VZCZCXRO5501
PP RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #0989/01 1631121
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121121Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3647
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9704
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6134
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 4169
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 9240
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 3126
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2202
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3034
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 6685
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 4568
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0398
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1205

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000989 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ASSESSING UNOHCHR FIELD PRESENCE 
 
REF: STATE 73151 
 
¶1. (U) Summary:  Poloff met with United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) Sri Lanka 
representative Rory Mungoven on June 9 to discuss the 
successes and constraints of the program and how the U.S. 
could buttress OHCHR's mandate in Sri Lanka.  Mungoven noted 
moderately successful initiatives with the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and genuine, though disconnected, steps 
by the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to address human rights. 
 He hoped that the United States as a member of the Co-Chairs 
could augment his role by continuing to support the UN's 
human rights message in Sri Lanka, and allocating UN funds 
specifically to OHCHR.  End summary. 
 
-------------- 
Background 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Following the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), OHCHR 
appointed Mungoven to assist the Government of Sri Lanka(GSL) 
and the LTTE in human rights road mapping.  These initiatives 
included drafting a human rights declaration to complement 
the CFA, strengthening the Human Rights Commission's regional 
offices, and providing human rights training for the Sri 
Lanka Army, Police, and the LTTE.  By extension, Mungoven is 
also a peace process advisor for the UN. 
 
------------------------------ 
Engaging with the Tigers 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Between 2002 and November 2005, the UN completed 17 
rounds of "moderately successful" human rights training with 
the LTTE, according to Mungoven.  Such training inspired the 
LTTE to create the North East Secretariat on Human Rights, a 
highly propagandistic organization but one which reflects an 
actual capacity for human rights monitoring, Mungoven said. 
The UN training also led the LTTE to write a human rights 
charter, which they have published but not implemented.  The 
success of the initiative can be conceptualized as an 
exercise for the LTTE which challenged them to think through 
the breadth of human rights issues, such as disability and 
age discrimination. 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to Mungoven, the true impact of the 
training cannot be evaluated, but it has provided a bridge by 
which to deal with the LTTE on human rights issues.  OHCHR's 
space for interaction with the LTTE on human rights has 
diminished since December 2005, when the LTTE increased 
violent attacks against Sri Lankan forces and civilians in 
the wake of President Mahinda Rajapaksa's election. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Engaging the Government of Sri Lanka 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Mungoven described "quality strides" with the GSL on 
supporting the functioning of the independent Human Rights 
Commission.  A disconnect remains, however, between the 
institutions and results.  For instance, the GSL has recently 
established a Ministry of Human Rights and Disaster 
Management as an institutional counterpart to the UN's human 
rights office, with few results thus far.  In addition, the 
HRC's reports go unpublished, and there is no prosecution for 
crimes or the prosecution collapses under a questionably 
independent judiciary.  Opined Mungoven, "The laws, tools and 
institutions for accountability are there, but there is a gap 
in implementation." 
 
-------------- 
Limitations 
-------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Mungoven pointed to three obstacles to a more 
substantial OHCHR presence in Sri Lanka.  First, his position 
 
COLOMBO 00000989  002 OF 002 
 
 
is not the equivalent of a UN Human Rights Mission and cannot 
work with such breadth.  Second, the GSL is resistant to a 
full scale human rights mission, partially by pressure from 
India, which wants to avoid a similar UN mission on Kashmir. 
Third, a UN human rights role requires buy-in from the LTTE 
in order to be effective: the LTTE take it or leave it as 
suits them. 
 
---------------- 
U.S. Support 
---------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) If the security and human rights situation in 
country continues to deteriorate, remarked Mungoven, the UN 
will need the Co-Chairs to be a more adamant influence 
against GSL resistance to human rights measures and also help 
strengthen the human rights capacity of the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM).  Lastly, the USG can earmark a 
portion of its UN contributions toward OHCHR programs. 
 
------------ 
Comment 
------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: We work very closely with Mungoven and 
believe the OHCHR presence here is very useful.  It will only 
become more so if human rights problems continue to increase 
as the "war and peace" situation continues to deteriorate. 
End comment. 
LUNSTEAD