VZCZCXRO1640
OO RUEHAST
DE RUEHBW #0964/01 1671433
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161433Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8821
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1152
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RXFEAA/HQ AFSOUTH NAPLES IT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000964 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: GETTING REAL WITH SERBIAN 
OPINION MAKERS 
 
BELGRADE 00000964  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: COMs of Contact Group countries 
and the UN told influential Serbian opinion 
makers that the GOS must do more to prepare its 
citizens for the likely outcome of Kosovo's final 
status.  The UN and Contact Group stand ready to 
assist Serbia to get through the Kosovo 
settlement and become a stable, strong, and 
prosperous European state. List of Serbian 
attendees in paragraph 11.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On June 14, at the French Residence, the 
Ambassador and the Director of the UN Office in 
Belgrade joined the French Ambassador over lunch 
with influential Serbian opinion makers to convey 
the message that (1) the Contact Group fully 
supports the UNOSEK-led Kosovo final status 
process, (2) the GOS -- and by implication other 
opinion makers -- must do more right now to 
prepare Serbs for the likely outcome of Kosovo's 
final status and (3) the Contact Group and UN 
stand ready to assist Serbia to get through the 
Kosovo settlement and become a stable, strong, 
and prosperous European state.  The group of 
prominent media, religious and policy leaders was 
quite receptive to the frank nature of the 
discussion and wished their government was 
equally forthcoming about the realities of the 
future status of Kosovo. 
 
UN lays it out 
-------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) UN Office Director Harston reported that 
UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari expects the status of 
Kosovo to be resolved by the end of 2006, and 
that in mid-July he will present a report to the 
UNSC containing "no surprises."  Harston said 
"messages have been clear" concerning final 
status and that, unfortunately, Ahtisaari could 
cite almost no progress from recent UNOSEK-led 
talks in Vienna.  Both Ambassadors Polt and 
Pernet voiced unequivocal support for the UNOSEK 
process and Harston averred that UNOSEK was in 
close contact and coordination with the Contact 
Group. 
 
GOS strategy is ineffective and unclear 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The consensus of the attendees was that 
the GOS is not open enough regarding its 
rationale and expectations from the talks, and 
that the GOS negotiating team is not presenting 
its case effectively.  Ivan Vejvoda said the GOS 
team had a "seminar" approach to the talks, as if 
they are discussing an academic case study rather 
than pragmatic solutions.  Ambassador Pernet 
noted how the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) had 
been able to formulate and publish a platform 
while the GOS had not.  DANAS Editor Ramac said 
the SOC had a history of being more willing to 
engage, citing (some in) the SOC's willingness to 
encourage dialogue and cooperation with UNMIK and 
KFOR after 1999.  Father Irinej said he was 
heartened by the lack of "public outrage" to his 
June 7 interview with Belgrade daily Glas 
Javnosti.  (Note: Irinej was the first SOC 
official to imply publicly that there must be 
preparations made for the possibility of an 
independent Kosovo. End note.) 
 
Serbian public is not engaged with negotiations 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Polt stressed that when 
Kosovo's final status is determined, the lack of 
practical engagement by the GOS will likely lead 
to a settlement package being presented which the 
majority of the IC would find acceptable.  It 
would then again be up to Tadic, Kostunica and 
other GOS officials to choose to frame the post- 
settlement reaction in a productive manner or 
not. Ambassador Pernet said one of the most 
troubling aspects of how the GOS is handling 
negotiations now is the "lack of public debate" 
on the issue. POLITIKA editor Smajlovic agreed, 
saying she was "ashamed" that frank discussions 
 
BELGRADE 00000964  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
on Kosovo status are occurring at foreign 
embassies in Belgrade, but not with the GOS. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Smajlovic nevertheless expressed dismay 
at the CG's implied "act of God" approach to the 
negotiations outcome and said that it appears to 
Serbs that the end of the process is already 
known to the international community.  She agreed 
that the DS and DSS will suffer politically if 
the lack of public debate would lead to confusion 
and outrage if Kosovo independence is announced. 
Ivanovic said cynically that perhaps "six years 
of democracy" is not enough for people to know to 
demand more transparency.  Vejvoda said the GOS 
itself does not understand that there is a "cost 
for peace and stability" which is the abandonment 
of extreme positions. 
 
GOS has proven inflexible 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Harston expressed dismay that both 
President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica were 
presenting the same inflexible position on Kosovo 
status as Milosevic did with eastern Slavonia, 
and that on Kosovo, the public stance of the DS 
and DSS is no different from that of the 
Radicals. Harston also alleged that Kostunica and 
Tadic are unwilling to meet with UN or other 
international representatives one-on-one to avoid 
being seen as "complicit" in a final outcome, and 
that both men use the common DS-DSS approach as 
cover to end any honest discussions of Kosovo 
status. Kosovo Serb leader Ivanovic added that 
the GOS negotiators cannot hope to achieve any 
measure of success with "just saying no," and 
that it "more important to get than to ask." 
Unlike most negotiations, Ivanovic said, the GOS 
sounds less willing to compromise publicly than 
it is in private discussions. Ivanovic indicated 
this was a sign of a "hands-off" and divested 
approach by Tadic and Kostunica to the actual 
negotiations, and that the (increasingly 
desperate) negotiators are left in charge of the 
process. 
 
Possible outcomes 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Vejvoda sought to frame a possible Serbian 
reaction to Kosovo independence in a historical 
context.  He said that when PM Djindjic made 
efforts in January 2003 to address Kosovo status, 
it was the international community that had said 
his moves were premature.  However, despite 
public opinion being against compromise or 
reduced sovereignty over Kosovo, Vejvoda said 
that there was a "sense of relief" among the 
public that the issue was finally being addressed 
at all.  He suggested that the recent referendum 
in Montenegro shows that sometimes inflexible 
rhetoric can be followed by practical, if 
grudging, steps forward. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment:  The purpose of this lunch was 
to impress upon influential policy makers a 
similarly realistic message we tell Tadic and 
Kostunica: the Contact Group and UNOSEK are 
unified, and time is overdue to prepare for "the 
day after" a settlement of Kosovo status.  The 
GOS is either unwilling or unable (or both) to 
inform its citizens of the probable outcome for 
Kosovo, but this should not deter other opinion 
makers from working to help the Serbian people 
better understand an unwelcome reality.  The 
international community, in turn, would do its 
part to demonstrate its commitment to help Serbia 
- whether we are joined by the GOS or not - to 
help Kosovo Serbs on the ground and to move 
forward and become a stable and prosperous 
European state. 
 
 
 
¶11. (U) Attendees: 
US/France/UN: 
 - French Ambassador Hugues PERNET (host) 
 
BELGRADE 00000964  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 - Ambassador Michael POLT 
 - Mr. Julian HARSTON, Director, UN Office in 
Belgrade 
 - LTC Thierry NAVREZ, French Defense Attache 
 - Mr. Didier LARROQUE, PolOff, French Embassy 
(notetaker) 
 - Mr. Demian SMITH, PolOff, US Embassy 
(notetaker) 
 
Serbs: 
 - Bishop-Elect Father Irinej DOBRIJEVIC, Serbian 
Orthodox Church 
 - Mr. Ivan VEJVODA, Director, Balkan Trust for 
Democracy 
 - Ms. Ljiljana SMAJLOVIC, Editor-in-Chief, 
POLITIKA 
 - Mr. Mihajlo RAMAC, Editor-in-Chief, DANAS 
 - Ms. Duska ANASTASIJEVIC, Reporter, VREME 
 - Mr. Oliver IVANOVIC, Chair, Serb List for 
Kosovo and Metohija 
 
POLT