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Viewing cable 06ANKARA3464, MOMENTUM ADVANCING CSI PROGRAM IN TURKEY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA3464 2006-06-12 14:46 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #3464 1631446
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121446Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6505
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 6556
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0777
RHMFIUU/COGARD MIO EUROPE ROTTERDAM NL
UNCLAS ANKARA 003464 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ROME FOR CBP ROBERT STIRITI 
DHS FOR CSI -- HORTON, WAINWRIGHT, DUBELIER 
DEPT PASS TRANSPORTATION DEPT 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT PTER KTIA TU
SUBJECT:  MOMENTUM ADVANCING CSI PROGRAM IN TURKEY 
 
 
1.  (U)  This cable is sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Summary:  We appreciate the CSI team's readiness to move 
forward with the Izmir port assessment despite the current legal 
questions surrounding the Declaration of Principles (DOP).  State 
Minister Kursad Tuzmen has assumed ownership of the program for the 
GOT, understands the importance of such agreements, and wants the 
program implemented this year.  Going forward with the assessment 
will satisfy one of the outstanding requirements for the program, 
and we stand ready to work with both sides to ensure mutually 
agreeable solutions to the remaining outstanding issues.  End 
summary. 
 
3.  (SBU)  We appreciate the Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
Division's readiness to move forward with the assessment despite the 
ongoing issues regarding the nature of the final CSI agreement. 
Since the Foreign Trade Undersecretariat (FTU) took responsibility 
from Turkish Customs for implementing CSI in Izmir, we have seen 
renewed momentum from the GOT and believe that our ability to secure 
a date for the assessment without having first signed the agreement 
demonstrates the desire of State Minister Kursad Tuzmen's (who 
oversees both FTU and Customs) to finalize the program during his 
"Year of America" this year. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Scheduling this assessment visit was one of two major 
hurdles we faced during the process of implementing CSI in Izmir. 
FTU officials have spent a great deal of effort convincing their MFA 
and Customs colleagues to agree to this assessment prior to signing 
the agreement.  Moving forward with the assessment as planned 
demonstrates CSI's importance to the USG and keeps the momentum 
going.  Canceling the assessment now would have the effect of ending 
the possibility of implementing CSI in Izmir by embarrassing FTU 
officials, who would not then be so willing to push things forward 
in the future. 
 
5.  (SBU)  The second hurdle we face is the content of the final CSI 
agreement.  We understand the CSI Division's desire to keep the 
agreement "non-binding," and we have communicated this, and the 
reasons surrounding it, to FTU.  In a June 7 meeting, FTU Head of 
Americas Department, Atilla Bastirmaci, told us that Turkish 
officials are also less concerned about the "binding" nature of the 
agreement. As he put it, "let's move away from the binding or 
non-binding terminology, because we may be talking about different 
things."  He added that in the end whatever is signed, whatever it 
is called, must at least be approved by the Council of Ministers. 
Whatever the USG does with it, [on whomever] we consider it binding, 
he said, is up to us.  He also explained that FTU has brokered 
similar agreements with other countries where the other side 
considered the document binding only on the agency involved while 
the GOT considered it binding on the whole.  We also discussed CSI 
legal staff's idea of having the GOT amend their side of the Customs 
Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) to permit U.S. officials at the 
inspections, to which the USG would simply agree.  Bastirmaci agreed 
to present this at a June 12 interagency CSI meeting. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment:  Now that FTU has responsibility for implementing 
CSI in Izmir, we foresee an accelerated pace of GOT action and an 
openness to finding a workable solution for both sides.  Finding 
solutions may take time, however, and we cannot guarantee that other 
issues will not arise that could slow the process.  Prior to 
becoming an elected official, Tuzmen was a career bureaucrat and 
former U/S at FTU, and he understands the importance of programs 
such as CSI for enhancing Turkey's export potential to the U.S. 
Tuzmen wants this program, and he has expended a considerable amount 
of energy to restart the GOT implementation process.  Implementing 
CSI in Izmir is important to our bilateral relationship by 
facilitating enhanced trade and the exchange of information that 
could prevent terrorist attacks. We stand willing to work with both 
sides to ensure that the best possible solutions to the outstanding 
problems are found.  End comment. 
Wilson