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DE RUEHTC #1167/01 1431448
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O 231448Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5788
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
45TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, MAY 16-19 
 
 
This is CWC-43-06. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (U) The U.S. achieved its primary goal at EC-45: 
discussion of the U.S. request for an extension of its 100% 
destruction deadline was serious and somber.  Delegations 
were clearly disappointed that it did not appear likely the 
U.S. would complete destruction by 2012, but there was 
virtually no harsh criticism and no panicked calls for 
immediate action, such as an amendment conference. 
 
¶2.  (U) Unfortunately, the impulse outside the Western Group 
to link the U.S. extension request and national 
implementation of Article VII obligations was clearly 
present.  And the sentiment regarding Article VII among 
non-WEOG States Parties is that progress has been made due to 
positive outreach, not "negative" measures.  While 
disappointing, this was expected.  What was disappointing and 
unexpected was the total lack of will among WEOG delegations 
to support U.S. efforts to have more robust Article VII 
language.  Indeed, it frankly appears that the U.S. is 
isolated on this issue.  Before EC-46, it will be necessary 
to rebuild cohesion among WEOG delegations and then talk with 
key NAM delegations, particularly Iran and India. 
 
¶3.  (U) Finally, it was noteworthy that NAM delegations 
attempted to negotiate as a block through Malaysia, which 
currently heads the NAM.  Unfortunately, this effort was 
seemingly "blessed" by the Article VII facilitator and the 
acting EC Chairman when they asked Malaysia to present the 
NAM position.  Delegation will work to counter this 
development carefully, but firmly, and on this issue, the 
U.S. can expect strong WEOG and some other support.  On a 
more general point, as Iran and India were dominating the 
"NAM" decision-making process, the key challenge remains 
finding a way to remove obstacles placed by these two 
delegations.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST 
---------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) As a procedural matter, the U.S. extension request 
was, as anticipated, deferred to EC-46.  What was critical 
was the tone of the formal debate and off-line discussion. 
While many SPs expressed serious concern, their tone was 
tempered and their comments were at times directed at other 
possessor states besides the U.S.  One notable exception was 
South Africa, which harshly criticized the U.S., commenting 
inter alia on the Article 12 provisions for the Conference to 
take measures in the event that activities prohibited under 
the CWC may seriously damage the Convention.  Iran echoed 
South Africa's sentiments, but far more diplomatically 
without commenting on Article 12 provisions. 
 
¶5. (U) The common themes among the floor statements about 
possessor states included commentary that they should be 
fully transparent in their destruction activities, improve 
their reporting on destruction progress, adhere to CWC 
deadlines, and reinforce their efforts on destruction so as 
to meet CWC deadlines. Delegations also noted that complying 
with destruction deadlines was a central element of the CWC, 
and failure to comply would undermine its credibility. 
Several delegations acknowledged the costs and challenges of 
CW destruction and appreciated the U.S. efforts to be 
transparent in this matter.  Some also noted that it was 
premature to consider scenarios of failing to meet a 
destruction deadline which was yet six years away, and that 
SPs needed to find reasonable solutions. 
 
¶6. (U) During the discussion, the UK tabled a proposal for 
the Chairman and a few interested states to make transparency 
visits to the large possessor states and report their 
findings to the EC.  This proposal received considerable 
support from WEOG members.  In side-bar discussions, and 
bilateral talks reported below, the delegation was also asked 
 
when the U.S. anticipated providing draft decision language, 
indicating a clear expectation that they anticipated 
receiving such language soon. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶7. (U) As a procedural matter, after informal consultations 
chaired by facilitator Maartin Lak (Netherlands) failed to 
reach consensus on report language, the EC noted the DG's 
report on Progress Made on the Plan of Action regarding the 
Implementation of Article VII Obligations.  South Africa 
attempted to change the word "obligation" for the phrase 
"national implementation measures," but this was not 
acceptable to other EC members. 
 
¶8.  (U) However, the run-up to that final decision was 
extremely difficult and contentious and bodes ill for the 
U.S. goal of more robust Article VII efforts in the coming 
months.  Most important, while the delegation sought to avoid 
linkage between the U.S. extension request and Article VII, 
non-WEOG delegations were not about to miss that opportunity. 
 Aside from South Africa, few delegations made an overt 
linkage from the floor or in consultations.  However, it was 
clear in side-bar discussions.  What made it difficult to 
combat this non-WEOG effort was the almost complete lack of 
will among WEOG delegations to put up a fight.  Indeed, 
during discussions on Article VII report language, there was 
a race to the bottom to find the lowest common denominator 
language that would include no mandatory actions by the EC 
Chair, Vice-Chairs or anyone else. 
 
¶9.  (U) All of this set the stage for a lengthy, contentious 
discussion on report language on the last day of the EC. 
Tensions were high during the negotiations, and as a result 
of time pressure, the facilitator closed the last informal 
consultation without summarizing where delegations stood, 
resulting in subsequent disarray.  While delegation will take 
soundings once tempers have cooled, the immediate impression 
was that the U.S. lost a substantial amount of goodwill by 
taking what others viewed as a "hard line" on Article VII. 
While there was commentary fQ some delegations that the 
U.S. extension request will now face a tougher grilling, and 
even from one delegation that the U.S. extension request was 
"dead," it remains to be seen if that was just a high level 
of frustration. 
 
¶10.  (U) What is clear is that the U.S. will have to do a lot 
of work if it wants to push an active Article VII agenda. 
The first step will be to re-build support among WEOG 
delegations and gain some Allies for the U.S. around a 
mutually acceptable position.  Then it will be necessary to 
have discussions with Iran and India, as these two 
delegations continue to be the main obstacles to progress on 
Article VII (if not most OPCW issues).  Delegation will 
provide further commentary and recommendations on Article VII 
to Washington. 
 
--- 
NAM 
--- 
 
¶11. (U) In a notable and unfortunate development, the 
Non-aligned Movement made its presence known, presenting 
so-called "united" positions on the draft Article VII report 
language.  The Article VII facilitator played into the hands 
of the NAM by calling on the NAM coordinator (Malaysia) and 
allowing him to present NAM positions during the 
negotiations.  This was repeated by the acting EC Chair 
(Ambassador Petri of Germany) during the afternoon session of 
May 19, until del reps requested that he refrain from doing 
so. 
 
¶12.  (U) On this issue at least, WEOG delegations were 
immediately energized and supportive of the U.S. view that 
this NAM effort must be neutralized.  Canada in particular is 
adamant that allowing blocs in the OPCW would make it 
impossible to reach agreement, and that clearly seems to be 
 
the general sentiment in the group.  Switzerland as WEOG 
coordinator intends to have discussions on how to respond to 
the NAM effort. 
 
¶13.  (U) It was notable that the NAM positions put forward 
were identical with those presented earlQ by Iran and 
India.  And there is indeed reason to question the strength 
of the "NAM" position.  The Colombian representative 
privately informed del rep that the "NAM" had no formal 
meetings and that not all NAM members agreed with the 
positions put forward.  And the Algerian Ambassador has also 
flatly stated that he was disappointed in the Ambassador of 
Sudan's handling of the Africa Group in that he virtually 
delegated his authority to South African delegate Peter 
Makwarela.  The Algerian Ambassador also said firmly "the NAM 
does not speak for Algeria."  Delegation will continue to ask 
various delegates whether they have signed on to letting the 
NAM speak for them.  And the solution to this problem may 
simply be to ensure that facilitators and chairpersons note 
that the NAM is not a recognized voting entity in the OPCW 
and ask delegations for individual national positions. 
 
¶14.  (U) The following are the EC-45 agenda items as numbered 
in the annotated agenda. 
 
----------------------- 
ITEM 3 - DG'S STATEMENT 
----------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) The Director-General's statement spent significant 
time on the U.S. extension request.  He expressed his regret 
that the U.S. cannot make the original deadlines, but 
appreciated the transparency in the information provided.  He 
also acknowledged the difficulties the U.S. faces in 
completing its destruction program, both technical and 
financial.  The DG asked for continued support for the 
Russian program by the donor community, noting it is the key 
to ensuring success.  The DG further noted that if Libya's 
deadlines and extension proposals are granted, it will finish 
later than envisaged, but before the final deadline in the 
CWC.  He also noted India's extension request, the joint 
extension request from China and Japan on abandoned CW, a 
State Party resuming its stockpile destruction, and the 
successful consultations between the Technical Secretariat, 
Albania, and the U.S. on destruction of Albanian CW. 
 
¶16. (U) The DG stressed that the TS continues to conduct 
training courses for National Authorities, assistance and 
protection programs, and implementation support in accordance 
with the Article VII action plan.  He stated that 24 
participants have been selected for the Associate Program in 
¶2006.  He mentioned the TS is organizing two EU-financed 
courses on analytical skills.  The TS has conducted a number 
of activities to promote universality, bilateral assistance 
visits to the Dominican Republic, Bahamas, Central African 
Republic and the Congo.  He noted he has personally initiated 
demarches and establish contacts with States not Party in the 
Middle East, including a visit to Israel.  The DG announced 
the third workshop on universality in the Mediterranean Basin 
will be held in Rome in October. 
 
¶17. (U) Referring to the budget surplus in 2004, the DG 
commented that some delegations believe these excess funds 
are available to the TS.  He then tried to explain TS 
underspending.  First, he noted some of the factors, 
including late and partial payment of assesQ contributions, 
exchange rates, and actual vs. projected inspection 
activities by the TS.  The DG said the TS is working with 
ABAF to improve its financial performance, and he will submit 
his 2007 Draft Programme and Budget in July, asking for an 
early designation of a facilitator. 
 
¶18. (U) The DG was pleased that preparations for the 
open-ended working group for the Second Review Conference 
have begun, and pledged his full support for the working 
group and its leader, UK Ambassador Lyn Parker.  The DG spoke 
about the open-ended working group on terrorism, and noted 
SPs continue to attach great importance to fighting 
terrorism.  He also stated the TS operates in accordance with 
 
its mandate as defined by the CWC, specifically, that the 
OPCW is not an anti-terrorism agency.  Finally, he thanked 
delegations for their participation in the Remembrance Day 
ceremony, and referred to the upcoming Tenth Anniversary 
commemoration next year. 
 
----------------------- 
ITEM 4 - GENERAL DEBATE 
----------------------- 
 
¶19. (U) The overwhelming focus was on, as anticipated, 
destruction deadlines.  Nearly all delegations stated that 
possessor states must put as many resources as necessary 
toward meeting deadlines set forth in the CWC.  Many 
delegations referred to the success of the convention being 
affected by whether or not possessor states meet the 
deadlines.  There was little finger pointing at the SPs that 
have requested extensions.  The EU noted it is willing in 
principle to agree to the requested extension to April 29, 
2012, but are concerned this deadline will not be met. 
Mexico stated it is concerned that not meeting deadlines 
would affect the credibility of not just the CWC, but all 
multilateral disarmament actions.  In order to facilitate the 
decision process, Mexico requested a comprehensive report on 
destruction status to be distributed prior to EC sessions. 
 
¶20.  (U) Of the possessor states, India noted their extension 
request of two years, to April 2009.  Russia referred to 
difficulties in destruction of CW stockpiles: technical, 
economic, social, financial and ecological.  They noted the 
assistance provided to them, and their interest in continuing 
and expanding destruction assistance programs.  China 
addressed the jointly submitted extension request, with 
Japan, for destruction of ACW in China.  A State Party, 
without referring to its extension request, noted that SPs 
should make efforts to meet deadlines, as there could be 
credibility issues if they do not. 
 
¶21. (U) On Article VII, there was appreciation of efforts 
toward implementation, attributed to encouragement and 
assistance tactics adopted by the TS.  Most statements noted 
90% of SPs have designated a National Authority, but few 
mentioned many SPs still have to write and implement 
anti-trafficking legislation.  Colombia noted that Andean 
countries are making progress on legislation.  On the Second 
RevCon, nearly every statement endorsed the selection of UK 
Ambassador Parker as Chairman, and the four regional 
vice-chairs.  Most statements also mentioned that full 
implementation of the CWC is necessary to combat terrorism, a 
few mentioned the work of the open-ended working group on 
terrorism, and the hope that the work of the group will 
continue. 
 
¶22. (U) Malaysia for the NAM and China, Iran, Cuba, India, 
Saudi Arabia and Indonesia requested consultations begin for 
full implementation of Article XI.  A few countries mentioned 
the need for an effective method for OCPF site selection, 
though not as many as usual, and there were only scattered 
references to Africa Office, Article X and universality. 
 
¶23. (U) Iran floated the idea of an international network to 
support victims of CW attacks.  They proposed bringing 
governments, international organizations, NGOs, chemical and 
pharmaceutical, and private industry together to discuss the 
issue.  They merely noted that they want to work on this idea 
with the TS and SPs, but did not elaborate further.  (Note: 
At the Conference of States Parties, Iranian groups usually 
have booths right outside the main meeting room to inform and 
generate support for their chemical weapons victims.  End 
Note.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
ITEM 5 - STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶24. (U) Item 5.1: The EC agreed to defer to EC-46 the 
verification plan for the Indian CWDF.  As during previous 
sessions, the U.S. stated it was unable to join consensus 
until the draft associated facility agreement has been 
 
distributed and reviewed.  (Comment: In the run-up to EC-45, 
Amb. Javits and del reps met with the Indian Ambassador and 
del reps to express concerns regarding continued lack of EC 
oversight of destruction operations.  India cited 
disagreements over air monitoring standards (both the 
application of new CDC standards to this facility, and TS 
dissatisfaction with the air monitoring system currently in 
place), and assured U.S. del they would provide periodic 
updates on any progress in facility agreement negotiations. 
End Comment.) 
 
¶25. (U) Item 5.2: The EC approved the verification plan for 
the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility. 
 
¶26. (U) Item 5.3: The EC approved the verification plan for 
Kambarka. 
 
¶27. (U) Item 5.4:  The EC deferred to EC-46 the verification 
plan for the Qaf-Molla CWDF in Albania.  Russia asked that 
Albania's detailed plan and its corresponding FA be deferred, 
citing the need for Moscow to have additional time to review 
the documents. 
 
¶28. (U) Items 5.5:  The EC approved Russia's request for 
corrections to its detailed plan for conversion of former 
CWPF by adding pumps to the production line at the open Joint 
Stock Company "Khimprom", Volgograd. 
 
¶29.  (U) Item 5.6: The EC noted the TS note on progress made 
in converting former CWPFs. 
 
¶30. (U) Items 5.7:  The U.S. extension request was discussed 
above. 
 
¶31. (U) Item 5.8: The Russian extension request was also 
deferred to EC-46.  During discussion of this item, several 
states noted that SPs must take full responsibility for 
meeting destruction obligations and that there is no linkage 
between the availability of assistance and meeting those 
obligations. 
 
¶32. (U) Item 5.10: The Indian request for an extension of the 
final deadline for destruction was adopted by consensus. 
 
¶33.  (U) Items 5.9 and 5.11:  The Libyan requests for 
extension of its intermediate and final deadlines were 
deferred to EC-46 by Russia, citing inadequate time for 
review.  Germany also recommended inclusion of additional 
text in the Libyan decision (covering extension of both 
intermediate and final deadlines) underscoring Libya's full 
responsibility for complete elimination of its CW stockpile. 
As in the discussion on the Russian extension request, the 
FRG raised concern that Libya should not link its destruction 
obligations to international assistance. 
 
¶34. (U) Item 5.12:  Article VII was discussed above. 
 
¶35. (U) Item 5.13: The EC approved the facility agreement for 
Newport. 
 
¶36. (U) Item 5:14:  The EC approved the facility agreement 
for the Kambarka CWDF. 
 
¶37. (U) Item 5:15:  The Albania facility agreement for the 
CWDF at Qaf-Molla was deferred until EC-46.  Russia stated 
that it needed additional time to review the document. 
 
¶38. (U) Item 5.16: Germany, Iran and Italy asked that the 
note by the DG updating on the progress of Schedule 2 
facility agreements be deferred to EC-46. 
 
¶39. (U) Item 5.17:  The EC noted the DG's report on the 
status of implementation of Article X.  Delegation made the 
points outlined in the guidance cable.  The importance of 
Article X and the questionnaire on National Protective 
Programs was noted, along with information the number of 
submitting countries is higher, but still too low.  Iran 
asserted attention should be paid to "operationalization" of 
paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of Article X.  The UK will have 
 
new language for implementation of the database soon.  The 
U.S. provided alternative report language, which was adopted 
with a minor edit. 
 
¶40. (U) Item 5.18:  The EC noted the DG's report on the 
status of implementation of Article XI.  A number of 
delegations (India, Iran, and a number of NAM states) called 
for early resumption of an informal consultation on the full 
implementation of Article XI.  However, no delegate as yet 
has offered to serve as facilitator. 
 
----------------------------------- 
ITEM 6 - LIST OF NEW VALIDATED DATA 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶41. (U) The annotated agenda for EC-45 showed two lists of 
validated data (one list of data for scheduled chemicals, and 
another of data for three analytical derivatives of scheduled 
chemicals) deferred from EC-44.  After initial opposition 
from Iran and India to the adoption of the analytical 
derivative data, the Council adopted both lists 
(EC-44/DEC/CRP.3 and /CRP.4). 
 
¶42. (U) EC-44 in fact decided to also consider at this 
Session one further list of validated data, relating to riot 
control agents (RCAs) (EC-42/DEC/CRP.5), and requested the TS 
to "submit a Note assessing the implications of the data 
contained in the lists set out in EC-42/DEC/CRP.5 for the 
activities of Member States."  Since the Note had not been 
prepared, the Secretary of the Policy-Making Organs elected 
to simply omit this document from the annotated agenda.  Del 
will monitor to ensure that the TS in fact produces the 
requisite paper and the decision document is considered by 
the EC, rather than quietly disappearing. 
 
---------------------- 
ITEM 7 - AFRICA OFFICE 
---------------------- 
 
¶43. (U) Sudan, on behalf of the Africa Group, and South 
Africa again dumped this in lap of the TS and new facilitator 
Andres Jose Rugeles Pineda (Colombia), without providing the 
information the TS needs to begin the reports on financial 
and administrative implications of an office in Africa.  The 
DG noted TS willingness to work on this issue, but noted they 
need more details from the sponsoring SPs before they can 
proceed.  South Africa requested the TS identify a P-5 
position to do these reports, and then see if more funding is 
needed.  There was no discussion of this proposal.  Rugeles 
Pineda stated that he will work to achieve consensus. 
 
--------------------------- 
ITEM 8 - BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES 
--------------------------- 
 
¶44. (U) EC-44 report language provided the necessary top 
cover for the TS to develop a proposal for future EC 
consideration on the establishment of an OPCW capability to 
analyze biomedical samples.  This work is ongoing, including 
the development of related funding proposals for inclusion in 
the 2007 Draft OPCW program of work and budget.  As a result, 
the discussion under this item dealt not with biomedical 
sampling, but with wording to conclude EC consideration of 
the DG's Note on the Seventh Meeting of the Scientific 
Advisory Board.  In a separate conversation, Finnish experts 
from VERIFIN expressed interest in working with U.S. and 
other experts to develop technical proposals, procedures, 
etc. related to biomedical sampling, noting that the true 
expertise in this area lay in a small number of member 
states, and not in the TS.  Del agreed to pass this proposal 
on to Washington for consideration. 
 
¶45. (U) This agenda item was one of several in which a 
procedural wrangle over the use and meaning of the verbs "to 
receive" and "to note" played out.  While at first glance a 
trivial discussion, it soon became clear that this debate was 
underpinned by a potentially serious issue of governance and 
procedure.  Specifically, Iran (with off-and-on support from 
India and South Africa) considers the act of "noting" a 
 
document to imply agreement with the content -- and, 
conversely, considers that "receiving" a document is a coded 
message that the EC, or some EC members, have substantive 
concerns with the content.  The corollary is that Iran 
considers actions taken by the DG or the TS pursuant to a 
document that the EC has declined to note are unsanctioned, 
unauthorized, and presumably should not be undertaken. 
 
¶46.  (U) The DG expressed his concern that such a procedure 
would give him no guidance on whether his actions were or 
were not acceptable to the EC, nor on what specific elements 
of a document raised concerns. The U.S. delegation intervened 
to refer back to the previous decisions.  By the end of the 
EC, numerous delegations had expressed disagreement with the 
Iranian interpretation and objections to its continued use. 
The protracted debate was useful, since Iran explicitly 
stated that in its view "received" was not a neutral term but 
had a "special meaning," and numerous delegations, 
particularly within WEOG, were sensitized to the risk of this 
wording being used as a means of effectively consigning a 
document to oblivion without any discussion of the substance. 
 
¶47. (U) Another result of this debate was constructive 
discussion within WEOG on the need improve the handling of 
SAB reports and recommendations.  Iran referred several times 
to concerns or objections to elements of the SAB's reports or 
the DG's notes to the EC on those reports, but repeatedly 
declined to discuss specifics (hence the difficulty with 
"noting" any of these documents).  There was broad sentiment 
within WEOG that a better mechanism needed to be found for 
assessing which SAB recommendations required a policy 
response from the OPCW governing bodies; framing appropriate 
requests for EC action on individual recommendations; and 
informing the EC of SAB work that did not require such 
action. 
 
¶48.  (U) Practice to date has often left SAB recommendations 
simply hanging -- neither accepted nor specifically rejected 
-- and created considerable uncertainty as to their status. 
The net effect has been to undermine the utility and 
relevance of the SAB.  U.S. and UK dels persuaded the WEOG 
that the initial, instinctive response -- that a problem, 
once identified, calls for EC report language and a 
"facilitation" -- might not be constructive, and that further 
discussion among WEOG dels to develop practical proposals 
would be preferable. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
ITEM 9 - WORKING GROUP FOR SECOND REVCON 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶49. (U) The Council anointed UK Ambassador Parker as Chairman 
of the working group, supported by four vice-chairs (Sudan, 
Mexico, Russia, and Iran).  This deal required recording in 
the report a set of "understandings" about the conduct of the 
Working Group and the role of the Chairman and Vice-Chairs as 
a "bureau." 
 
¶50. (U) Comment:  Parker is likely to be an effective Chair. 
However, the creation of a "management team" for the working 
group including Russia, Iran, Sudan and Mexico may not auger 
for a smooth process.  In particular, the constructive 
arrangement the U.S. enjoyed with the Chair of the Working 
Group for the First Review Conference, which allowed us to 
heavily shape draft report language from the outset, will 
likely be substantially hampered.  An additional complication 
is that the UK del was clearly reluctant to do anything that 
would antagonize non-aligned delegations until agreement was 
reached on Parker's chairmanship of the working group. 
Delegation will watch to see if there is any continuing UK 
reluctance to engage and, if so, will raise this matter with 
the UK. 
 
--------------------- 
ITEM 10 -- OIO REPORT 
--------------------- 
 
¶51. (U) The Council noted the annual report of the Office of 
Internal Oversight for 2005 and the accompanying note by the 
 
DG.  Facilitator Chiho Komuro (Japan) gave a brief oral 
report on the consultations held on the report.  Per 
Washington guidance, Del rep thanked the DG for his efforts 
to ensure full implementation of OIO recommendations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
ITEM 11 -- FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶52. (U) Item 11.1:  Regularizing Payments to OPCW.  Action on 
this item was deferred, as consultations are ongoing. 
Co-facilitator Jay Lee (South Korea) briefed the EC on 
progress in consultations during the intersessional period. 
 
¶53. (U) Item 11.2:  The EC noted the report by the DG on OPCW 
income and expenditures for the financial year to March 31, 
¶2006. 
 
¶54. (U) Item 11.3:  The Council considered the audited 
financial statements of the OPCW for 2005, and the report of 
the External Auditor.  Because the External Auditor's report 
was recently released and no consultations have been held on 
the report, Switzerland and others requested that 
consideration of this item be deferred to EC-46. 
 
¶55. (U) Item 11.4:  The Council noted the Note by the DG on 
transfers of funds in 2005. 
 
¶56. (U) Item 11.5:  Financial Rules.  The EC deferred 
consideration of the item to EC-46, as consultations are 
ongoing. 
 
¶57. (U) Item 11.6:  Transfer Agreement Between Provident Fund 
and UN Joint Staff Pension Fund.  The Council deferred 
consideration of the item after the TS reported that ABAF had 
raised several questions regarding the agreement that the TS 
would like to further examine. 
 
¶58. (U) Item 11.7:  The EC considered the report by the DG on 
the implementation of the regime governing the handling of 
confidential material by the TS.  The facilitator Betsy 
 
SIPDIS 
Sanders (U.S.) led delegations to a consensus on report 
language, asking the TS to send to National Authorities an 
annex to the Declarations Handbook on Confidentiality. 
 
¶59. (U) Item 11.8:  The Council noted the Note by the DG on 
the report of Security Audit team IV. 
 
------------------------ 
ITEM 12 - ANTI-TERRORISM 
------------------------ 
 
¶60. (U) After a lengthy and sometimes acrimonious debate over 
this item and the report language on it, the EC agreed to 
receive and consider the Note by the DG on the OPCW's 
contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts.  Early in the 
debate, South Africa attacked the DG's note and the work of 
the TS in the anti-terrorism field.  Algeria, Switzerland, 
Belgium, Spain, the U.S., Italy, India, China, Germany, 
Australia and even the DG responded to an isolated South 
Africa's attack by supporting an anti-terrorism role for the 
OPCW and by supporting facilitator Sophie Moal-Makame's 
(France) efforts in the Open Ended Working Group on 
Terrorism.  Even EC Chair Mkhize (South Africa) appeared to 
be surprised and taken aback by her delegation's attack on 
the DG's note and the work of the Working Group. 
 
¶61. (U) During the debate over the report language concerning 
this item, Iran pushed to have the report "received" as 
opposed to "considered" (despite the fact that the document 
had already been received, at EC-44) noting during one of its 
interventions that "received" had a different meaning for the 
Iranian delegation and was therefore essential in the report 
language.  Iran's position seemed to be that by only 
receiving the report the DG would have a diminished, if any, 
mandate to work on anti-terrorism issues.  Iran appeared to 
be reluctant to directly attack the DG's note (not surprising 
considering the drubbing that South Africa endured for 
attacking the note) and instead opted to attempt to weaken 
 
the report through the creative use of report language.  A 
number of delegations pushed back forcefully on this effort, 
although ultimately delegations finessed the issue with 
language which included both verbs. 
 
------------------------ 
ITEM 13 - TS INSTRUMENTS 
------------------------ 
 
¶62. (U) The EC received the Note by the DG on instruments 
signed by the TS with the governments of SPs and with organs 
of equivalent function within other international 
organizations and decided to consider it further at its next 
regular session.  India and Iran had asked that the item be 
deferred for consideration at the next EC, although the 
Iranian delegation concluded its request with "preliminary 
remarks" that amounted to a broadside against current 
practice and a call for development of detailed "parameters" 
limiting the DG's authority to sign such agreements.  South 
Africa accused the DG of signing agreements with SPs and 
other organizations in contravention of the CWC, citing as an 
example the EU assistance agreement with the TS. 
 
---------------------------- 
ITEM 14 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶63. (U) There was no discussion under this topic. 
 
--------------------- 
DESTRUCTION INFORMALS 
--------------------- 
 
¶64.  (U) At the May 15 destruction informals, the TS provided 
three overview presentations updating attending delegations 
on the status of verification activities, CW destruction 
efforts, and CW production facilities conversion.  All 
possessor States, except Albania, provided an update (either 
as a presentation or national statement) on their destruction 
progress. 
 
¶65.  (U) Russia led the session with an update on its 
destruction efforts, drawing on its recently submitted 
"amended plan for destruction" and other previously provided 
material, and highlighting that it plans to destroy 20 
percent of its stockpile by April 29, 2007.  Russia also 
stated that construction had started on other destruction 
facilities at Kambarka, Maradykovsky, and Shchuchye.  Russia 
expects to begin destruction operations (hydrolysis of CW 
agent in aerial bombs) at Maradykovsky by July 2006. 
 
¶66. (U) Dale Ormond, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Elimination of Chemical Weapons (DASA ECW), provided the 
U.S. detailed presentation on its CW destruction efforts and 
recently submitted extension request, emphasizing a possible 
delay in completion of destruction beyond the deadline 
requested (April 29, 2012).  As after the April 20 
presentation, delegations were remarkably silent.  (Comment: 
Informal feedback indicates many capitals are still reviewing 
the significant amount of detailed information provided in 
April, which may explain the lack of detailed 
program/technical questions.  End comment.) 
 
¶67. (U)     China provided a lengthy presentation on the 
recovery, storage and destruction of Japanese Abandon 
Chemical Weapons.  (Comment:  Presentation veered away from 
the purely technical, and toward the politically charged, 
with overt references to "heinous Japanese crimes."  End 
comment.)  China reported that to date, some 58 sites have 
been discovered, with the largest number located in Harbling, 
Dunhau city, Jilin Province.  The PRC presentation showed 
plans for site selection and eventual construction of a 
destruction facility.  Japan responded with a brief statement 
from the floor. 
 
¶68. (U)     A State Party provided a brief national statement 
on it destruction efforts.  Since the last EC meeting in 
March 2006, a State Party reported that it destroyed 54 MT of 
Diflour (DF) and 45 MT of OPA.  As of April 2006, a State 
 
Party had destroyed 70 percent of its CW stockpile. A State 
Party extension request for 100 percent destruction was 
approved in EC-44 through December 2008. 
 
¶69. (U)     Libya provided a national statement on its CW 
destruction efforts by noting its recent submission of 
requests for deadline extensions for Phases 1, 2, and 3 
intermediate, and Phase 4, the 100 percent deadline.  Libya 
has requested deadlines be set for destruction of Category 1 
CW by December 2010 and Category 2 CW by December 2011. 
Drawing on talking points provided by the U.S., Libya noted 
that this timeline takes into account the potential delays 
inherent in negotiation of an assistance implementing 
agreement with the U.S.  Libya also provided general 
information on its plans for destruction, and progress on 
conversion of its former CW Production Facility at Rabta. 
 
¶70. (U)     India made a brief national statement updating 
interested delegations on its CW destruction progress.  India 
reported that its second CWDF begin operation in January 2006 
and completed a campaign in March 2006, having destroyed 100 
MT of Category 1 CW.  India also has submitted an extension 
request for 100 percent destruction by December 2009.  (Note: 
 Following mention of continuing TS/India facility agreement 
negotiations by Director of Verification Horst Reeps, U.S. 
rep took the floor to note the importance of facility 
documents as a critical means of allowing EC oversight of 
destruction operations.  U.S. rep encouraged the TS and India 
to reach agreement on the facility agreement, and submit it 
as soon as possible for EC consideration.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
DASD (NCB) DR. HOPKINS MEETING WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶71. (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (DASD (NCB)) Dr. Tom 
Hopkins met with DG Pfirter in his role as acting ASD (NCB). 
The DG expressed appreciation for Hopkins' presence as a sign 
of U.S. commitment to the CWC, and expressed his opinion that 
no one could question the U.S. efforts or transparency, while 
acknowledging that the real concern for most interested 
delegations was the progress of Russian CW destruction.  As 
in previous meetings, the DG stressed the importance of a 
U.S. public commitment to meeting the 2012 deadline if at all 
possible, without which it would be difficult for him to 
speak in support of U.S. efforts. 
 
¶72.  (U) The DG also noted his desire that member states move 
from the initial "phase" (one of confusion and unease) into 
the next phase, one of acceptance and a willingness to 
address the issue in detail at a more appropriate time (i.e. 
closer to the deadline).  He expressed a hope that the matter 
would be settled, at least in the short term, by a decision 
prior to CSP-11, in order to avoid the issue of CW 
destruction becoming all-consuming during preparations for 
the Second Revcon.  Pfirter encouraged the U.S. to continue 
its detailed, transparent reporting to the EC. 
 
--------------------- 
BILATERAL WITH RUSSIA 
--------------------- 
 
¶73. (U) Del reps met with representatives from the Russian 
delegation to answer Russian questions on the U.S. extension 
request.  Russian del inquired as to whether the U.S. 
intended to submit a new detailed plan (i.e. one allowing the 
U.S. to meet the final deadline of April 29, 2012).  U.S. rep 
explained that Washington views the current extension 
request, and supporting documentation, as legal, as the 
request clearly meets the requirements set out in the 
Convention.  Russian del also asked whether the U.S. plans to 
submit a draft decision for its extension request.  U.S. rep 
replied that text is being drafted, and prior to submission 
(likely prior to EC-46), the U.S. will share proposed text 
with key delegations. 
 
¶74.  (U) Reps from Moscow then asked a number of technical 
questions, focused on destruction capacity and program 
 
challenges, all of which were answered by program expert Mr. 
Dale Ormond (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Elimination of Chemical Weapons).  Certain questions seemed 
to indicate Russia believes the U.S. plans to accelerate its 
program through major facility modifications; U.S. del 
explained that any improvement in the pace of destruction was 
currently envisioned through improvement in operational 
efficiencies.  Russian del also implied the U.S. detailed 
plan was inadequate (through indirect comparison with their 
own), a fact that U.S. reps refuted, noting that the level of 
detail provided was consistent with other requests, and 
augmented by the information available to the Council in U.S. 
Annual Plans for Destruction. 
 
¶75. (U) In a follow-up meeting later in the session, U.S. and 
UK reps asked experts from Moscow a series of detailed 
questions, focused primarily on the Kambarka and Maradykovsky 
destruction facilities, and on international assistance for 
the facilities under design and/or construction (details to 
be reported SEPTEL).  The meeting concluded with a 
U.S./Russia bilat, during which the concept of site visits 
for the "possessors requesting extensions to 2012" was 
discussed.  Russian del stated it would pass the proposal to 
Moscow for review, but did not see any clear benefit in such 
visits, especially when considering the 
monitoring/verification already achieved through continual 
presence of the TS Inspectorate. 
 
¶76.  (U) U.S. del agreed that Washington would have to 
thoroughly weigh the benefits of such visits against their 
operational impact, but also encouraged Russia to think of 
the visits not in terms of "additional verification," but in 
terms of a political gesture of increased transparency.  U.S. 
reps spoke to the possible impact such visits could have, 
especially on SPs not familiar with the destruction process, 
and the possibility of increasing member states' appreciation 
for the scope of (and challenges associated with) such 
operations.  Russian del also expressed a desire to have 
provisions such as these applied to any possessor state 
extending beyond April 29, 2007, and not only to the U.S. and 
Russia. 
 
--------------------- 
BILATERAL WITH THE UK 
--------------------- 
 
¶77. (U) U.S. reps met with the UK delegation to discuss the 
U.S. extension request.  UK was primarily interested in 
exploring the possibility of site visits to Russian and U.S. 
CW destruction facilities, and provided a non-paper that laid 
out general terms of reference for such visits.  U.S. reps 
agreed that, as discussed earlier in WEOG, site visits could 
certainly provide valuable insight into the scale and 
complexity of destruction operations.  However, the matter 
would have to be thoroughly assessed in Washington - not only 
for political benefit, but also for operational impact and 
security and safety concerns.  Both delegations agreed that 
the terms of such visits would have to be clearly defined, 
and reasonable expectations established (i.e. political 
understanding/support versus a technical assessment of 
progress). 
 
¶78. (U) UK reps also raised the subject of the legality of 
the U.S. request, and agreed the U.S. could anticipate some 
difficulty with delegations holding the belief that the 
detailed plan/projections presented in the extension request 
must be reconciled with the specific deadline requested. 
U.S. rep made the point that while Washington was clear in 
its view that the extension request fulfills the requirement 
set out in the CWC, UK insight into how to manage this 
perception (that the plan and request are somehow 
inconsistent, and that the extension request cannot therefore 
be approved) would be valuable.  Finally, the UK delegation 
inquired as to U.S. plans for a draft decision, and expressed 
an interest in seeing draft text during EC-45.  U.S. reps 
replied that the matter was still under review in Washington, 
but that before a text was distributed to the EC (likely 
prior to EC-46), the UK and other key delegations would be 
consulted. 
 
 
--------------- 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 
--------------- 
 
¶79. (U) U.S. reps met with Jeff Osborne, Chemical 
Demilitarization Branch ACW/OCW expert, to discuss the 
upcoming destruction mission in the Solomon Islands.  U.S. 
reps answered many of Osborne's technical and logistical 
questions, and reminded him that the mission date provided 
previously was still subject to change.  Osborne provided 
several additional questions, to be relayed to PACOM 
destruction team members by Joint Staff rep.  Osborne also 
re-iterated to the U.S. del his primary goal was to provide 
assurance to member states that destruction was carried out 
in accordance with the CWC; bearing this in mind, it would be 
important for him to have adequate access to all phases of 
the recovery and destruction processes.  Finally, in response 
to a U.S. inquiry, he noted a detailed plan for destruction 
would still need to be submitted. 
 
¶80.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL