VZCZCXYZ0028
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGP #1530/01 1310847
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 110847Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9848
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SINGAPORE 001530 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR A/S DARRYL JACKSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC PREL ETRD KSTC SN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COMMERCE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
DARRYL JACKSON'S VISIT TO SINGAPORE 
 
¶1. (SBU) We look forward to your May 23-25 visit to 
Singapore.  Your meetings with key Singapore government 
officials are an important opportunity to solidify our 
deepening cooperative relationship on developing and 
enforcing trade controls and combating proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their components.  Your visit 
should encourage Singapore to take further steps to expand 
the scope of its trade control regime to ensure that 
proliferators and terrorists do not misuse its port. 
 
A Strong Partner 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Our bilateral ties with Singapore are at a 
historical high point -- in particular our security 
relationship.  Counterterrorism cooperation has been 
especially close.  Singapore is also home to a U.S. military 
logistics hub, and has strongly supported our actions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  In July 2005, President Bush and Prime 
Minister Lee signed the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) 
to expand our military and counterterrorism ties; the 
agreement specifically notes the importance of enhanced 
cooperation on nonproliferation and export controls. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Counterproliferation and export controls are a new 
and rapidly growing facet to our security relationship. 
Singapore strongly supports the United States, global 
nonproliferation agenda and trade security initiatives.  It 
was the first country in the region to join the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) (2002) and the Megaports Initiative 
(2005), and it participates enthusiastically in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Singapore has 
worked with us in the IAEA Board of Governors to hold Iran 
accountable for its violations of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  In 2003 it instituted a new 
strategic goods control law that imposes controls on a range 
of sensitive goods and technology, including transshipment 
cargoes.  Since then, our bilateral cooperation on countering 
proliferation has grown substantially, and Singapore has 
improved its own enforcement efforts through strengthened 
regulations, extensive training for its customs and 
checkpoints officials, and improved cooperation with other 
countries, including the United States. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) While these measures are a vast improvement, the 
legal framework provided by Singapore's strategic goods 
control law still falls short of international best practices 
and has hindered efforts to improve law enforcement 
cooperation on proliferation matters.  Singapore does not yet 
adhere to key multilateral control regimes such as the 
Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group, 
and controls only a subset of the items controlled by these 
regimes.  Singapore also does not collect manifest data on 
transshipment or transit shipments (80 percent of the 
containers passing through the port) unless they are bound 
for the United States (under CSI).  Law enforcement 
cooperation is good, but is hampered by the Singapore 
government's resistance to sharing law enforcement 
information and the absence of a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty.  The United States and Singapore have been discussing 
an MLAT for four years, but our approaches remain far apart. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Singapore is interested in addressing these 
shortfalls, and in October 2005 the United States and 
Singapore held a bilateral dialogue on improving our 
counterproliferation cooperation.  Singapore has stated its 
intention to improve its export controls and adhere to the 
multilateral regimes, but has identified several areas where 
it lacks the technical expertise, experience, or processes 
necessary to effectively enforce its current -- and 
eventually expanded -- export control laws.  It has asked the 
United States for assistance in addressing these gaps, 
particularly in helping licensing enforcement officials 
better understand nuclear and dual-use commodities, so they 
can better identify products requiring a license and pursue 
violations when they occur. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The United States and Singapore have agreed to 
pursue an aggressive training program -- including programs 
run by the State Department, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, the Department of 
Defense, and the FBI -- for Singapore Customs and other 
security agencies aimed to improve their ability to 
understand, recognize, and control Strategic Goods. 
Singapore officials have been enthusiastic participants in 
all of the courses offered thus far, and they will be eager 
 
to learn from you about how your organization balances the 
need to control strategic goods with the need to facilitate 
legitimate trade.  They will also benefit from discussions 
about the actual mechanisms of reviewing and approving 
license applications. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Themes for your meetings include: 
 
-- Exchanging best practices on export control implementation; 
-- Expanding the scope of Singapore's control laws; 
-- Improving export control mechanisms; and 
-- Exploring further areas of cooperation. 
HERBOLD