Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06WARSAW931, POLAND: WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: SMALLPOX DEMARCHE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06WARSAW931.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06WARSAW931 2006-05-19 15:25 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Warsaw
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS WARSAW 000931 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DKOSTELANCIK AND MSESSUMS 
DEPT FOR IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL AORC TBIO PL WHO
SUBJECT: POLAND: WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY: SMALLPOX DEMARCHE 
 
REF: STATE 71569 
 
Post received the following response to reftel demarche from 
Teresa Bondarewicz, Office Director, Department of 
International Cooperation in Poland's Ministry of Health on 
May 17, 2006. 
 
Begin Text. 
 
In response to your request for the Ministry's opinion 
concerning the retention of smallpox reserves, we would like 
to  inform you that the decision to store the smallpox 
reserves in two protected places was caused in the past by 
the necessity of conducting further research on the virus for 
a variety of reasons, especially for developing new types of 
vaccines and different possibilities concerning smallpox 
prevention, diagnosis, and cure. 
 
The reasons for retaining smallpox virus are still valid 
today. We are still not sure that the virus is not possessed 
by governments or groups whose intentions and activities are 
not subject to international control, thus making it possible 
that the smallpox virus, through accident or criminal 
activity, could be dispersed into the public.  If the legally 
stored smallpox reserves were to be destroyed, humanity would 
lose an essential tool in the fight against a return of 
smallpox, and immensely dangerous disease capable of reaching 
epidemic proportions. 
 
It is also necessary to take into account the fact that 
destruction of the legally stored smallpox reserves would not 
affect its existence in the hands of those who would use the 
disease to harm.  Total destruction of the smallpox reserves, 
which come from a legal source and remain under strict 
control, would lead to a halt in scientific research on the 
production of new vaccines and work targeted at protecting 
people from a possible future outbreak of smallpox. 
 
Taking into consideration the above, we share the fears 
expressed in the letter from the United States Government and 
support the argument for further storage of smallpox 
reserves.  At the same time, we believe that the reserves 
should be kept in strictly controlled laboratories and remain 
under the control of the international community. 
 
End Text. 
HILLAS