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Viewing cable 06ANKARA3671, TURKEY: DETENTION OF SCAN BOTHNIA A REMINDER OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA3671 2006-06-21 14:44 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS ANKARA 003671 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY: DETENTION OF SCAN BOTHNIA A REMINDER OF 
STRAITS PASSAGE PROCEDURES 
 
1. The British-flagged vessel Scan Bothnia, en route from 
Ukraine to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was detained on 
June 9 at the port of Derince near the Bosporous by Turkish 
Coast Guard and Customs authorities on the suspicion that it 
was illegally smuggling US military equipment. 
 
2.  Acting on a media tip-off, Turkish authorities boarded 
the ship at Derince, a transit port, and found six military 
recovery vehicles and twenty crates of parts, inside of which 
were an additional six containers of machine guns.  According 
to Turkish authorities, the weapons were not listed on the 
transit application form and, when questioned, the ship's 
captain did not acknowledge the presence of weapons on board. 
 
 
3.  Taos Industries, the US contractor for the heavy tracked 
recovery vehicles, contacted us on June 9 to request 
assistance in freeing the ship.  The company provided 
documentation substantiating that the six vehicles and 
related parts, including defensive weaponry, were ordered by 
the US Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (USTACOM) for 
delivery to US forces in Iraq and eventual transfer to the 
Iraqi Security Forces.  After confirming the bonafides of the 
company and placement of the order by TACOM, we requested MFA 
assistance to gain the vessel's release.  On June 17, the 
vessel was released. 
 
4.  According to the MFA, the ship was detained because the 
ship's transit application form, which requires 
acknowledgment of the number and type of any weaponry 
contained in the cargo, only listed "general parts."  We have 
notified Taos Industries, which has a contract for the 
delivery of up to 66 tracked recovery vehicles to US forces 
in Iraq, that all weaponry must be specifically listed on the 
transit application and should be acknowledged by the ship's 
personnel. 
 
5.  COMMENT:  This avoidable oversight cost the ship a 
one-week delay in reaching its final destination and may 
result in additional delays in the UAE, where the vehicles 
are to be transferred to a US-flagged vessel for final 
delivery to Iraq.  US military equipment has traversed the 
Turkish Straits previously without incident.  The lesson of 
Scan Bothnia case is that contractors and/or shippers must 
clearly and properly notify the Turkish authorities of the 
military cargo they are carrying through the Bosporous.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON