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Viewing cable 06DUBLIN774, IRELAND HIDES BEHIND EU SMOKE SCREEN ON DOHA TALKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DUBLIN774 2006-06-30 14:25 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dublin
VZCZCXRO6215
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ
DE RUEHDL #0774/01 1811425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301425Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7167
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST 0415
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: WTRO ETRD ECON EI
SUBJECT: IRELAND HIDES BEHIND EU SMOKE SCREEN ON DOHA TALKS 
 
REF: A. STATE 104561 
 
     B. YOUNG-WILSON E-MAIL OF JUNE 27 
 
DUBLIN 00000774  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary: Regarding ref A points on the Doha negotiations, 
Irish Government officials maintain that key WTO partners, 
particularly the United States, have not offered enough to 
reciprocate EU concessions.  Irish trade officials believe 
that EU movement on agricultural market access is possible if 
the United States can push its offer of 60 percent cuts in 
distorting agricultural subsidies up to 70 percent.  The 
Department of the Prime Minister holds that the most 
significant movement to date in the Doha talks has come from 
the EU as it awaits reciprocal responses from the United 
States and other WTO players.  Agriculture Minister Coughlan 
strongly opposes further EU concessions on agriculture, a 
position dictated by pressure from Irish farm lobbies, which 
fear import surges as a result of possible market openings. 
In reply to Irish Government assertions, Post noted that EU 
farm subsidies in 2005 roughly quadrupled the U.S. level and 
that EU complaints about U.S. farm supports aimed to divert 
attention from the EU's weak offer on agricultural market 
access.  In terms of media outreach, Post has placed an op-ed 
in the Irish Times, drawing from ref A and previous demarche 
points, and has provided ref A's key messages to economic 
journalists.  As Post has previously reported, Irish 
inflexibility on the agricultural component of the Doha talks 
is rooted in Government reluctance to offend the farm sector 
ahead of general elections, now less than a year away.  End 
summary. 
 
The Department of Trade: Minimal Scope for EU Movement 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2.  Ireland supports the Commission's position that EU 
movement on agriculture is possible in concert with 
concessions by other major Doha partners in the Geneva 
negotiations, Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
(DETE) Senior Trade Negotiator and 133 Titulaire Tony Joyce 
told econoff on June 27 in response to ref A demarche. 
Reiterating points in prior discussions, however, Joyce 
cautioned that the EU offer on agricultural market access was 
already at the outer edge of the EU's negotiating limit.  He 
estimated that the United States would have to push its offer 
of 60 percent cuts in distorting agricultural subsidies up to 
70 percent to elicit further EU movement on market access. 
Econoff cited recent OECD figures that put the total value of 
EU farm supports in 2005 at roughly quadruple the U.S. level, 
an imbalance that would make further agricultural subsidy 
cuts difficult for the United States, particularly U.S. 
farmers, to accept in the absence of commensurate gains in 
market access.  Joyce replied that Ireland understood U.S. 
domestic pressures on this point, particularly as they 
influenced Congressional attitudes toward the Doha 
negotiations.  He also noted that, within Ireland's 
agricultural sector, further market openings would most 
seriously harm beef and dairy farmers, who thus staunchly 
opposed additional EU concessions.  Joyce concluded by 
providing econoff the 133 Committee "Hymn Sheet" on EU 
positions for Doha, which Post passed to USEU (ref B). 
 
The Prime Minister's Department: Others Not Moving Enough 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
3.  On June 27, Post also provided ref A points to the 
Department of the Prime Minister, and on June 30 Owen 
O'Leary, the Department's Assistant Secretary for EU and 
International Affairs, responded that EU Member States, 
including Ireland, were awaiting fair and reciprocal movement 
by other WTO partners in the Doha talks.  O'Leary noted that 
Ireland had a deep interest in a successful conclusion to the 
Doha Round, particularly as a small, open, trading economy. 
The Irish view, however, was that the most significant 
movement to date in the talks had come from the European 
side, while the United States and other key partners had not 
yet gone to the limits of their negotiating mandates. 
O'Leary cited reports that the Geneva negotiations would 
conclude on June 30 without continuing into the weekend as 
originally planned, and he hoped that negotiators could 
return in July to address EU concerns on reciprocity.  (As of 
this writing, Post has not been able to confirm this 
development.)  Econoff responded that these views tracked 
with the Commission's public line on the Geneva talks, which, 
in the U.S. view, aimed to divert attention from the EU's 
weak offer on agricultural market access. 
 
Agriculture Officials and Lobbies: No Movement Possible 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
4.  Public commentary on the Doha negotiations, led by 
Agriculture Minister Mary Coughlin, has focused on Irish 
opposition to further EU agricultural concessions.  On June 
 
DUBLIN 00000774  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
29, Minister Coughlan issued a press statement saying that 
"there was no justification for further movement by the EU." 
She elaborated that "any move toward the G-20 position ... 
would have very damaging consequences for market access, 
particularly for beef imports into the EU."  On June 28, the 
Irish Times had reported that Minister Coughlan was under 
coordinated pressure from agricultural lobbies, including 
Meat Industry Ireland, which issued a statement saying that 
"the current EU offer on market access had already conceded 
too much on import tariff reductions."  Also on June 28, 
Padraig Walshe, President of the Irish Farmers Association 
(IFA), had told reporters that the current EU offer would 
reduce the value of Irish agricultural output by 27 percent 
and that further concessions would open the European market 
to unlimited imports from Brazil.  He added that the IFA had 
written to Prime Minister Bertie Ahern to resist the 
"sell-out of European farm families."  The Irish Cooperative 
Organization Society and the Irish Dairy Industries 
Association similarly published a joint statement on June 28 
calling on the Commission not to exceed its negotiating 
mandate in agriculture. 
 
Embassy Media Outreach 
---------------------- 
 
5.  Regarding media outreach, the June 30 Irish Times ran an 
annual July 4 supplement from the American Chamber of 
Commerce, which featured an editorial on the Doha 
negotiations that Post had ghost-written, drawing on ref A 
and previous demarche points.  The editorial, which we will 
forward to EUR/UBI, called for balance in Ireland's position 
on Doha, keeping in mind potential benefits for the 
industrial and services sectors, the drivers of Ireland's 
economic success.  Post also provided ref A points to 
economics reporters at the Irish Times, who are considering 
writing an analysis on the outcome of the Geneva talks. 
 
Comment: Nothing New in the Irish Position 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.  Irish responses to ref A are consistent with views on 
Doha that have been shared with Post over the past year by 
Irish Government officials, all of whom have highlighted 
political reluctance to offend the farm community ahead of 
the May 2007 general elections.  As we have previously 
reported, the irony in the Irish position is that full-time 
farmers now constitute well below five percent of the labor 
force, with the industrial and services sector responsible 
for the creation of roughly 200,000 new jobs over the past 
two years.  The predominance of agricultural concerns in 
Ireland's approach to Doha is, in one sense, testimony to the 
political influence of domestic agricultural lobbies, which 
have been able to coordinate with farm communities more 
effectively the smaller those communities have become. 
KENNY