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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA//
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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UNCLAS ANKARA 003416 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: PSI; TURKISH HOSTS MAJOR PSI EXERCISE; ANATOLIAN 
SUN 
 
¶1.  Summary: Turkey hosted a major PSI exercise, Anatolian 
Sun '06, from May 24-26, 2006. This exercise was the first 
multidimensional PSI exercise, which combined land, maritime 
and air interdiction components.  The aim of Anatolian Sun-06 
exercise was to test and develop the information and 
intelligence exchange, consultation and political decision 
making processes along with the operational mechanisms at 
both national and multinational levels within the framework 
of PSI. Turkey extended invitations to sixty-seven (67) 
countries to participate or observe the exercise.  IN 
addition to Turkey, three countries, US, France and Portugal, 
supplied operational assets to participate in the LIVEX 
portion of the exercise, while thirty-four (34) other 
countries sent delegations to observe.  Turkey focused its 
outreach efforts on Central Asian and Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries. Sixteen different GOT agencies also 
participated, making the exercise particularly valuable in 
building interagency links that have traditionally been weak. 
 Turkey did an outstanding job planning and executing a 
complex PSI exercise.  Turkish officials' exuberance during 
the cargo inspection element may have overwhelmed some of the 
observers from smaller countries with less capabilities. 
Nonetheless, the exercise was very well organized, well 
attended, met many of the training objectives, and provided 
an outstanding opportunity for PSI outreach.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Exercise Background 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  Turkey formally endorsed the PSI in December 2003. Turkey 
was welcomed as a member of the Operational Experts Group 
(OEG) and attended several exercises.  At the April 2005 OEG 
meeting, Turkey announced that it would host a PSI exercise 
in the spring of 2006, Anatolian Sun.  Anatolian Sun was the 
first PSI exercise hosted by Turkey.  Furthermore, it was the 
first multidimensional PSI exercise that combined land, 
maritime and air interdiction components. 
 
¶3.  The aim of Anatolian Sun-06 exercise was to test and 
develop the information and intelligence exchange, 
consultation and political decision making processes along 
with the operational mechanisms at both national and 
multinational levels within the framework of PSI.  The 
exercise was composed of two parts: 
 
--Command Post Exercise (CPX) - The goal of this phase was to 
exercise Turkish crisis management centers and included 
participation of approx. 16 Turkish national institutions. 
Also, countries which participate in the OEG were provided 
access to the exercise web site to follow the progress of the 
exercise and participate as appropriate. 
 
--Live Exercise (LIVEX) - This phase included the 
participation of naval ships and aircraft from Turkey, the 
United States, France and Portugal.  The goal of this phase 
was the actual interdiction of a ship suspected of 
transporting WMD related materials out of Antalya Bay, Turkey. 
 
¶4.  The objectives outlined by the GOT for this exercise 
included: 
 
-- Examining intelligence sharing procedures at national and 
international levels and identify problem areas. 
 
-- Test and develop command, control, and operational 
capabilities in applying interdiction measures 
 
-- Identify national legal authorities to effectively 
implement interdiction measures and make necessary 
arrangements in the legal structure; as well as identify 
areas to be developed in the political decisions-making 
process. 
 
--------------------- 
Overview of Exercise 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  Anatolian Sun '06 was based on a generic scenario, which 
did not target any specific country, and consisted of three 
main events which covered land, maritime, and air PSI 
interdiction measures.  These three events were: 
 
a) An air shipment of WMD related materials to Turkey and 
implementation of air interdiction measures.  Interdiction of 
the suspect plane carrying WMD material was exercised during 
the CPX. 
 
b) The interdiction of trucks transporting WMD related 
material at the customs screening location in Antalya. 
Information was provided to the GOT concerning two (2) trucks 
carrying WMD related materials which had successfully entered 
the southeastern portion of Turkey.  The information exchange 
and truck-related interdiction operations were part of the 
CPX and the actual inspection of one of the trucks was 
conducted as part of the LIVEX. 
 
c) As part of the LIVEX, a ship transporting WMD related 
material was interdicted outside of Antalya Bay. 
Intelligence information concerning one of the trucks showed 
that it had successfully passed its cargo to a ship in the 
Port of Antalya.  The commercial ship departed port without 
authorization and was subsequently interdicted by PSI 
partners working in cooperation.  This portion of the LIVEX 
also included the interdiction of a helicopter attempting to 
remove the material from the ship, by both shipboard 
helicopter and land based fixed wing assets, and the boarding 
and escort to port of the ship in question. 
 
¶6.  Observers of the exercise were hosted on a Turkish Navy 
ship throughout the at-sea portion of the exercise. Observers 
were kept up-to-date throughout the exercise via 
announcements over the ship's PA system. Once the exercise 
participants returned to the port, observers were led to a 
covered grandstand where they observed the actions of Turkish 
Customs, Atomic Energy Authority, police and other 
organizations as they carried out their duties. 
 
--------------- 
Live Exercise 
--------------- 
 
¶7.   The LIVEX portion of the exercise began with the 
departure of a small freighter (M/V Sea Star) from the Port 
of Antalya with cargo suspected of containing WMD related 
material.  Earlier in the morning four (4) surface combatant 
ships (one each from Turkey, US, France and Portugal) had 
begun a simulated NATO exercise off the coast of Antalya. 
The exercise was suspended and the four ships formed a PSI 
task force with the goal of intercepting the freighter.  The 
4 naval ships were assisted in their search by Maritime 
Patrol Aircraft from Turkey, France and the US.  The M/V Sea 
Star was located and the naval ships interdicted the ship. 
 
¶8.  Following authorization from the flag state of the M/V 
Sea Star (in this case "yellow country"), boarding operations 
were conducted.  Joint boarding operations utilizing 
operational assets from all participating nations were 
conducted in Turkish waters under the authority of Turkish 
officials.  Once the boarding was completed, the M/V Sea Star 
was escorted back to port for a more thorough inspection of 
the ship and its cargo. 
 
¶9.  In port, the cargo was off loaded and inspected for 
biological, chemical and radiological hazards.  The 
inspection of the cargo was done jointly by the Turkish 
Atomic Energy Authority, the Turkish Health Ministry and 
Turkish Customs.  All individuals were outfitted with 
appropriate safety equipment and all internationally 
recognized safety procedures were followed.  The containers 
were opened and the contents identified as WMD related 
materials. 
 
¶10.  As part of the shore-side activities, one of the trucks 
interdicted during the CPX phase of the exercise was 
inspected.  Biological hazards were found and proper 
decontamination of the truck and personnel was conducted. 
 
------------------------ 
International Outreach 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  The Republic of Turkey extended invitations to 
sixty-seven (67) countries to participate or observe the 
Anatolian Sun Exercise.  These countries included PSI 
endorsing countries and other nations that have shown 
interest in supporting PSI.  Three countries, US, France and 
Portugal, supplied operational assets to participate in the 
LIVEX portion of the exercise in addition to Turkey. 
Thirty-four (34) other countries sent delegations to observe 
the exercise.  In coordination with the United States, Turkey 
focused its outreach efforts on Central Asian and Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries, encouraging their attendance 
at the exercise. 
 
¶12.  The following countries sent observers to the Anatolian 
Sun exercise: 
 
--Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United 
States. 
 
¶13. The following countries were invited to attend but for 
various reasons did not send a delegation to the exercise: 
-- Afghanistan, Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, 
Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, 
Morocco, Norway, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Serbia-Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, 
and UAE. 
 
¶14.  The GOT repeatedly reinforce the message that no 
specific country was the target of this PSI exercise.  This 
was particularly evident following publication of the May 22 
New York Times article, "U.S. Exercise With Turkey is Aimed 
at Iran". The scenario included generic activities in the 
movement of WMD related materials which would allow exercise 
participants and observers to develop a set of lessons 
learned to improve their own capabilities. 
 
------------------------- 
Impression of Exercise 
------------------------- 
 
¶15.  The LIVEX was, by all accounts, a complete success.  All 
aspects of the vessel boarding, vessel escort and container 
inspections were completed without incident or injury and 
provided good at-sea training for the involved assets. 
 
¶16.  It was apparent to veteran exercise observers that the 
LIVEX was well planned and choreographed.  The LIVEX timeline 
was adhered to very closely and it was apparent that the 
Turks left nothing to chance. 
 
¶17.  The Turks did an outstanding job of hosting over 100 
people from 37 countries.  The exercise control team kept the 
observers engaged in all aspects of the LIVEX by making 
periodic announcements of events as they unfolded and 
explained what authorities enabled their actions. 
 
¶18.  The inspection and decontamination of the cargo 
container and personnel were consistent with internationally 
recognized standards.  While observing this was routine for 
exercise veterans from long-standing PSI endorsees, this was 
an important part for delegations getting their first 
exposure to PSI. 
 
¶19.  We have discussed the exercise with different officials 
within the Turkish government. The overall impression was the 
exercise was very useful in displaying the large amount of 
interministerial coordination that is required should Turkey 
be required to react to this type of situation. This was the 
first major exercise which required a number of Turkish 
Ministries to have to work together.  Not accustomed to 
working together the individual learning that was achieved by 
many slowed the exercise at times.  However, this experience 
will better prepare Turkey should it be faced with these 
situations in the future. 
 
------------------------ 
Comments 
------------------------ 
 
¶20.  Anatolian Sun was one of the most robust PSI exercises 
conducted to date.  The exercise included a distributed CPX 
involving a large number of Turkish ministries (over 1,800 
GOT personnel were involved to varying degrees) and a LIVEX 
involving 5 surface combatants (4 as exercise participants 
and 1 as the observer platform), 3 Military Patrol Aircraft 
(MPA), 2 helicopters, 2 fighter aircraft, Turkish Coast Guard 
and Custom Boats and numerous Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) assets 
from Turkey and three other participating nations.  Anatolian 
Sun clearly demonstrated Turkey's commitment to countering 
the proliferation of WMD and related materials. 
 
¶21.  There were two areas of note associated with Anatolian 
Sun: 
 
(a) The CPX was conducted primarily as a Turkish national 
exercise with limited opportunities incorporated into the 
scenario for other nations to participate.  While the CPX did 
not focus on developing international communications; given 
the traditionally weak interagency links within the GOT, this 
arrangement greatly enhanced Turkey's capacity and ability to 
respond in the future to an actual PSI action. 
 
(b) The in port inspection/decontamination phase may have 
been too complicated for some observers.  Turkey clearly 
demonstrated their willingness and capability to conduct 
these types of operations.  However, observers from non-PSI 
nations may have been left with the impression that their 
respective country would be required to have these same 
capabilities in order to endorse PSI. 
 
In spite of these minor issues Turkey did an outstanding job 
planning and executing a complex PSI exercise.  The exercise 
was very well organized, well attended, met many of the 
training objectives of the PSI, and provided an outstanding 
opportunity for outreach activities. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON