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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001568 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, IO/PSC, D:T.SMITH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU UN
SUBJECT: UNSC MISSION REPORTS TO AU THAT SUDAN HAS NOT 
APPROVED UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION 
 
 
¶1. (SBU). SUMMARY.  On June 7, the visiting UN Security 
Council delegation visiting Addis Ababa, Chad, and Sudan, 
briefed representatives of the 15-member African Union Peace 
and Security Council (AU PSC) and AU partners (i.e., 
non-member states) on its June 6 meetings in Khartoum with 
Sudanese President Bashir, parliamentarians, opposition 
parties, and NGOs.  UNSC PermReps outlined continued Sudanese 
reservations about an UN operation, including a Chapter VII 
mandate under the UN Charter, but stressed the necessity of 
continued engagement.  France and China underscored the need 
for the consent of the Government of Sudan before a UN 
operation could be deployed.  Speakers hailed the June 7 
meeting as the first ever between the UN Security Council and 
the three-year-old AU Peace and Security Council.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
NEXT STEPS: STRENGTHENING AMIS AND TRANSITION TO UN 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) According to UKUN PermRep Sir Emyr Jones Parry, 
while the UNSC mission urged both Sudan's Government of 
National Unity (GNU) and other parties to comply with 
commitments "on the UN taking over AMIS II" (i.e., the 
enhanced African Union Mission in Sudan), "we did not get 
agreement on that transfer, nor did we expect to get that." 
The UN was "further forward, but not there yet."  On the 
other hand, the UNSC did receive confirmation that a joint 
UN-AU technical assessment mission would be permitted to 
visit Darfur and Khartoum, beginning June 9.  Such a mission 
was crucial, not only for strengthening AMIS, but also for 
developing its new mandate.  While a transfer was "probable," 
the UNSC had not expected to obtain the GNU's full approval, 
he said. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Jones Parry underscored the necessity to strengthen 
AMIS, and to provide it with the resources necessary to 
fulfill an enhanced mandate that included the protection of 
civilians, rather than focusing only on monitoring.  As five 
to eight additional battalions required training, equipment, 
transportation, and sustenance, there was a risk the 
international community was not taking sufficient steps soon 
enough; even President Bashir has stressed the urgency of 
action, he said.  Jones Parry highlighted the need for 
adequate security as AMIS draws down and the UN builds up. 
He also recommended that the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (UN DPKO) develop two concepts of operations:  one 
for the transition of AMIS to a UN-led mission, and another 
for the UN operation itself. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Jones Parry outlined a roadmap for transition, which 
he said was shared by both the UNSC and the AU Commission, 
and would be discussed with UN Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno: 
-- continued implementation of current AMIS operations; 
-- agreement on a new concept of operations (CONOPS), based 
on the May 5 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), placing greater 
emphasis on protection of civilians; 
-- AMIS securing personnel and resources for AMIS expansion 
(which would require bilateral aid and a pledging conference 
before July); 
-- identification by the assessment mission of the scope for 
transition; 
-- production by UN DPKO of a CONOPS for the UN mission, for 
consideration by the UNSC; 
-- identification of troop contributing countries for the UN 
mission, "with a strong African character;" 
-- transition to the UN, with full operational capacity 
likely not to occur until January 2007. 
 
Jones Parry noted that these steps needed to be done with the 
consent of Sudan. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
SUDANESE CONCERNS ABOUT UN, CHAPTER VII, AND CHAD 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Peru UN PermRep De Rivero observed that Sudanese 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001568  002 OF 003 
 
 
parliamentarians, with whom the mission had met, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the prospect of a UN force coming to 
Sudan.  The UNSC representatives sought to defend UNSCR 
1679's references to a UN operation in Darfur operating under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and to explain that the UN's 
threats to use force were directed against armed groups, 
rather than Sudan, a UN member state.  "They are not too 
convinced about that," he remarked, adding that the UN 
required a strong mandate to protect civilians and comply 
with the DPA.  Greek UN PermRep Vassilakis questioned whether 
President Bashir "has the necessary support from inside" to 
accept a Chapter VII UN operation.  Argentina PermRep Mayoral 
said the view of parliamentarians was clearer than that of 
central government officials, but noted that parliament 
included representatives of the north and south, but not of 
Darfur. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Danish UN PermRep Andersen noted that President 
Bashir sought to blame the Government of Chad, while 
exonerating the GNU.  According to Andersen, Bashir said that 
the Janjaweed was only "partially" a Sudanese problem, as 40 
per cent of the Janjaweed came from Chad.  By focusing on the 
technical nature of the joint UN-AU assessment mission, the 
GNU sought to depoliticize issues too sensitive to handle 
otherwise, Andersen said.  He noted that the GNU was now 
pursuing a "negotiations strategy" with the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) in southern Sudan, and had asked Uganda to mediate. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Slovak UN PermRep Burian said that Government of 
Southern Sudan (GOSS) ministers had cited "many failures" 
along with many successes, particularly the failure of donors 
to deliver on pledges made in Oslo for the reconstruction of 
the south.  They also called for greater attention to be paid 
to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA), between north and south, not just the DPA.  The LRA 
posed a serious problem for southern Sudan, he said, and was 
reportedly recruiting as well as targeting internally 
displaced persons. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Asked about future steps the AU might take, Congo UN 
PermRep Biabaroh-Iboro observed that while AMIS transition to 
the UN would be on the agenda of the upcoming July 1-2 AU 
Summit in Banjul, the AU would likely await conclusions of 
the UN-AU joint assessment mission.  AU Commission 
Chairperson Konare would travel to Sudan, he said; 
furthermore, a committee of African heads of state, as noted 
in the March 10 AU PSC decision, could go to Khartoum to meet 
with President Bashir.  Biabaroh-Iboro said the UNSC and the 
AU could coordinate quickly with each other, citing the May 
16 UNSCR, which immediately followed the May 15 AU PSC 
decision. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In response to Greek Ambassador to Ethiopia's 
observation that public outreach activities were needed to 
reach civil society in Darfur, Greek UN PermRep Vassilakis 
agreed that the AU and UNMIS could develop and disseminate 
information materials, but not the UNSC itself. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Responding to Norwegian Charge's inquiry about 
whether the UN could intervene earlier to strengthen AMIS, 
French UN PermRep De La Sabliere expressed skepticism, noting 
that intervention required sufficient preparation.  In an 
emergency, a single nation state could intervene, he said, 
citing France's intervention in Bunia in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, under UNSC auspices.  While the period 
prior to the deployment of UN forces needed to be as short as 
possible, UN forces could not be deployed without Sudan's 
consent; the UN needed to develop a mandate that protected 
civilians, in consultation with Sudanese authorities, he said. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Jones-Parry said difficulties with simultaneously 
deploying AU and UN troops include concerns about conflicting 
command and control, headquarters, lack of parity of pay and 
financing, and the dearth of troop contributing countries. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Chinese UN PermRep Wang concluded the presentation 
by UNSC members by remarking that UNSC members had different 
views of the causes and situation of conflict in Darfur, but 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001568  003 OF 003 
 
 
should unite behind the Abuja talks "to help Africans help 
Sudanese help themselves."  Ongoing discussions between the 
Sudan and the UN had developed trust, he said; "our common 
objective is peace."  Wang called for continued support for 
strengthening AMIS over the next few months, and asserted 
that continued engagement by partners could lead to Sudan's 
approval of a UN operation.  "The door for the UN taking over 
is open; the (UNSC) mission has not closed the door." 
HUDDLESTON