureaucracy.  Rather, Finland can be counted 
on to help seek common ground when Washington and Brussels 
diverge on their approaches to common goals. 
 
Democracy and the Near Neighborhood 
----------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Promoting democracy and good governance in 
Finland's "near neighborhood" is a top GOF Presidency 
priority.  The Finns have quietly but steadily increased 
their bilateral commitments in the region, from opening a 
bilateral development assistance office in Minsk; to 
financing tertiary education for Belarussian exiles; to 
funding Kiev-based NGOs combating Trafficking in persons 
(TIP).  Finland will work to get the EU to the same place 
and lay the groundwork for a proactive EU institutional 
and structural approach.  The Finns will also likely put 
emphasis on Ukraine.  Beyond the Near Neighborhood, 
Georgia and the Caucasus will be priorities.  Working 
quietly within existing EU mechanisms that seek to co-opt 
-- rather than to alienate or isolate -- the GOF will 
push for renewed EU engagement in south Ossetia and the 
jump-starting of the moribund Abkhazia settlement 
 
HELSINKI 00000505  002 OF 004 
 
 
process.  Further afield, the GOF shares the US view 
that, ultimately, democracy in the Middle East offers the 
best hope for peace and security.  The GOF support EU 
funding for democracy promotion throughout the region, 
and will urge united European stances toward Hamas and 
the Iranian regime.  Although some Finnish leaders, in 
the past, spoke out strongly about the US invasion of 
Iraq, all are fully committed to supporting the new Iraqi 
government and the GOF will fully encourage all EU 
efforts to build democracy and stability there. 
 
Russia 
------ 
¶5. (SBU) No bilateral relationship or aspect of foreign 
policy is more important to Finland than Russia, the 
country with which it shares a 900-mile border (the EU's 
longest external border); a history marked by Russian 
colonial dominance and war; and a critical present-day 
trade and energy relationship.  The Finns share our 
concerns about recent negative trends in Russia and the 
perception of a backwards drift on democracy.  Given our 
shared concerns and the shared priority we place on 
Russia, there will be opportunities for the US to work 
with Finland to influence these processes; however, the 
Finns will emphasize a "soft approach" to Russia and 
eschew particularly aggressive advocacy that would -- 
from their perspective -- overly antagonize the bear to 
the east.  Finland hopes to reinvigorate institutional EU 
structures to engage Russia on several broad fronts.  In 
particular, the GOF wants to use the Presidency to 
renegotiate the Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) and revive the EU's "Four Common Spaces" 
initiative.  The Finns will also address democracy and 
other issues where Russia may be "backsliding" through 
the EU-Russia Human Rights consultation process and by 
attempting to establish substantive dialogue with Moscow 
on energy security. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Concerns about Russia are often linked to energy 
security, and in this area Finland will be an excellent 
partner as the US seeks to forge shared positions with 
the EU.  In general terms, there is little daylight 
between the US, the EU and Finland on desired end states 
and the means to get there.  All agree that market-based 
pricing, adequate investment in infrastructure, diversity 
of supply and new technologies are key.  If anything, 
Finland's national positions are closer to those of the 
US, given the GOF's pro-nuclear power policies and 
Finland's acknowledged leadership in areas such as 
nuclear safety and storage, biofuels and biomass.  In all 
these areas, the Finns tend to accept the logic of US 
positions and will offer voices of reason during EU 
deliberations.  On Russia and in discussions with large 
EU member states, however, Finland will not look to out- 
shout anyone.  For example, the GOF embraces nuclear 
power as part of a solution to its energy diversity 
problems, but will not press other EU countries with 
strong anti-nuclear views to change those.  As for 
Russia, the GOF will be a steadfast ally in working 
through existing mechanisms (EU, G-8 and other dialogue 
fora; traditional diplomacy; eventually perhaps the WTO) 
to bring Moscow around to the idea that being a reliable 
supplier and a good citizen of the free market is 
beneficial to all. 
 
EU Enlargement and the Western Balkans 
-------------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) Finland supports the Commission's decision to 
call off negotiations with Serbia (Enlargement 
Commissioner Ollie Rehn is a Finn) over the Mladic 
situation.  Finland will encourage continued EU pressure 
on Belgrade to arrest Mladic, with the carrot of a quick 
resumption of negotiations during the Finnish Presidency 
if they do so.  The Finns also strongly support Special 
Envoy Marti Ahtisari's mission (another Finn) and will 
work actively within the EU to assist him.  A final 
status arrangement will remain a top Presidency priority 
for the GOF. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The GOF will remain one of the most vocal 
proponents of EU enlargement.  Finland will use its 
Presidency to urge candidate states to maintain progress 
on fulfilling standard criteria as well as to thwart the 
efforts of some EU members to promote "special status" or 
"additional conditionalities" for some who seek 
membership (Turkey, in particular).  The GOF's stance on 
enlargement -- based on its commitment to equal treatment 
for all candidates -- is often unpopular, both within the 
EU and among Finnish domestic public opinion.  The GOF 
will stand fast in the face of anti-EU and/or anti- 
 
HELSINKI 00000505  003 OF 004 
 
 
enlargement rhetoric.  However, it could become 
problematic during the Finnish Presidency if Turkish 
progress stalls or if others in the EU allege that 
progress has stalled.  In either of those cases, the GOF 
is likely to consult actively with the US regarding the 
best means of keeping Turkey on track. 
 
Environment 
----------- 
¶9. (SBU) Unlike many EU member states, the GOF accepts 
the logic of addressing environmental concerns through 
the nexus of energy security and technology.  However, 
Finland means much more when it talks about the 
environment.  In that regard, climate change and global 
environmental degradation will be high on the Finnish EU 
Presidency agenda, and while it is willing to address its 
dialogue with the US outside of a Kyoto or Kyoto II 
framework, it will not shy away from (and indeed will 
push for) discussion of solutions based in part on 
emissions reduction, trading and conservation.  Like most 
EU countries, the GOF increasingly rejects the US 
position that these areas are off the agenda and that new 
technologies will render such considerations moot in the 
near future.  They are keen on finding ways, in 
cooperation with the U.S., to find clean energy solutions 
for China. They also call for closer attention to energy 
efficiency, and in that vein intend to launch a voluntary 
forum for exchanging best practices called the World 
Audit Program at a conference to be held September 11-12 
(Audit 06).  (The GOF has repeatedly asked for, and 
Embassy supports, substantive USG participation in this 
event.) 
 
Justice and Home Affairs 
------------------------ 
¶10.  (SBU)  The stalled Constitutional process has 
influenced Finland's JHA plans.  In the absence of a new 
Constitution, the GOF will push to move "third pillar" 
police and criminal cooperation issues (that would have 
been harmonized under the Constitution) to the "first 
pillar," where they will be handled in the Commission. 
Despite the reluctance of some EU countries to take this 
step (including heavyweights like Germany), the Finns 
believe a basic agreement on the issue is possible by 
December.  Finland also hopes to reach agreement with the 
US on the pending Eurojust agreement and to encourage 
greater counterterrorism cooperation within the EU. 
Finland's Interior Minister is a vocal proponent of 
strengthening anti-trafficking measures, and the GOF 
plans to organize two major anti-trafficking events 
during the Presidency.  The first will be in Helsinki and 
focus on identification, repatriation, and assistance to 
minors; the second is TBD, but will definitely be outside 
Finland. 
 
Economic Goals 
-------------- 
¶11. (SBU) Finland will continue to emphasize the goals of 
the Lisbon Strategy during its EU Presidency.  In 
particular, Finland will emphasize improving productivity 
(pressed, in part, by some of its own demographic 
challenges in the face of an aging population) through 
investing in human capital and technology development. 
It will continue to press for a strong and broad 
innovation policy, regulatory harmonization and the 
opening up of the EU's internal market.  Finland intends 
to introduce a transport policy focus to the agenda, in 
the understanding that a strong logistical capacity is a 
key factor in European economic growth, competitiveness 
and employment.  Finland will also seek to promote data 
security in European information society policy.   It 
will also work towards creating a European information 
society strategy. 
 
The Wild Cards 
-------------- 
¶12. (SBU) Again, both we and the Finns expect their 
Presidency to offer few if any major surprises.  However, 
there are three possible issues that could emerge as wild 
cards.  While we consider all three unlikely -- and, as 
wild cards, difficult to predict -- they merit brief 
consideration: 
 
 -- A Crisis in Iran:  In the event of an acute Iran 
crisis, such as smoking gun revelations of nuclear 
weapons work or serious threats to Israel, it should be 
possible to work with the GOF to craft a strong, unified 
trans-Atlantic response, up to and including possible 
support for UN sanctions.  The Finns have stated many 
times that they oppose military action, but short of 
 
HELSINKI 00000505  004 OF 004 
 
 
that, will consider almost any other US initiatives if a 
crisis emerges. 
 
 -- Terrorist Response:  Finnish authorities and the 
general public believe their country faces little or no 
major terrorist threat.  This at times results in the 
GOF's adopting a somewhat relaxed domestic response. 
However, on the EU level, the GOF can be expected to 
encourage improved enforcement and to push for 
institutional and procedural changes to facilitate 
intelligence gathering and sharing within the EU. 
 
-- China Arms:  Beijing once viewed the Sept. 2006 EU- 
China Summit in Helsinki as a possible window of 
opportunity to press for lifting the Embargo.  However, 
the GOF has made it very clear that it has no/no interest 
in touching the issue of the embargo during its 
Presidency.  Apparently China has also received that 
message and has scaled back what was once an aggressive 
lobbying campaign.  The only chance for the embargo to 
re-surface during the Presidency is if an EU heavyweight 
were to make an unexpected and all-out push to resume 
discussions.  And even then, Finland will likely seek to 
kick this issue to Germany in 2007. 
 
HYATT