VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1075/01 1461307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261307Z MAY 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9162
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1343
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 0119
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0134
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 0170
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1145
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2168

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO NP IN
SUBJECT: UN SECRETARIAT SAYS NEPALIS SUPPORT EXPANDED UN 
ROLE 
 
REF: RICHELSOPH-KUMAR E-MAIL 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  During a May 23 meeting with visiting 
IO/UNP Deskoff and USUN Poloff, UN Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA) officer Tamrat Samuel briefed on his 
recently-completed visit to Nepal and India and outlined his 
views of a possible expanded role for the UN in Nepal. 
Samuel said nearly all GON officials he met had asked that 
the UN help monitor the cease-fire between the GON and the 
Maoists, supervise Maoist DDR, and provide electoral 
assistance.  He also mentioned GON Prime Minister's request 
for a UN "witness" to peace talks as well as his own view 
that the international community should consider feeding 
Maoist supporters, but implied that neither request had 
consensus support within the GON.  If Nepal were to request 
UN assistance, Samuel observed that monitoring could take 
place under a "national mechanism supported by a strong UN 
structure" that would be largely civilian in nature with a 
"small" military observer force. Although he could not yet 
say what authorization the UN would need to mount such an 
operation, Samuel opined that either a UNSC or a GA 
resolution could do the trick.  He did not rule out expanding 
the mandate of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal to take on these new functions, 
but argued that OHCHR in Geneva would be hard-pressed to 
organize the logistics necessary for a quick deployment of 
monitors.  Ruefully acknowledging Indian objections to an 
expanded UN role in Nepal, Samuel reported that no senior UN 
officials plan to visit the region until it becomes clear 
whether the Nepalis will submit a formal request for UN 
assistance.  Samuel appeared to take on board suggestions 
that the Nepalese Mission to the UN be involved in future 
consultations on Nepal. End Summary. 
 
GON Wants an Expanded UN Role 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Samuel averred that the UN would determine its role 
in Nepal entirely based on the request of the GON.  Although 
he said that Nepali officials had privately expressed a 
desire for the UN to mediate between the GON and the Maoists, 
Samuel acknowledged that the GON was unlikely to make such a 
request formally due to Indian sensitivities -- and he added 
that in any case, SYG Annan preferred that the Nepalis 
conduct their dialogue "on their own."  Assuming the UN does 
not take on a mediation role, Samuel outlined several other 
possible areas of assistance: monitoring of the cease-fire 
between the GON and the Maoists, some role in supervising or 
observing Maoist DDR, and support for the Nepali electoral 
process.  He emphasized that during his consultations in 
Kathmandu, GON officials had voiced near-universal support 
for a UN role in all three areas.  Speaking personally, 
Samuel suggested that the international community might also 
want to consider feeding Maoist supporters, provided that the 
guerillas abandon their tactic of extortion and forced 
taxation.  While he acknowledged that the World Food Program 
(WFP) could not feed combatants, Samuel argued that the WFP 
could feed former combatants who had successfully undergone a 
DDR program.  Although he mentioned GON Prime Minister 
Koirala's informal request that the UN serve as a "witness" 
to GON-Maoist negotiations, Samuel implied that there was not 
yet consensus within the GON on this issue. 
 
Authorizing the UN to 
Monitor the Cease-Fire 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In order for the UN to monitor the cease-fire 
between the GON and the Maoists, Samuel argued that the 
parties would first need to decide on a detailed code of 
conduct agreement that would define which acts would be 
considered "provocative."  Monitoring would take place under 
a "national mechanism supported by a strong UN structure" 
that would report on respect for human rights, incidents of 
abductions and extortion, as well as conditions for elections 
(including an end to intimidation).  Monitors would also have 
to report on military action in breach of the cease-fire, 
Samuel argued, which could possibly include decommissioning 
of weapons.  Samuel observed that the monitoring structure 
should be largely civilian, with a "small military observer 
force."  Asked how the UN would seek authorization for such a 
mission provided that the GON made a formal request, Samuel 
said he was still investigating this issue.  He opined that 
either the UNSC or the GA could potentially authorize such a 
mission, but he did not rule out expanding the mandate of the 
present Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) in Nepal -- although he cautioned that pursuing this 
option might constrict the UN's ability to respond quickly. 
Samuel suggested the if the GON made a formal request for 
cease-fire monitors only a short time before they are needed, 
for example, UN OHCHR in Geneva would be unable to handle the 
logistics involved in such a deployment.  He suggested that 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) would be 
better-placed to respond to such a fast-breaking situation, 
but even DPKO would need adequate time to prepare. 
 
Managing Indian and 
Nepali Sensitivities 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) While reporting that Indian officials he met in New 
Delhi did not seem opposed to UN monitoring of a cease-fire 
between the GON and the Maoists, Samuel agreed that the GOI 
appeared to have backtracked on this issue.  Despite India's 
views on UN cease-fire monitors, Samuel said he thought the 
GOI would still support a future role for the UN in providing 
electoral assistance and in supervising Maoist DDR -- but he 
acknowledged that even on these issues he had no clarity on 
exactly what type of UN role India backed or at what point it 
would offer its support.  Asked about any future trips to the 
region by senior UN officials -- Special Adviser to the SYG 
Vijay Nambiar had previously suggested DPA U/SYG Gambari or 
DPA Asia Division Director Michael Williams could visit 
Kathmandu after Samuel's return -- Samuel reported that talk 
of future visits had been suspended until it became clear 
whether Nepal would request UN assistance.  Per reftel, 
Poloff urged Samuel to include the Nepali Mission to the UN 
in his consultations in New York and to ensure they were 
included in any broader discussions on Nepal involving the 
Secretariat and other missions.  While initially suggesting 
 
SIPDIS 
that the GON could be brought into the discussions over time, 
Samuel seemed to take the point about involving the Nepalis 
now when he realized their participation could help manage 
Indian sensitivities about an expanded UN role. 
BOLTON