VZCZCXRO9270
RR RUEHAT
DE RUEHTC #1195/01 1461316
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261316Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5834
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
INFO RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 0880

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/UBI 
DHS FOR ROSENZWIEG AND OIA-DSEQUEIRA 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS EAIR PREL NL
SUBJECT:  DHS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DUTCH ON PROPOSED 
"TRUSTED TRAVELER" PROGRAM 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  During April 10 discussions, Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Acting Assistant Secretary for 
Policy Paul Rosenzweig and Deputy Director of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) Gert Versluis 
reviewed outstanding DHS concerns about the proposed 
bilateral International Expedited Traveler, (IET, or 
"trusted traveler") program between JFK and Schiphol 
airports.  Rosenzweig asked about Dutch background checks, 
EU privacy restrictions and whether the program could be 
limited to Dutch citizens.  Versluis committed to consult 
with European Commission (EC) officials on the latter two 
items.  In a May 4 conversation with Consul General Bond, 
Versluis reported that, following consultation with EC 
officials, he believed the EU issues could be satisfactorily 
resolved.  Rosenzweig and Versluis plan to meet June 2 in 
Brussels to discuss next steps.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Rosenzweig and Versluis met at Immigration Service 
headquarters for an hour on April 10 to review the status of 
the IET program, and clarify outstanding DHS concerns. 
Rosenzweig expressed regret at the delay in getting back to 
the Dutch on concerns that had arisen during the DHS 
clearance process about whether Dutch participants in the 
program would be adequately vetted.  (Note.  Negotiations on 
a draft MOU for a pilot program to permit expedited 
immigration clearance for vetted "trusted" travelers 
enrolled in the IET program concluded in August 2005. End 
Note.)  He stressed that DHS considered the Dutch valued 
partners on border control issues, and remained interested 
in working with them on developing a "trusted traveler" 
program, assuming DHS concerns about vetting could be 
resolved. 
 
¶3. (U) Rosenzweig noted that DHS had thought (mistakenly) 
that PRIVIUM (a Schiphol-based program that provides 
expedited entry and departure for members) was a trusted 
traveler program (with thorough background checks on 
participants), vice a registered traveler program.  Now that 
DHS understands the difference, he said, it was important to 
be clear that a higher enrollment standard was needed to 
participate in the IET program than for PRIVIUM membership. 
Versluis responded that it had already been agreed that the 
IET participation standard would be stricter than PRIVIUM's. 
 
¶4. (U) Rosenzweig then identified three key DHS issues that 
would have to be resolved for the bilateral "trusted 
traveler" pilot program to go forward.  These were: 
 
a) Whether the pilot program could be limited to Dutch 
citizens.  He said this was necessary because neither the 
Dutch nor the USG have the required access to other 
countries' criminal records to adequately vet the 
backgrounds of non-Dutch EU participants. 
 
b) Whether proposed EU data protection directive (that would 
strengthen EU privacy protections and potentially hinder the 
sharing of law enforcement information with non-EU members) 
would preclude the Dutch from sharing with DHS information 
on the criminal backgrounds of applicants. 
 
c) The thoroughness and scope of the Dutch background checks 
on applicants for the trusted traveler program.  He stressed 
that DHS would need to know what databases were checked, how 
deeply, and how far back. 
 
¶5. (U) On background checks, Versluis said that in 
discussions to date on the IET, the GONL had agreed to 
inform DHS if applicants had criminal records precluding 
their enrollment in the pilot program.  Four categories of 
criminal offenses had been defined, and it had been agreed 
that DHS would be informed if there were negative 
information about an applicant relating to any of those 
categories.  He noted that the background check is done 
during enrollment and updated regularly.  Watchlists are 
also checked each time the person travels. 
 
¶6. (U) On the issue of EU privacy restrictions, Versluis 
noted that participants would be fully aware of the 
requirement for a background check, and voluntarily 
authorize the release of the data when applying to 
participate in the program.  Travelers would have the 
alternative of traveling to the United States without 
joining IET so nothing would compel them to agree to provide 
their personal data.  For these reasons, he said, he not 
believe that the Dutch provision of criminal background 
information to DHS would run afoul of EU privacy 
regulations. 
 
 
THE HAGUE 00001195  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (U) On the issue of limiting the IET program to Dutch 
citizens, Versluis indicated he was not sure whether the 
program could be limited to Dutch citizens.  He said it 
would be necessary to ensure it would not violate EU 
regulations, but that it might be possible to limit it to 
Dutch citizens initially on grounds that it was a pilot 
program. 
 
¶8. (U) Versluis suggested that a possible solution for 
checking the backgrounds of non-Dutch applicants would be 
for them to obtain a Certificate of Good Behavior (CGB), 
which he said he understood was not available to anyone with 
a recent criminal record.  Citizens of non-visa waiver (VWP) 
EU countries would need a US visa and a CGB.  All the names 
would also be checked against the EU watchlist.  Rosenzweig 
explained that the CGB would not be sufficient, as the USG 
needed more specific and complete information about possible 
criminal records to permit expedited border crossing. 
 
¶9. (U) Versluis committed to consulting with European 
Commission (EC) officials to determine whether the program 
could be limited to Dutch citizens without running afoul of 
EU regulations, and whether current or anticipated EU 
privacy restrictions would negatively affect Dutch ability 
to provide the results of background check information to 
DHS.  Versluis and Rosenzwieg agreed that if the outcome of 
Versluis's consultations with the EC were positive, they 
would proceed with more technical discussions to ensure that 
Dutch background check procedures meet DHS requirements. 
 
¶10. (U) Versluis informed Consul General Bond May 4 that his 
May 2 consultations with the EC's Frank Paul had been 
positive, and he believed that DHS concerns on restricting 
the program to Dutch participants and on data sharing could 
be resolved.  He said that the Commission would not object 
to limiting the bilateral program initially to Dutch 
citizens, as long as it could be opened up to other EU 
citizens at some point in the future.  Additionally, he said 
he had confirmed that EU privacy restrictions would not 
prohibit sharing necessary background information on 
participants because the program is entirely voluntary. 
 
¶11. (U) Versluis and Rosenzweig will meet in Brussels June 2 
on the margins of the USEU-sponsored Counter Terrorism 
Conference to discuss the outcome of Versluis's 
consultations with Commission officials, and to determine 
the next steps for resuming working level discussions on the 
IET pilot program, including a detailed, technical review of 
the Dutch criminal background check procedures for program 
participants. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) COMMENT.  The resumption of discussions on the 
"trusted traveler" program with the April 10 Rosenzwieg- 
Versluis meeting has helped alleviate Dutch irritation over 
continuing delays in USG approval of the draft MOU.  Post 
appreciates Rosenzwieg's willingness to travel at short 
notice to clarify DHS concerns with the existing draft and 
to continue to move the negotiation process forward.  End 
Comment. 
 
ARNALL