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Viewing cable 06ANKARA3784, BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: POST-SHIPMENT END USE CHECK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA3784 2006-06-28 13:10 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
null
Tim W Hayes  06/29/2006 02:44:21 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Tim W Hayes

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
UNCLAS        ANKARA 03784

SIPDIS
CX:
    ACTION: PMA
    INFO:   FCS CONS AMB POL DCM DAO RAO ECON TSR PA

DISSEMINATION: PMA /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: PMA:MNARDI
DRAFTED: PMA:WPINKSTON
CLEARED: PMA:MNARDI

VZCZCAYI975
PP RUEHC RUEUITH RUEHAK RUEKJCS
DE RUEHAK #3784 1791310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281310Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6895
INFO RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY
UNCLAS ANKARA 003784 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE AND PM/DTTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC TU
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN LEVEL 3: POST-SHIPMENT END USE CHECK 
OF LICENSES 05-952140, 05-935458, AND 05-949858 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 77031 
 
     B. SECSTATE 77034 
 
 
 
1. SUMMARY: We met with an official from ASELSAN to discuss 
license numbers 05-952140, 05-935458, and 05-949858 per 
reftels, and confirmed the orders and the end users.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. During a June 6, 2006 meeting at the ASELSAN HQS building 
on the outskirts of Ankara, ASELSAN Program Manager Burce 
KARABAY was forthcoming about their ongoing contracts. 
Karabay chaired the meeting and answered most of our 
questions.  Regarding license no. 05-935458, Karabay said 
ASELSAN had received most of the Raytheon 27 W1000 Thermal 
Weapons Sights kits and most of the 27 chopper assemblies, 
but that ASELSAN had purchased only six of the eight 
categories of components.  Karabay claimed that ASELSAN 
decided not to purchase "Lens no. 1, 3 (3181053)" and "Lens 
no. 2, 9 (3181057)" components due to their cost, noting that 
an unspecified Turkish firm was able to manufacture lenses of 
sufficient quality similar to these lenses.  Karabay said 
that none of Raytheon's thermal weapons sights have yet been 
exported to other countries.  He did remark that ASELSAN had 
received permission from Raytheon and the USG to export its 
own kits to Georgia, and that ASELSAN was awaiting approval 
on the export of other kits to Bulgaria but was awaiting 
final approval from the USG.  Karabay said that the kits 
exported to Georgia, and those proposed for sale to Bulgaria, 
were manufactured by ASELSAN but would consist of 
second-generation technology. 
 
3.  Regarding the 600 casings (license 05-949858), Karabay 
said ASELSAN is no longer using the US firm Howmet Castings 
Bethlehem.  He claimed that ASELSAN had tired of Howmet's 
delivery delays and had switched to use an unspecified 
Turkish subcontractor. 
 
4.  Regarding license 05-952140, the export of M929 aviator 
night vision goggle spare parts and components.  Karabay said 
that the MOD had ordered 45 sets of goggles for Turkish Naval 
and Coast Guard forces and that eight had been delivered thus 
far.  Karabay said the remaining 37 sets were expected in 
April 2007 due to delays from the US supplier, ITT Industries 
Night Vision company based in Roanoke, Virginia.  Karabay 
complained extensively about the delays in the supply of the 
night vision equipment in accordance with US regulation. 
 
5. Based on the site visit, the meeting with the ASELSAN 
official, and the follow-on information provided, ASELSAN 
appears to be properly using the W1000 Thermal Weapons Sights 
kits and the M929 aviator night vision goggles. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON